Studies in Law, Politics and Society: Volume 31

Utopia, a term first coined by Sir Thomas More in the sixteenth century, referred to a place of unattainable social perfection. But the appeal of a concept that embraces rather than mocks the imagination has broadened its meanings and uses. In the early twentieth century, Anatole France wrote, “Out of generous dreams come beneficial realities. Utopia is the principle of all progress, and the essay into a better future.” In contemporary vernacular, utopia has come to refer not only to imagining perfection but cures for imperfection. By this definition, any struggle for rights could be conceived as utopian to the extent that it represents a desire to make the world a better place for the would-be beneficiaries. The utopianism of rights envisions conditions in which human dignity can be ensured and vulnerability minimized.

Our point of departure is a reservation concerning the validity of cosmopolitan ideas in response to 9/11. Cosmopolitanism in the social and political sciences plays an important role in the reconstruction of conceptual tools, the diagnosis of the current epoch and the creation of new normative standards. Its key motif, however, that of epochal change from a nationally-based to a cosmopolitan world order, is prematurely dismissive of traditional categories and assimilative of a normative vision. The separation of the present from the past is as overstated as is its conflation with the future.

The present paper attempts to map the discursive relations between conflict and settlement as reflected in the realms of law and mediation during the second half of the 20th century, offering a 21st century model to combine the mediation drive to settle through reaching inter-subjective transformation with the legal drive to escalate and promote social conflict. Contemporary mediation, according to this model, should involve on the one hand “negotiating for justice,” according to the familiar models of problem solving and transformation, and on the other hand “fighting for law”: acknowledging the self-referential and ideological quality of conflicts, while emphasizing the pragmatic need to end them through an interpretive public act that involves value judgments.

The figure of the “Kafkaesque” in law serves often as a stand-in for something like “perverted justice” and ranks prominently among the legal profession as a whole. But we should not soothe ourselves with such obvious clichés surrounding the “Kafkaesque,” rather we must continue to pursue the disturbing challenge Kafka poses for the analysis of the law. It is clear that Kafka’s texts hit a certain nerve of modern law that reaches well beyond these familiar punchlines. It is the task of this article to uncover some of the reasons why Kafka strikes such a strong cord with both legal scholars and people outside of academia alike.

What do crime victims want? The answer suggested by Alexandre Dumas’ iconic character Edmund Dantés in The Count of Monte Cristo suggests that victims may want retribution, not revenge. Victims may seek more than restored honor or personal restitution. They may long for justice to prevail as an affirmation that the world still makes sense. Yet, Dumas also reminds us through the novel that human justice is only human and cannot provide this kind of cosmic guarantee. From this perspective, it is revenge, not retribution that looks more measured and more humane.

Gilles Deleuze and Alain Badiou are two very different philosophers, and yet they touch upon many similar themes. Perhaps most noticeable is their respective concerns for developing philosophical systems free of the concerns of so-called post-modernism. In this paper I look at some of the themes in their work, and consider what might thereby be enabled within thinking about law. In so doing the paper argues that Deleuze’s work is particularly useful, as it allows for a polymorphous practice of thought, appropriately named as “jurisprudence.”