Emerging European Financial Markets: Independence and Integration Post-Enlargement: Volume 6

The history and prospects of European integration are both fascinating and exciting. Analysts of every aspect of this process, including its cultural, economic, financial, historical, political, and social dimensions, should recall that its main rationale remains as it has always been, to permanently end conflict and to secure peace and prosperity for all Europeans. As the European Union's (EU's) own website (see http://europa.eu.int) points out Europe has been the scene of many and frequent bloody wars throughout the centuries. In the 75-year period between 1870 and 1945, for example, France and Germany fought each other three times with huge loss of life. The history of modern European integration commenced in earnest with the realization in the early 1950s that the best way to prevent future conflict is to secure more economic and political integration. This led to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, followed shortly by the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. Since then, the process of integration and enlargement has progressed at varying speeds, but always moving forwards. In 1967, the founding institutions of the EEC were merged to form today's European Commission (EC), the Council of Ministers, and the European Parliament. The members of the European Parliament were initially chosen by the member governments of the EEC, but direct elections commenced in 1979, and have continued every 5 years since then. The Treaty of Maastricht created the EU in 1992 and established the process of economic and monetary union (EMU) that culminated in the introduction of the euro in 12 of the 15 Member States in 2002.

In its recommendation on the 2004 update of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs), the European Commission (2004) issued country-specific recommendations for fiscal policy in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries that have recently joined the European Union (EU) (henceforth the EU-10 countries). All countries except Estonia and Slovenia were urged to reduce their general government deficits, or to pursue low budget deficits in a credible and sustainable way within the multi-annual framework of EU budgetary surveillance. Some countries have received additional recommendations (the Czech Republic to reform its health care and pension systems, Estonia and Lithuania to avoid pro-cyclical policies, and Poland to reform its pension system). Most new Member States will consequently have to reduce their fiscal deficits and/or will have to avoid pro-cyclical fiscal policies to comply with the BEPGs, but also because of the required convergence within the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Bearing in mind that the government balance for the new Member States was –5.7 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2003, the required reduction of fiscal deficits will not be easy. This has been acknowledged by the Commission, which has argued that the need to reach and maintain sound budgetary positions will require an appropriate time path between the necessary consolidation and the appropriate fiscal stance supporting the transition. Particular attention will also need to be given to country-specific circumstances, in particular to initial budgetary positions, to ongoing structural shifts in the new Member State economies, and to the possible risks resulting from current account imbalances and strong credit growth.

Theory suggests that as long as a country runs a balanced budget regime, there is no linkage between fiscal variables and the interest rates. In the case of fiscal expansion that is not sufficiently covered by government revenues, however, the government has two options to finance its deficit: printing money or additional borrowing. Both options lead to an increase in the risk premia on government bonds. One strand of literature focuses on a currency crisis that emerges as a necessary outcome in light of contradictions between fixed exchange rate, and fiscal and financial fundamentals. If government bonds are denominated in domestic currency, the government can reduce their real value by higher inflation or by devaluation of the national currency. In order to bear this risk foreign investors require a currency risk premium. Governments can eliminate the risk of currency devaluation by issuing bonds denominated in foreign currencies, but the default risk remains and it depends on public finances. Another strand of the literature looks at the relation between fiscal variables and government bond yields in the framework of portfolio balance model.

This chapter analyses the operational framework for monetary policy implementation in some central European countries that have recently joined the European Union (EU).¹ For the sake of simplicity, they will be referred to as “non-euro area countries” in the rest of the chapter (although such a classification also includes Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom) which are not analysed here. The analysis is based on public information collected for 2001; since then, the operational framework of these central banks has not changed substantially. Most of the recent changes in the operational framework have taken place in the Eurosystem (or euro area, as it is also commonly known). For this reason, more recent euro area data is reported for 2003 and 2004, and a detailed analysis is made wherever appropriate. The study therefore presents an uptodate comparison of operational frameworks across the countries. The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 examines the characteristics of the minimum reserve system in the euro area. Section 3 examines open market operations, Section 4 examines the standing facilities and Section 5 looks at counterparties. Finally, chapter 6 describes at eligible collateral.

The popular rejection of the European constitution in France and the Netherlands triggered much debate in and around the European Central Bank (ECB) concerning the long-term viability of the euro. The region of European Monetary Union (EMU) member countries has suffered from economic strains for several years: while Germany has been in a severe economic downturn since 2001, and thus its government has implored the ECB to adopt more stimulatory monetary policy, other countries, such as Ireland and Spain, have been in the midst of an economic boom. With the prospect of a slowdown in the political process of forming a United States of Europe, a number of observers and policy-makers have begun to review the long-term viability of the European currency system. In early June 2005, politicians in Italy even publicly contemplated the possibility of leaving the euro-system and re-introducing their domestic currency, thus enabling Italy to conduct its own monetary policy, suitable for its own policy goals. Meanwhile, policy-makers in a large number of East European and Asian countries continue to favour joining the EMU and adopting the euro at the earliest possible date. Given the most recent events and discussions, and after several years of experience with the euro, it may be a suitable time to reconsider some of the potential benefits and disadvantages for new accession countries to join the euro system in the future.

The processes of liberalisation, globalisation and integration have brought new dynamics into banking markets. In an increasingly competitive environment, banks have been forced to refocus their strategies and examine their performance, because their survival in the 21st century will depend on efficiency (Denizer & Tarimcilar, 2001). In recent years, therefore, bank efficiency has received wide attention, and researchers have developed an extensive array of sophisticated methods and tools to estimate efficiency.

The banking sector in the new European Union Member States (NMS)¹ has changed dramatically since the transition from centrally planned to market-based economies.² In 1993, the ratio of average banking assets to gross domestic product (GDP) was 53 per cent, and this had increased to 72 per cent by 2000. However the banking sector in NMS is, however, still relatively small compared to the former European Union 15 (EU-15), for which the same ratio was 140 per cent in 2000. In NMS the level of bank intermediation is also low. In 2000, the ratio of private sector credit to GDP was less than 40 per cent, whereas in the euro area it was 100 per cent. A third distinguishing feature of NMS banks is that foreign investors now dominate ownership. In 1995, 8 per cent of banking assets were in foreign hands, and by 2002 this had increased to 88 per cent.³ In contrast, banks in the former EU-15 are mainly domestically owned or are traded on national stock markets.

The 17 December 2004 was a turning point in both Turkish and European history: The European Council followed the European Commission's recommendation and approved the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey, which commenced on 3 October 2005. The goal of accession to the European Union (EU) has become one of the main driving forces for broadly defined legal, political, economic, and financial reforms in Turkey.²

Financial derivatives markets are a relatively new development globally. In the USA, the first commodity derivatives trading began in Chicago at the Chicago Board of Trade in 1849. However, the first financial derivatives trading did not begin until 1972, when the Chicago Mercantile Exchange began trading futures contracts on seven foreign currencies. These were the world's first official financial futures contracts. In Europe, the oldest financial derivatives market was the London International Financial Futures Exchange, or LIFFE, which began trading financial futures in 1982.

Financial and capital liberalization can play a fundamental role in increasing growth and welfare. Typically, emerging or developing economies seek foreign savings to solve the inter-temporal savings-investment problem. On the other hand, current account surplus countries seek opportunities to invest their savings. To the extent that capital flows from surplus to deficit countries are well intermediated and put to the most productive use, they increase welfare. Liberalization can, however, also be risky, as has been witnessed in many past and recent financial, currency and banking crises. It can make countries more vulnerable to exogenous shocks. In particular, if serious macroeconomic imbalances exist in a recipient country, and if the financial sector is weak, be it in terms of risk management, prudential regulation and supervision, large capital flows can easily lead to serious financial, banking or currency crises. A number of recent crises, like those in East Asia, Mexico, Russia, Brazil and Turkey (described, for example, in International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2001), and, to some extent, the Argentinean Crisis of late 2001, early 2002, have demonstrated the potential risks associated with financial and capital flows liberalization (Prasad et al., 2003).

The growth in euro-denominated bond debt issued by emerging market sovereigns picked up considerably after the Asian currency crises. However, while many emerging market governments now have outstanding euro-denominated issues, the market for this debt remains considerably smaller and less liquid than its US dollar counterpart. This has implications for both investors and sovereigns as they try to balance liquidity and cost of capital considerations against portfolio diversification and exchange rate movements. Broadly speaking, spreads on emerging market bonds across countries tend to move in tandem over time. This chapter takes an introductory look at the market for euro-denominated sovereign debt, and investigates the degree to which spreads on euro-denominated emerging market sovereign debt react to common forces. Following a similar analysis of the US dollar market in McGuire and Schrijvers (2003) (hereafter MS2003), we use principal factor analysis to determine the number of common factors that drive movements in spreads, and then seek to assign meaning to these factors through simple correlations with economic variables.

Romania was a centrally planned economy until 1990. Over 1950 to 1975 large-scale government investments were made into heavy industry and hence productivity increased. Performance was measured against required production quotas rather than quality products that could be exported (Bacon, 2004). Compared to most other Central and Eastern European countries, Romania had little prior experimentation with market practices, so when the change occurred it was even more significant (Bacon, 2004). Romanians initially enjoyed their new economic freedoms and imported consumables previously not permitted. Inflation increased and workers sought higher wages, with consequential negative effects on output (Daianu, 2004). The government also expended large amounts, particularly foreign exchange reserves, prior to elections. Meanwhile, supranationals, such as the International Finance Corporation (IFC), World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), all funded Romania's burgeoning market economy. In 1993, a pyramid-type scheme offering huge returns for money invested for 3 years blossomed and became so large it rivalled gross domestic product (GDP) at the time. Hence the 1990s was a period of instability despite efforts to transform the economy to market practices.

The biggest enlargement of the European Union (EU) took place in May 2004 when 10 new countries (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) joined the union, increasing the number of member states from 15 to 25. Of these newcomers, eight are former Eastern European countries with transition to Western-type market economies. These emerging markets provide increasingly growing investment opportunities and international diversification options for fund managers and individual investors. Well-known features of emerging equity markets are high returns, high volatility, and low correlation with developed markets. Bekaert and Harvey (2002) find that this correlation is on average increasing, particularly for those emerging markets that have liberalised their financial markets. Mateus (2004) finds similar results with EU access countries for recent years. Additional features of emerging markets are sparse data, low liquidity, and large price changes due to political changes or market crashes (e.g. Hwang & Pedersen, 2004).

Over the last few years, Central and East European economies have become more integrated with the West European economy. In general, these economies have become more market-oriented and restrictions on foreign investment have been relaxed. An important step in this development was the admission of eight East European countries to the European Union (EU) in 2004. As the economic ties between Western, Central and Eastern Europe strengthen, one would naturally expect the financial markets to follow suit and become more integrated as well. A good example is the historical case of the Italian and German government bond markets: Before 1999 these two markets differed markedly in terms of credit quality and price volatility, but since the creation of the Euro zone in 1999 they have become highly similar.

After the collapse of communist and socialist regimes at the beginning of 1990s, a number of Central and Eastern European (CEE) economies started their journey into capitalism by establishing private property and capital markets. As a result, a number of stock markets have since been established in the region. Since then, they have displayed considerable growth in size and degree of sophistication, and they have attracted the interest of academics for a number of reasons. First, these markets provide a possibility to re-examine existing asset-pricing models and pricing anomalies in the conditions of the evolving markets. Market efficiency of the CEE markets is tested in Ratkovicova (1999) and Gilmore and McManus (2001); a version of the CAPM is tested in Charemza and Majerowska (2000); Mateus (2004) explores the predictability of European emerging market returns within an unconditional asset-pricing framework while the January-pricing anomaly is studied in Henke (2003). Second, in the light of growing interdependencies between world equity markets due to enhanced capital movements, numerous studies have investigated the extent to which emerging European stock markets are integrated with global markets, and the extent to which they are subjects to global shocks (Gelos & Sahay, 2000; Gilmore & McManus, 2002; Scheicher, 2001). Among the CEE markets, those of the Vysegrad countries (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) have attracted most of the attention of the academics due to their economies faster growth relative to their regional counterparts (Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Croatia and Baltic countries), in addition to political stability and their (successfully realized) prospects of joining the European Union (EU).

Overnight risk is of particular interest for many market participants including traders who provide liquidity to the market, but also to market participants with longer investment horizons who want to determine whether a given risk–return tradeoff can justify possible intermediate portfolio hedging transactions. Overnight risk may in particular play a highly significant role in emerging markets, given that information is incorporated into prices at a slower rate and liquidity may hinder a quick unwinding of portfolio positions.

Many of the emerging and transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have been building their economies largely on the infrastructure inherited from Communist times. It is widely recognized that much of the infrastructure in both the private and public sectors must be replaced if those economies are to achieve acceptable rates of economic growth and participate successfully within the broader European Union (EU) economic zone (The Economist, 2003). Upgrading infrastructure includes the likely importation of technology and management expertise, as well as substantial financial commitments. In this regard, inward foreign direct investment (FDI) is a particularly important potential source of capital for the emerging and transition European economies (ETEEs). FDI usually entails the importation of financial and human capital by the host economy with measurable and positive spillover impacts on host countries’ productivity levels (Holland & Pain, 1998a). The ability of ETEEs to attract and benefit from inward FDI should therefore be seen as an important issue within the broader policy context of how these countries can improve and expand their capital infrastructure, given relatively undeveloped domestic capital markets and scarce human capital.

Understanding economic development in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) requires an analysis of investment in these economies. Previous analyses, however, have focused primarily if not singularly on the role of foreign direct investment (FDI; Akbar & McBride, 2004; Clague & Rausser, 1992; Uhlenbruck & De Castro, 2000). This focus follows that of regional policy-makers, who heavily encouraged FDI through acquisition or greenfield investments (Frydman, Rapaczynski, & Earle, 1993). These policy-makers, however, additionally established stock exchanges in each of their countries. There are now at least 24 operating stock exchanges in CEE and the countries that previously made up the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia.¹ The role of the development of these local stock exchanges in the development (LSED) of local economies (primarily through foreign portfolio investment) has not yet been systematically examined, nor has it been linked explicitly to the role of FDI. Finally, the role of local companies’ listings on foreign exchanges (FSEL) has not been examined in tandem with the role of FDI or LSED (for an examination of the relationship between FDI, LSED, and FSEL, however, see Claessens, Klingebiel, & Schmukler, 2001).

In the enlarged European Union (EU) with 25 members, the free movement of capital, coupled with the free movement of goods and services should be a major direct attraction for both intra-EU and external foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. EU membership does not, however, lead to a linear increase in FDI inflows as many analysts suggest (ECE, 2001). With EU accession, the structure of FDI may change substantially (Hunya, 2000; Dyker, 2001). Activities based on the existence of closed domestic markets (e.g. food and beverages) and on cheap labour (e.g. assembly activities) might be reduced, or even closed down, giving way to more knowledge-intensive activities in the new EU member countries (Kalotay, 2004a). FDI in the new EU member countries is not yet on an uninterrupted growth path. In the pre-accession phase (1995–2003), the relative importance of new EU members in global FDI flows when compared to that of the “old” members of the EU, was actually shrinking. Thus, if new members want to use FDI as one channel for catching up, they have to reverse this trend and increase their inward FDI quite rapidly.

Yusaf Akbar is Associate Professor of International Business at the Southern New Hampshire University, United States. His teaching and research interests are in foreign direct investment, public policy and strategy, and his geographical area interests are in East and Central Europe. He has published widely in peer-reviewed journals including Journal of World Business, Thunderbird International Business Review and World Competition. Yusaf has been Visiting Professor at various schools around the world, including the American University in Bulgaria, ESSCA, the KMBS, the MIB School of Management-Trieste, and Thunderbird.