The fight against corruption and its implications for development in developing and transition economies
The Authors
Edward Fokuoh Ampratwum, Fitzwilliam College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to survey current academic and policy debates on combating corruption and the implications of the various international initiatives on social and economic development in both developing and transition economies.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper reviews a range of published articles (1967-2005), which provide theoretical and practical research on corruption and development. Themes discussed ranged from: conceptualization of corruption, causes of corruption, effects of corruption, perception and measurement of corruption, aid and corruption, and international efforts at combating corruption.
Findings – Provides information on each author's perspectives on corruption, aid and development. The paper generally concedes the wastefulness of corruption. Corruption directly impedes progress towards the common poverty reduction objectives of both donor agencies and aid recipient countries.
Practical implications – A very useful source of information drawing on thoroughly researched papers on corruption and the efforts at ridding society off its effects. The paper provides an impartial motivation to policy makers in re-examining existing international tools for combating corruption in developing and transition economies.
Originality/value – The paper fulfils an identified need to digress from the neo-liberal approach to corruption and adopt a more nuanced and institutional-based reviews of the concept of corruption and consequently efforts (by both governmental and non-governmental international organizations) at combating it. While the paper recognizes that corruption wastes and misallocates resources from the most socially useful projects towards those that are beneficial to bribers and corrupt public officials, it nonetheless asserts that the misguided approaches to corruption only creates more bottlenecks that stifles development in the developing and transition economies.
Article Type:
Research paper
Keyword(s):
Corruption; Bribery; International aid; Economic development; Developing countries.
Journal:
Journal of Money Laundering Control
Volume:
11
Number:
1
Year:
2008
pp:
76-87
Copyright ©
Emerald Group Publishing Limited
ISSN:
1368-5201
Corruption is an insidious plague that has a wide range of corrosive effects on societies, it undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to violations of human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of life, and allows organized crime, terrorism and other threats to human security to flourish (UN Secretary General Kofi Annan).
Introduction
The interest in corruption as a factor affecting development has a long history. Corruption is usually defined as the transgression of formal rules governing the allocation of public resources by officials in response to offers of financial gain or political support. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in his report to the General Assembly charged that:
… this evil phenomenon is found in all countries, rich and poor. The United States, despite its wealth, democracy, and elaborate system of justice, has been experiencing a troubling bout of financial fraud. Corruption, however, hits poor countries especially hard by diverting money away from development (Francis, 2003).
Consequently, fighting corruption is no longer just a moral issue. It has become a major tool in the fight against world poverty (Francis, 2003).
This paper will therefore survey current academic and policy debates on the nature and causes of corruption; consequences or impact of the phenomenon on economic growth, aid flow and development; the forces shaping it at the global level such as the World Bank, OECD, UN, etc.; the international initiatives and efforts aimed at combating the problem as well as the policy implications of these anti-corruption strategies for social and economic development in both developing and transition economies.
Conceptualizing corruption
Since, the mid-1990s, corruption has become an issue of major economic and political significance in many countries across the globe, including a number of developed western states. Corruption scandals are a prominent source of media interests and newspapers frequently publish stories about illicit behavior by politicians and public officials. Partly on account of heightened media attention, there is widespread perception that corruption is on the increase, both among the general public who demand effective action and politicians who are eager to derive political capital by adopting forthright stance over the need to eliminate corrupt practices (Robinson, 2004).
What exactly constitutes corruption?
Economic corruption is the use of public office for private gains where an official (the agent) entrusted with carrying out a task by the public (the principal) engages in some sort of malfeasance for private enrichment which is difficult to monitor for the principal (Bardhan, 1997). Political corruption differs from economic corruption as defined above. Political corruption is defined as the violation of the formal rules governing the allocation of public resources by public officials in response to offers of financial gains or political support (Nye, 1967; Robinson, 2004).
Corruption may be categorized into three main forms: incidental (individual), instrumental (for instance, the public service) and, systemic (societal). In the systemic case, corruption pervades the entire society and in the process becomes routinized and accepted as a means of conducting everyday transactions. This “entrenched” or “systemic” corruption affects institutions and influences individual behavior at all levels of political and socio-economic system (Johnston, 1996). Entrenched corruption features in societies with the following characteristics: low-political competition, low and uneven economic growth, weak civil society and the absence of institutional mechanisms to deal with corruption (Robinson, 2004). It is hoped that at the end of this paper the viability or otherwise of some of these categorizations of Johnston and the Neo-liberal theorists as seen above, would have been adequately examined in the quest to examine the justification for the international fight against corruption in developing and transition economies.
Causes of corruption
While few analysts would dispute a definition of corruption as the abuse of public roles or resources for private benefit, there is little agreement on the nature and causes of corruption (Robinson, 2004). Some of the disagreements emanate from the choice of analytical module or framework employed, since corruption can be analyzed through a range of approaches drawing on different disciplines.
Public-choice theorists point to the fact that government officials with low wages and thus unmotivated might be propelled to expedite tardy bureaucratic matters. The low wages in the civil service largely explain the ubiquity of low-level corruption. The further wage levels in the civil service fall below those in the private sector, the greater the temptation will be to close the gap through unlawful means. It is, however, worth mentioning that while country-level studies and surveys consistently cite low-civil service wages as a major cause of corruption, USAID officials and studies by other donors indicate that increasing civil service pay does not necessarily reduce corruption. Indeed, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report suggests that wage increases must be accompanied with other reforms to be effective.
Besides civil service wages, neo-liberal economists, towing the lines of
However, when the cause of corruption is left at the doorstep of low wages and excessive discretionary powers allocated to bureaucrats as Klitgaard's neo-liberal module postulates, it does follow that when regulatory reform reduces the monopoly and discretionary powers of officials, and greater transparency increases the possibility of being caught, and if higher wages and working conditions are provided, then corruption should decline. But is this always the case? Are the impetuses for corruption the same everywhere?
Outside the neo-liberal approach to understanding corruption, some institutional analysts contend that the legacy of colonial rule is a significant factor in explaining variations in the intensity and prevalence of contemporary forms of corruption in Africa, Asia and Latin America. For instance, it is argued that corruption in Latin America has been an endemic feature since the colonial period and reflects deep socio-cultural traditions that are resistant to change. Others contend that the root cause of corruption lies in the historic dominance of the state in economic and political affairs, a situation which has created opportunities for rent-seeking and weakened the ability of citizens to hold politicians and state officials accountable for their actions (Robinson, 2004, p. 6).
While contemporary manifestations of corruption in Africa cannot be explained by colonialism per se, it is worth emphasizing that colonial regimes left institutional legacies which have shaped the subsequent form and extent of corrupt practices (Robinson, 2004). In the Asian case, the prevalence of corruption appears to be a function of the process of accumulation and evolution of property rights overtime. The patterns of clientalistic relations established between emerging capitalists' classes, politicians and the state bureaucracy reflect underlying socio-economic factors which are the principal determinants of the forms assumed by corruption and its impact on economic growth.
Effects of corruption
The growing concern to develop effective and preferably short-term anti-corruption strategies is partly because corruption has profoundly inegalitarian effects; it damages the interests of the poor most, whether the corruption is “petty” or “grand” in character. In Africa, as elsewhere, corruption often has a “Robin Hood in reverse” character: the losers are likely to be the exceptionally poor, female, and marginalized, whilst the winners are already wealthy and part of an inefficient, swollen state. This corrupt misallocation of resources happens where poverty is a product of unequal wealth distribution and where it is also a consequence of the social exclusion of the poor (Riley, 2004).
Corruption skews public expenditure away from health and education, presumably because they are more difficult to manipulate for bribe purposes than are other projects. Corrupt politicians might be more inclined to spend on fighter aircrafts and large-scale investment projects than on textbooks and teachers' salaries, even though the latter may promote economic growth to a greater extent than the former (Goldsmith,1999). Indeed “all over Africa, there are abandoned roads, factories, and other projects that were constructed primarily because they provided opportunity for corruption” (Azfer et al., 2001).
Corruption has its adverse effects also on growth and investment. Several studies attest to the fact that payment of bribes to get an investment license clearly reduces the incentive to invest (even apart from the composition of investment), in view of the considerations of secrecy and uncertainty (Bardhan, 1997). Empirical evidence based on cross-country comparisons do suggest that the most important channel through which corruption reduces economic growth is by lowering private investment, which accounts for at least one-third of corruption's overall negative effects. At the same time, the remaining two-thirds of the overall negative effects of corruption on economic growth must be felt through other channels, including those mentioned above. While it is difficult to disentangle those other channels, there is some evidence that one of them – the distortion of government expenditure – plays a significant role. Contrary to the above conventional economic theory, the East Asian experience indicates that the intensity of corruption does not necessarily assume an inverse relationship with economic growth. In some context, corruption actually fosters economic growth by facilitating inward investment and by increasing the scope for collecting higher rents through taxation as a consequence (Robinson, 2004). However, even where corruption and economic growth co-exists, pay-offs introduce costs and distortions (Rose-Ackerman, 1999).
Some other studies associate high levels of corruption with lower levels of investment and growth. Corruption reduces the effectiveness of industrial policies and encourages businesses to operate in the unofficial sector in violation of tax and regulatory laws. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is discouraged by high corruption levels. Corruption acts like a tax on FDI. An increase in the corruption levels from the relatively clean Singapore to relatively corrupt Mexico is the equivalent of an increase in the tax rate of over 20 percent points. These findings may however be contested on grounds that the East Asian economies have been characterized by impeccable growth and investment despite the fact that they are fraught with corruption. Besides, China, Brazil, Thailand and Mexico attract large flows of FDI despite their perceived high corruption. Skeptics are, however, quick to retort that the Asian economies are not an exception. Those with high corruption levels would have attracted more FDI if corruption had been lower, and their industrial policies would have been more effective (Rose-Ackerman, 1999).
Corruption may not always be seen as inconsistent with development. At times, it may even foster development. In the last 1970s, Leff argued that:
… corruption may induce an element of competition into what is otherwise a comfortably monopolistic industry … [and] payment of the highest bribes [becomes] one of the principal criteria for allocation. Hence, a tendency toward efficiency is introduced into the system.
Similarly, economist Francis Lit in the 1985 issues of the Journal of Political Economy has asserted:
… bribing strategies … minimized the average value of the time cost of the queue … [and the official] … could choose to speed up the service when bribery is allowed (Kaufmann, 1997, p. 115).
Critiquing the speeding-process argument of Leff and Little, Azfer et al. (2001) assert that the rampant resort to speed money can result in public officials resorting to extortion; “service will be provided only if bribes are paid.” Corrupt officials may instead of speeding up, actually cause administrative delays in order to attract more bribes (Bardhan, 1997). For instance, in India telephone operators moved from expediting calls to failing to bill customers. In Italy, where long bureaucratic delays are the rule, officials often ask for bribes just to do their jobs. As a consequence, the rest of the public suffers even longer holdings.
It would be worth exercising a high degree of circumspection when drawing on empirical results related to a phenomenon such as corruption, which by its very nature is difficult to measure. Two issues that merit special attention in this context are those of causality and the possible role of other forms of institutional inefficiencies.
Perception and measurement of corruption
From the discussion so far, it is obvious attempts to reduce and control corruption are politically salient objectives for social reformers and civil society groups, concerned governments and for a number of aid donors, who have recently developed policies on these issues (Riley, 2004). However, available measures of the level of corruption in a country are all based on the perceptions of observers and participants which raise problems of objectivity and comparability which are fairly serious (Khan and Sundana, 2000). Highlighting the subjectivity of such indices, Bardhan (1997) reports that there is a certain schizophrenic public concern or perception of corruption that argues that the same people who are most vocal and genuinely worried about widespread corruption and fraud in the public arena do not hesitate at all in abusing public resources when it comes to helping out people belonging to their own kinship network. This view, no doubt, consolidates Putnam's study of comparative civicness in the region of Italy, where the amoral individuals in the less civic regions clamor most for sterner law enforcement (Bardhan, 1997).
One of the most common indices used in the measurement of corruption is the German-based
Corruption, aid and development
Over the last few years (mid-1990s), the issue of corruption has attracted renewed interest, both among academics and policy makers. There are a number of reasons why this topic has come under fresh scrutiny. Corruption scandals have toppled governments in both major industrial countries and developing countries. In the transition countries, the shift from command economies to free market economies has created massive opportunities for the appropriation of rents (that is, excessive profits) and has often been accompanied by a change from a well-organized system of corruption to a more chaotic and deleterious one. With the end of the Cold War, donor countries have placed less emphasis on political considerations in allocating foreign aid among developing countries and have paid more attention to cases in which aid funds have been misused and have not reached the poor.
The Washington consensus and political scientists have often proposed two factors as channels for addressing the corruption menace. These are democratization and economic liberalization. Democracy is a necessary condition for eradicating corruption, even if the democracies themselves are not immune from it. Africa must first break from the single party ideology. Unless this can be achieved, poverty-the main cost of corruption can never be eradicated. In theory the creation of democratic political institutions offers the potential for closer scrutiny of the actions of politicians and government officials by citizens, and independent media, NGOs and elected representatives; yet practically do the presence of these bodies and agencies deter the perpetuation of corruption? Are there no examples of thriving corruption in democratic states? On the other hand, are there not many examples of minimal corruption in authoritarian states?
Indeed, some analysts argue that corruption is on the increase as a direct result of democratization. Though democracies have potential to devise institutions through which corruption can be tackled and contained, in reality many new democratic states in Africa, Eastern Europe and Latin America are characterized by high and increasing levels of corruption and that their democratic structures have even proven markedly ineffective in curbing the spread and tenacity of corrupt practices in developing countries (Harris-White and White, 1996
Besides, there is no simple relationship between democracy and the levels of corruption (Glynn et al., 1997). Though democratic rights and processes do not make significant contributions to corruption per se (Johnston, 1996); it is probably fair to argue that democratic regimes, over the long run, engender more powerful antibodies against corruption than systems in which political liberties are stifled (Glynn et al., 1997). Besides, in a democracy not only is the coordination problem in rent-seeking among legislators rendered more difficult but more importantly, democratic institutions build levels which makes it difficult for the networks of corruption to be sustained for long (Bardhan, 1997).
In addition to democratization, the World Bank has argued that the principal way to reduce corruption is to encourage deeper and more thorough economic liberalization and deregulation of borrowers, although reforming and strengthening public institutions are also regarded as important (Riley, 2004). The replacement of discretionary controls over prices and the production and distribution of goods and services with market mechanisms as linked to Klitgaard's propositions in the earlier section of this paper, should limit the scope of rent-seeking behavior by public officials. But drawing on Harris-White and White (1996) institutional approach to corruption, Robinson points out that the experience from developing countries that have undergone some economic liberalization does not provide firm support for the belief that markets can reduce the incidence of corruption. Indeed, economic reforms can have adverse consequences for corruption at least in the short term. For instance, in the absence of adequate enforcement mechanisms, tax reforms designed to increase government revenues can increase incentives for corrupt practices. Again, privatization, for instance, in the absence of effective regulation has the potential for generating high levels of economic rent, especially in natural monopolies, and private appropriation of public assets through illegal means. There as innumerable cases of skyrocketing corruption after reform in South America, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine and Tanzania (Toye and Moore, 2004). However, discounting the salience of Robinson's arguments above, Kaufmann asserts that such reforms are “half-baked, poorly designed, inadequately implemented and that is why they boost corruption.” He contends that “well-designed and properly executed market reforms do not yield corruption.” More so, the absence of economic reform would see elite's interests being more entrenched as their finances might accumulate through monopolistic structures (1997).
Aid and corruption
One of the most difficult policy issues is how to prevent corruption from distorting government expenditure. This important issue goes to the heart of donors' concerns about the possible misuse of aid funds. Donors find it difficult to ensure that aid funds are spent wisely, because resources are fungible. Aid is said to be fungible because the marginal increase in public expenditure in response to an aid inflow is not the expenditure toward which the aid was targeted. Aid tends to free-up resources. As a result, it becomes critical to assess and influence the quality of overall government spending, rather than focus on sectorial spending (Santiso, 2001). For example, a donor may give aid funds to enable the recipient country to build a school, which the recipient may indeed use for that purpose; however, the availability of aid funds to build the school makes it possible for the recipient to use the resulting savings to buy sophisticated weapons, whose purchase may provide more scope for illegally diverting funds into individuals' pockets than school construction could. Specialized NGOs have therefore been established in a number of countries to publicize the problem of corruption and mobilize public concern around cases of malfeasance as a means of provoking an official response. At the international level, there is increasing resolution on the part of inter-governmental bodies such as the OECD and the World Bank to tackle the problem of corruption in response to rising concerns about aid's effectiveness at a time of financial stringency, and to public criticisms (Robinson, 2004).
International efforts at combating corruption
The fight against corruption has only been placed on the international policy agenda since the mid-1990s, despite its long-known effects on democratic institutions and economic and social development. Corruption directly impedes progress towards the common poverty reduction objectives of both donor agencies and aid recipient countries, including the Millennium Development Goals (OECD, 2006). Today, many international organizations are addressing the global and multi-faceted challenge of fighting corruption. The main contribution by the OECD has been in the area of fighting corruption in international business transactions. The 1997 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Official in International Business Transactions, together with the 1996 Recommendations and 1997 Revised Recommendation of the Council on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions were adopted by all OECD countries and five non-OECD countries. It is a legally binding document, the implementation of which is systematically monitored. This convention has since become a powerful tool in controlling international bribery (OECD, 2005a, b, c).
The OECD also supports several regional initiatives to promote anti-corruption actions in non-member countries. The Anti-Corruption Network for Transition Economies one such initiative assists the countries of Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia in their fight against corruption by providing a regional forum for exchanging experience and elaborating best practices. Ministers launched the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan in 2003 to provide targeted support to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Ukraine (OECD, 2005a, b, c).
Efforts by other international organizations and communities such as the World Bank, the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States, and the
The World Bank aims to tie lending more closely to efforts at reducing corruption. A recent bank internal report accepts that “the evidence of systemic corruption in itself is not a reason to withdraw the Bank's support”. Nevertheless, the bank has been examining in detail the ways of using lending to reduce corruption. If corruption is systemic, affecting the bank's projects, and a government is unwilling to act to reduce corruption, the bank now proposes to reduce sharply or stop lending to the government concerned, although it will continue its support of NGOs and civil society organizations in that country (Riley, 2004, p. 137). The latter point, no doubt, betrays the political nature of some of the bank's decisions and the conceptualization of NGOs and other civil society organizations as instruments of foreign interference.
Some other international professional and business organizations have also put the anti-corruption initiative on their agenda. The International Chamber of Commerce issued a recommendation in March 1996 urging its members to adopt rules of conduct designed to limit bribery in international trade. The rules prohibit bribery for any purpose, not just to obtain or retain business. The Council of the International Bar Association adopted a complementary resolution in June 1996. The UNDP AID accountability initiative is considering working with the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions and the International Federation of Accountants to develop projects to strengthen accountability in developing countries (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). In the USA, the American Bar Association has a task force on international standards for corrupt practice, and Business Roundtable has taken up the question of corruption, particularly as it affects government procurement processes throughout the world.
Having looked at the consequences of corruption in both developed and transition economies, the statistical issues in measuring corruption and the anti-corruption strategies outlined above, it is not in anyway inappropriate to question this new interest by international organizations in fighting corruption. Corruption is a domestic political problem and should be left to individual countries. Outsiders' reform efforts such as those of the World Bank or the OECD as discussed above represent an unacceptable attempt to impose “western” values and divert social development issues in developing economies. I concur with cynics of the World Bank that the corruption issue is just another means for the bank to secure its real goal: greater structural adjustment in those states whose adjustment programs have been stymied by political pressures. The bank's new policy plays down other means of reducing corruption (Riley, 2004, p. 138).
Besides, the control of corruption should not be linked to international trade and lending policy. As in the debate over human rights and labor standards, international bodies should not tie trade policy and development assistance to “non-economic” issues. The bank's use of traditional approaches to strengthen good governance in developing countries is misguided. While the principle of conditionality has some legitimizing arguments, it is open to criticism as to the way it is applied and its ultimate effectiveness in achieving its intended objectives. Evidence from South-East Asia and Latin America demonstrates the inability of conditionality to act as a credible mechanism to induce policy reform; more to the point, conditionality cannot substitute or circumvent domestic ownership of and commitment to reform (Santiso, 2001). Ultimately, the World Bank and associated international organizations ought not develop one template based on “best practice” to be applied to all countries. Culture and history – as well as current economic and social conditions – influence both the nature of the problem and the kinds of solutions that make sense.
Conclusion
Since, the mid-1990s, a remarkable number of governmental and non-governmental international bodies have acted or called for action on corruption. However, the debate on corruption, aid, economic liberalization and democratization needs a more precise focus. It is important to ask more specific questions that need to be considered. What types of corruption are the most damaging? Can corruption be unambiguously identified in all cultures? (Azfer et al., 2001) What are the relationships between corruption and poverty and how can an effective, enabling state act to reduce corruption and through this assist in poverty alleviation? What forms of anti-corruption strategies are likely to be most effective in the short-and long-term (without becoming additional costs of transaction, slowing or diverting attention from social development?) (Riley, 2004) These pertinent questions will have to be critically considered if the international war on corruption and subsequently “good governance” will attract support from governments and civil societies in both developing and transition economies.
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Further Reading
Abdul Aziz, T. (n.d.), "Civil society in the fight against corruption", available at: unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN002891.pdf, .
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OECD (2003), "Fighting corruption: what role for civil society? The experience of the OECD", OECD, Paris, OECD Publications (00 2003 13 1 P) – No. 82021 2003, available at: www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/ (accessed March 25, 2007), .
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W. (1993), "Corruption", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 108 pp.599-617.
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W. (1994), "Politicians and firms", Quarterly Journal of Economics, November, .
Tanzi, V. (1995), "Corruption, arm's length relationships, and markets", in Fiorentini, G., Peltzman, S. (Eds),The Economics of Organized Crimes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp.161-80.
Corresponding author
Edward Fokuoh Ampratwum can be contacted at: fokuoh2001@yahoo.co.uk