Collusion and collective action in the patent system: A proposal for patent bounties

Welcome:
Guest

Advances in the Study of Entrepreneurship, Innovation & Economic Growth

ISSN: 1048-4736
Series editor(s): Sherry Hoskinson and Donald Kuratko

Subject Area: Enterprise and Innovation

Content: Series Volumes | Current Volume RSS

Options: To add Favourites and Table of Contents Alerts please take a Emerald profile

Document Information:
Title:	Collusion and collective action in the patent system: A proposal for patent bounties
Author(s):	John R. Thomas
Volume:	13 Editor(s): Gary D. Libecap ISBN: 978-0-76230-822-4 eISBN: 978-1-84950-123-1
Citation:	John R. Thomas (2001), Collusion and collective action in the patent system: A proposal for patent bounties, in Gary D. Libecap (ed.) Entrepreneurial inputs and outcomes: New studies of entrepreneurship in the United States (Advances in the Study of Entrepreneurship, Innovation & Economic Growth, Volume 13), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp.95-132
DOI:	10.1016/S1048-4736(01)13006-7 (Permanent URL)
Publisher:	Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Article type:	Full length article
Abstract:	Persistent commentary contends that the Patent Office is issuing patents that appropriate public domain concepts at an alarming frequency. This article describes the forces that have rendered the Patent Office an increasingly porous agency. It next reviews existing proposals for improving patent quality, including the conventional wisdom that an opposition system would contribute meaningfully to the solution of our patent quality problem. This article instead proposes that the Patent Office recruit members of the public to act as private patent examiners. By awarding informants with a bounty assessed against applicants, the Patent Office can reduce the social costs of the patent system.