Does Public Debt Discipline Managers and Controlling Owners?

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Advances in Financial Economics

ISSN: 1569-3732
Series editor(s): Professor Kose John, Professor Anil Makhija, Professor Stephen P. Ferris

Subject Area: Economics

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Document Information:
Title:	Does Public Debt Discipline Managers and Controlling Owners?
Author(s):	Willem Schramade, Peter Roosenboom
Volume:	14 Editor(s): Kose John, Anil K. Makhija ISBN: 978-0-85724-915-9 eISBN: 978-0-85724-916-6
Citation:	Willem Schramade, Peter Roosenboom (2011), Does Public Debt Discipline Managers and Controlling Owners?, in Kose John, Anil K. Makhija (ed.) International Corporate Governance (Advances in Financial Economics, Volume 14), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp.43-63
DOI:	10.1108/S1569-3732(2011)0000014005 (Permanent URL)
Publisher:	Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Article type:	Chapter Item
Abstract:	This chapter investigates whether shareholders of firms that enter bond markets for the first time benefit from a reduction in free cash flows or suffer from controlling owners keeping a lock on control. We analyze an international sample of 225 bond initial public offerings (IPOs) from 37 countries. We find that announcement returns are higher for firms with higher free cash flows and lower for firms with controlling owners that have majority control. These effects depend on the level of legal shareholder protection. We find that the disciplinary power of public debt is more important in countries with strong shareholder protection. In countries with weak shareholder protection, the negative lock on control effect dominates.