The role of local communities in peacebuilding in post-ethnic conflict in a multi-cultural society

Introduction

A dramatic increase was observed in the cases of ethnic conflicts in the multi-cultural society of Indonesia, especially after the end of the New Order era in 1998 (Aspinall, 2011; Al-Qurtuby,2012/2013). In Lampung, from 2010 to 2016, several types of conflicts took place, such as spontaneous crimes, acts of vigilantism and other crimes that often developed into ethnic conflicts (Hartoyo, 2016). In addition, a prominent culture of vigilantism prevailed. People hold low trust in the legal systems of local communities, which makes them seek justice in their own way. Many crimes committed by a few individuals quickly evolved into acts of collective violence, such as vigilantism, resulting in escalation, retaliation and a cycle of ethnic conflicts (Barron and Madden, 2004). However, Indonesia has a diversity of wisdoms as a social capital that contributes positively to both violence prevention and conflict resolution. These include the “Muakhi” tradition in Lampung (Hartoyo, 2019), the “Pela Gandong” tradition in Maluku (Bakri, 2015) and the “Tepung Tawar” tradition in South Sumatra (Alfitri and Hambali, 2013).

According to Widyaningsih and Kuntarto (2019), local wisdom is shared by all ethnic groups. Pancasila as the state ideology is an instrument of increasing tolerance between ethnic groups in Indonesia (Singgih, 2016). Karo Batak people tend to use customary laws to resolve conflicts (Kaban and Sitepu, 2017). Asmara (2018) concluded that Sasak people on the island of Lombok have principles of local values to maintain social harmony. In an effort to build peace, according to Sudjatmiko (2008), several stages involving various social and governmental organisations, both local and national, were assessed. Since 2012, the role of local communities and local wisdom in peacebuilding has been strengthened by the issuance of Law No. 7 of 2012 concerning handling of social conflicts. This strategic policy is an effort to support the shift of development paradigm towards bottom-up to improve the community welfare (Hartoyo, 2018).

So far, various peacebuilding efforts have been made by the community; however, there are still some weaknesses. Some of the drawbacks include the lack of appreciation for the role of the grassroots peace actors (Al-Qurtuby, 2012/2013), exclusivism and elitism in the peace process (Bräuchler, 2009) and failure of the anti-violence education methods (Noel et al., 2006). In fact, a lot of violence emerged in areas that were previously considered to be peaceful and there were renewed outbreaks in cases considered to have been previously resolved (Hartoyo, 2016). Meanwhile, Wilson (2005, p. 12) identified other faults as follows:

• peacekeeping is not integrated with development, particularly in post-conflict areas;

• humanitarian aid from both the local government and international organisations is unrelated to the peacekeeping efforts;

• there is a lack of physical protection and legal certainty in cases of repeated violence; and

• there is weak and inflexible coordination among governmental agencies, especially in terms of budgetary matters.

To overcome these weaknesses, a number of other studies have recommended several peacebuilding strategies, especially in rural areas. Maddison and Diprose (2017) stressed the importance of effective dialogue to gain political/institutional support, which can be mobilised by local actors who have the legitimacy and trust of the conflicting parties. Parker (2014) underlined the importance of religious education in schools to foster tolerance and understanding. Meanwhile, according to Pfefferbaum et al. (2017), the youth are the main constituents of a community that are absolutely involved in the peace process and increase the resilience of the community in general. Smith’s (2014) study suggested the use of a “hybrid political order” approach for peacebuilding in communities that are facing many types of conflicts. Some other recommendations are to improve the quality of communication between the government and the society (Rohmad et al., 2016); increase the density of local religious institutions (Juan et al., 2015); involve non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Afrizal, 2015; Shea, 2016); to have good governance (Daris et al., 2017); optimise social, cultural and economic factors to improve social adhesiveness and integration and improve the effectiveness of customary laws (Suprapto, 2015).

So far, there have been only few studies on the role of local communities in creating peace after inter-ethnic conflicts in a multi-cultural society. Most studies focus on the role of the state and civil society in peacebuilding, paying less attention to the role of local communities (Orjuela, 2003). The structural approach has not yet been able to explain or prevent ethnic conflicts, especially in the medium and short term. In a few micro-scale studies, a psychosocial approach has been used. According to Bahtiar (2012), the psychosocial ways that are currently used include measuring the formation of cross-ethnic groups, involvement in social and developmental activities, assimilation and amalgamation development. The socio-cultural approach is very important in peacebuilding trough local wisdom, including through the art of music (Wu, 2018).

Lampung Province is a prototype of a multi-cultural society because it represents an area of transmigration and also is a destination for voluntary migration from various regions of Indonesia. Consequently, Lampung exhibits ethnic problems, such as political identity, prejudice, ethnic stereotypes, ethnocentrism, intolerance, social conflicts, ineffective peace making and failed reconciliation. These problems have remained within the community in spite of the various resolution efforts. Sociologically, a number of previous studies showed the complexity of the relationships among those variables (Alfitri and Hambali, 2013; Allen and Barter, 2016; Mavridis, 2015; Roth and Sumarto, 2015).

Ethnic conflicts in local communities raise a number of major theoretical questions, such as whether those conflicts decrease tolerance among communities, decrease the influence of the unifying symbol, cause a lack in community involvement in the peacebuilding process or cause public alienation in the decision-making process. The role of the locals, who live in villages that experienced conflicts, in strengthening peace efforts in post-ethnic conflicts needs to be explored, especially in a multi-cultural society like that of Indonesia. This research was conducted in Lampung Province, analysing the relationship between socio-demographic variables (age, gender, educational level, ethnicity and socio-economic status (SES) and tolerance (ethnic and religious) and the relationship between the variables of ethnic tolerance (ET), religious tolerance (RT) and voluntary activities of peacebuilding (VAP), by taking into account local community participation and local wisdom for strengthening social harmony in post-ethnic violent conflicts.

Methods

This study used a survey method that was conducted in five regencies of Lampung Province, namely, South Lampung, Central Lampung, East Lampung, North Lampung and Tanggamus. From each regency, two villages that experienced one or more ethnic conflicts were sampled. Peaceful villages were not selected as case samples to obtain data on local community participation in peacebuilding in post-ethnic violent conflicts. During a period of 15 years (2000–2014), the highest rate of ethnic conflicts occurred in the past five years, with the assumption that the local community participation in peacebuilding can be known.

Data on ethnic conflicts and conflicting villages are based on the results of a 2016 research conducted by the Lampung Province Social Service (Hartoyo, 2016). The villages had similar demographic characteristics (educational level and gender) and had relatively similar cultural diversity. According to Barron and Madden (2004:6), all the social conflicts that ever happened belong to the category of vigilantism. About 50 people were chosen randomly from each village and answered a questionnaire that was designed according to the local context. Enumerators were selected from among professionals with skill and experience. The survey was designed specifically to determine the relationships between socio-demographic variables and ET, RT and the level of participation in peacebuilding. About 50 interviews were carried out in each village, yielding a total sample of 500 respondents.

The socio-demographic variables in this study were age, gender, educational level, SES and ethnicity. Age was calculated from the date of birth. Gender was a dummy variable, in which males were coded as “2” and females as “1”. Education was taken as the respondents’ highest level of formal education: basic education was given a score of 1, secondary education (junior high school and senior high school) was given a score of 2 and higher education was given a score of 3. SES was measured via the respondents’ income level, with categories of monthly income below IDR (Indonesian Rupiah) two million = low (score 1), between IDR two and IDR six million = moderate (score 2) and above IDR six million = high (score 3). Ethnicity was a dummy variable in which the dominant ethnicity (Java) was coded as “2” and non-dominant ethnicities (non-Java) were coded as “1”. Tolerance (ET and RT) and VAP were measured on a Likert scale, with five answer options.

In order to strengthen the explanation of quantitative data, in-depth interviews were also conducted with 50 residents, five informants from each of 10 villages. The informants comprised community leaders or traditional leaders, local police officers (Bhabinkamtibmas), local military officers (Babinsa) and district government officials.

Results

Discussion

In this study, we found that inter-ethnic relationships in everyday life are still tainted by some negative feelings, such as jealousy, suspicion, resentment, anger, hostility, dissatisfaction and injustice. These negative feelings are considered to be latent conflicts that can possibly become open conflicts any time.

In conflict management, there is a need to keep this latent conflict productive by expanding an early warning system. The Po-Keung (2014) study suggested the need to institutionalise the values of equality, acceptance and peace in living together, regardless of religious, social, cultural and other racial differences.

A number of studies showed that there are many factors affecting the level of tolerance, including education (Roth and Sumarto, 2015), self-control (Bettelheim and Janowitz, 1949), ethnic diversity (Mavridis, 2015), religious practice (Allen and Barter, 2016), urbanisation (Nizah, 2015), the laws governing the acquisition and expression of citizenship (Weldon, 2006) and the duration and level of democracy (Hazama, 2014). Those factors can help in studying the dynamics of the lives of multi-cultural societies in Indonesia, especially in Lampung Province. Diversification of ethnic and religious groups, urbanisation and institutionalisation of dominant cultures into the rule of law can comprise a potential conflict; these need to be managed so that they can function in minimising ethnic and religious segregation and in preventing and overcoming the occurrence of ethnic conflict.

The results of the present study show that, first, the variable of education does not affect the degree of ET and RT. These results show that the variable of formal education does not work. Tule (2000), for example, made it clear that positive cultural values (local and national) are socialised through both formal and informal education. In the context of conflict management in a multi-cultural society, internalisation of values of tolerance to the local community can serve to strengthen early warning systems.

Second, the variable of ethnicity affects RT, in which the dominant ethnicity tends to have higher tolerance compared to the non-dominant one. Javanese migrants constitute the dominant population in Lampung Province, through both transmigration and voluntary migration in the past. Most Javanese migrants to Lampung Province were from the lower class, instead of the “gentry” or “nobility” (upper class). The lower class were flexible in their migration destinations and their tolerance of other ethnic groups tended to be higher. Resistance of indigenous ethnic groups to ethnic immigrants occurs not only because of using up economic resources, but also because of the conflicts between different religious values. Tolerance becomes more difficult when ethnic differences are reinforced by religious differences or constructed in different socio-cultural conditions. The reality is that psychosocial distances are more widespread in inter-religious relationships compared to different religions. Prejudice is part of the expression of dissatisfaction of inter-ethnic relationships that are embedded in negative feelings.

In Addition, the findings of the present study reinforce those of previous studies. For instance, in a study conducted by Brewer and Pierce (2005), it was indicated that individuals who have cross-sectoral category structures and multiple social identities with multi-cultural awareness provide an effective start to reduce social prejudice. In a study conducted by Clobert et al. (2017), the authors explored the tolerance of contradiction and the possible emotional mechanisms in bridging the relationship between religiosity and prejudice versus tolerance. The results of that study showed that there was a difference in tolerance between in-groups and out-groups based on the different ethnic and religious backgrounds.

Third, the variable of gender affects ET; men show higher tolerance than women do. This finding is related to ethnic prejudice and to the freedom of inter-ethnic relationships. Men in rural areas are more free to deal with members of other ethnic groups compared to women. Women have more limited interaction with members of other ethnic groups, so ethnic prejudice tends to survive longer in women’s perception. At the substantive level, women’s position and movement in the social world are more limited compared to men. However, if the variable of gender were related to the variable of education, there would be no difference in the tolerance levels between men and women.

Other socio-demographic variables like age and SES do not affect ET and RT. Given the high rating of ET and RT, ET is still higher than RT. Similarly, in a study conducted by Janmaat and Keating (2017), it was found that young people are less tolerant of ethnic and religious differences compared to their parents. Many horizontal violence actors are young people; in some cases, violent conflicts are supported by parents of various SESs (even indigenous leaders and local community leaders). In the context of local communities in rural areas, there is no room for tolerant attitudes if religious values remain absolute for some adherents. For some Muslims, accepting an invitation from adherents of other religions (especially Hindus) raises concerns about being served haram (religiously illicit) food. Additionally, for many Muslims, helping in building a house of worship for another religion is “beyond the pale” (beyond the limits of tolerance). Most Muslims argue that tolerance is only for worldly affairs. Donating or helping in building alien houses of worship is a matter of “the hereafter” that could undermine their faith.

Our results indicate that, apparently, a high level of ET and RT does not guarantee peace. This finding was reinforced by the study of Abrahms (2008), who stated that structural pressure and cultural segregation influence intolerant views and are more permissive to violent behaviour. In reality, violent conflicts between groups (vigilantism) in this research area are mostly inter-ethnic conflicts. Even though the data show that men have higher ET than women, the perpetrators are mostly men, especially young men. Nevertheless, many violent conflicts involve the elderly and even traditional leaders and religious figures. Such conflicts begin with crimes such as theft and robbery committed by members of one ethnic group against the members of another ethnic group not too far away. Mass repression (vigilante violence) often follows, so the perpetrators, if caught or their surrogates are seriously injured or killed. The reaction of revenge is not spontaneous but is deliberated through a process of coordination and only with the consent of the elders and the local traditional leaders. At this point, the national high level of tolerance becomes irrelevant.

Fourth, local community participation in peacebuilding is influenced by RT and ET and is not focused on specific socio-demographic characteristics. The community leaders were more intensive in peacebuilding than gross-road. Inter-ethnic networks and trust are built to enhance the social capital and social cohesion, by a functioning local wisdom called “Muakhi” (brotherhood) as a cultural approach (Hartoyo, 2019). This approach is facilitated by stakeholders, especially state apparatus and civil society organisations. Community leaders are mostly active in several social organisations consisting of diverse socio-cultural backgrounds. Local elites are more likely to enter into cross-cutting affiliations and have cross-cutting loyalties; however, on the other hand, they are obliged to maintain their ethnic identity and religious groups.

In reality, participation of local communities in peacebuilding is generally limited and, therefore, does not guarantee peace. Views and attitudes of intolerance still remain in inter-ethnic and religious relationships; this indicates the presence of negative feelings among people by maintaining the “in-group” and “out-group” identity. Strengthening the identity of ethnic communities occurs through settlement homogeneity, traditional languages and traditions and other socio-cultural aspects that are typical of being the medium of survival for negative feelings among them. Another way to build peace is through celebrating national holidays by displaying cultural diversity and respecting creativity. The participants included all villages in each sub-district and district. The results of Krasniqi’s (2019) study on the role of open fun football in peacebuilding in post-conflict societies are apparently not suitable to be applied in Indonesia, especially in Lampung Province, which has different socio-cultural characteristics.

At the level of peacebuilding, initiatives to provide information to the security forces, for example, are not widely practised by the community members. This occurs because such actions need commitment and a high level of social sensitivity. An action that is still required is to provide an understanding of the values of peaceful cultures to others. Another action that is also required is to establish a cross-ethnic and religious social organisation that allows its members to be in the position of cross-cutting affiliations; for example, “Rembuk Pekon” is an institution of village deliberation that was built by a local community with diverse ethnic and religious values. Other peaceful actions are still institutionally limited and cannot be done systematically and structured through local policy.

Referring to the terms introduced by Davies and Gurr (1998, pp. 4-5), peacebuilding does not qualify to be an effective early action. It needs multi-stakeholder readiness to be mobilised into an effective early action. Political will, an institutional framework and policies also need to be developed for peacebuilding. In short, effective peacebuilding needs to be supported by early warning and early response systems. Early warning not only helps make predictions but also anticipates the emergence of conflict. Preventive actions are based on controlling the indicators of increased tension and on taking steps to facilitate precautions (Haider, 2014).

In the pre-ethnic conflict period, the moral and socio-cultural values underlying inter-ethnic relationships eroded. These values included mutual assistance, tolerance, mutual respect, togetherness, mutual appreciation, equality of access to resources, mutual trust and local cultural values. These values are known in each ethnicity on a normative level but are not reflected in everyday life practices. The weakness of inter-ethnic relationships was immediately corrected in the post-peace period through a reconstruction programme for strengthening community participation and revitalising the role of local institutions. Implementing peacebuilding programmes at the village and sub-district levels has been supported by various parties, such as ministries, local government, local security apparatus (Babinsa), local police (Bhabinkamtibmas), universities and NGOs.

It has been found in a number of studies that the peacebuilding process, especially at the preventive stage, is systematic and structured and considers the importance of multi-stakeholders (Hauge et al., 2015). The results of a study conducted by Hartoyo (2016) showed that the role of local community leaders is more prominent in efforts to stop conflict and less prominent in efforts to prevent conflict. This study also reinforces the finding that social media plays an important role in changing the knowledge, attitudes and behaviours of citizens regarding participating in peacebuilding (Best et al., 2012). From the gender perspective, the results of this study also reinforce those of Arostegui (2013) on the role of women in peacebuilding, which did not differ significantly from that of men.

Conclusion

In this study, we explained the influence of socio-demographic characteristics, tolerance (ET and RT) and VAPs in multi-cultural local communities after violent conflict between ethnic groups (and religions). The results showed that, first, the degree of tolerance in multi-cultural society is not specifically concentrated in the socio-demographic characteristics. Factors such as gender, educational level, age and SES do not affect ET and RT. This finding reinforces the opinion that socio-cultural factors are more dominant in increasing the degree of ET and RT after violent conflict in multi-cultural local communities.

The results also showed that ET affects RT. The dominant ethnicity tends to be more tolerant or open in relation to other ethnic groups, both of the same or different religions. Javanese Muslims are more open in relation to other ethnicities than Balinese Hindus. On the other hand, a certain ethnic group of the same religion that lives in a village is more closed or less tolerant than an ethnic group that lives heterogeneously with various other ethnic groups. These ethnic groups tend to develop psychosocial distance (prejudice and stereotyping) against other groups, especially if accompanied by different religions. This reality reinforces the conclusion that a high degree of ET and RT in the lives of multi-cultural societies does not guarantee sustainable peace if not managed properly.

Local community participation in peacebuilding during post-ethnic violence conflict is not influenced by the socio-demographic characteristics but is influenced by ET and RT. This finding shows that the socio-cultural approach based on local wisdom is the main strategy in peacebuilding in post-ethnic (and religious) violent conflict in multi-cultural societies. Weakness of inter-ethnic relationships soon improves in the post-peace period through the reconstruction of social and cultural factors to strengthen social cohesion and social capital at the local community level by involving various stakeholders.

Acknowledgement

This work was fully supported by Universitas Lampung, Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education, Government of Indonesia, through a research grant.