Attribute-based product reputation as a market signal: examining product safety recalls in the US auto industry

This study examines how firm product reputation functions as an internal and external expectations-setting mechanism shaping firm and external stakeholder behavior.

Longitudinal analysis of 17,879 recalls from 15 automobile manufacturers operating in the United States between 1967 and 2016.

Applying the behavioral theory of the firm (BTF) and signaling theory, this study’s findings suggest that product safety reputation creates variability in the likelihood of both voluntary and government-ordered recalls.

Performance expectations set by past product performance influence managerial decision-making such that products with a higher reputation for quality are more likely to be voluntarily recalled than are their less reputable counterparts. Similarly, regulators are more likely to order the recall of higher reputation products, suggesting that past product performance also influences enforcement behavior. Finally, the scope and severity of product defects are shown to interact with product reputation to influence the likelihood of government-ordered recall.

Firms and firm stakeholders make distinct decisions based on performance variations within firm product portfolios.

Overall firm reputation is important, but there are distinct dynamics that result in product performance variability within firm product portfolios that have important implications on issues such as product safety recalls.

This study's findings reveal that as an internal signal, managers' expectations of product performance can change their behavior following product safety defects. Specifically, voluntary product recalls are more likely for higher-reputation products than those with lower reputations for product safety. This suggests that firm behavior regarding product safety recalls is not consistent within their own product lines. Externally, this study’s findings suggest that product reputation also influences relationships with key stakeholders. Product reputation for quality was shown to be associated with an increased likelihood of government sanctions. Regulators will also be more likely to initiate punitive sanctions against higher-reputation products as the severity and scope of safety defects increase. Under such circumstances, higher-reputation products are more likely to face government sanctions than lower-reputation products. Hence, government regulatory behavior is subject to influence from performance signals such as product reputation.