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Are boards and institutional investors active monitors? Evidence from CEO dismissal

Annita Florou (Department of Accounting and Finance, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece)
Peter Pope (Department of Accounting and Finance, Lancaster Management School, Lancaster, UK)

Managerial Auditing Journal

ISSN: 0268-6902

Article publication date: 10 October 2008

1482

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the turnover‐performance relation depends on the proportion of outside directors and institutional ownership concentration and to explore the relative roles of accounting‐ and stock‐based performance measures in the process of CEO dismissals.

Design/methodology/approach

Probit analysis using an unbalanced panel of the top 460 UK listed companies from 1990 to 1998 was employed.

Findings

No evidence of effective board monitoring was found. On the other hand, evidence of institutional shareholder activism was found. In particular, when institutional concentration is high, the turnover‐performance link is more negative in relation to stock returns but less negative in relation to accounting performance. This is consistent with institutional investors using a richer set of information than that contained in reported accounting earnings.

Research limitations/implications

Further research may examine the effect of board monitoring on the turnover‐performance relation after considering the endogeneity of board structure and membership. Moreover, further research may examine the complementarity of the two governance mechanisms considered, i.e. the board of directors and institutional investors.

Originality/value

In the aftermath of Enron and other corporate frauds world‐wide, the paper exploits a unique dataset of institutional ownership and provides additional evidence on the controversial role of boards and institutional investors in replacing inefficient CEOs, as well as on the role of accounting information in the effectiveness of governance processes.

Keywords

Citation

Florou, A. and Pope, P. (2008), "Are boards and institutional investors active monitors? Evidence from CEO dismissal", Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 23 No. 9, pp. 862-872. https://doi.org/10.1108/02686900810908427

Publisher

:

Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2008, Emerald Group Publishing Limited

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