Probing on the institutional arrangements of supervisory functions in the governance of listed companies in China

This paper aims to explore the extent of adequacy and confidence that can be enjoyed by minority shareholders in the supervisory controls on Boards in listed companies in China.

This study draws upon the legislative controls and case‐studies in China.

Being the cornerstone of the development of capital markets, listed companies are in complementary relationship with the latter, which in turn serves as the financing tool for the former. Recently, the financial markets all over the world have been thrown into deep crisis and the financing functions of the domestic capital markets have almost been paralyzed. In this context, it is high time for us to exert more efforts to improve the institutional arrangements of the supervisory functions in the governance of listed companies in China, to strengthen corporate governance, to restrain the actions and behaviors of major shareholders, directors and the executives, to strengthen their concerned responsibilities, to put greater attention and more protection on the promotion of minor shareholders' confidence on capital markets, and to maintain the steady and sustainable development of capital markets in the long run.

This study and findings should be of interest to those seeking to assess the adequacy of minority protection in China.