Bank asset allocation: the effectiveness of market monitoring
Journal of Advances in Management Research
ISSN: 0972-7981
Article publication date: 28 October 2013
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to study the effectiveness of market discipline on banks’ risk-taking behavior based on how swiftly banks respond to market information.
Design/methodology/approach
A simplified incentive model provides the necessary justification for two types of market disciplines: first, monitoring by uninsured market participants, and second, risk premium in terms of interest spread required by risk-averse depositors. Panel data regression is carried out for both surviving and failed US banks for the period 1999:Q4-2007:Q3 to examine the role of market discipline, bank capital, and macroeconomic shocks.
Findings
The paper finds that banks which failed during 2007:Q4-2010:Q4 suffered from fundamental weaknesses in their asset quality relative to the surviving banks prior to the crisis.
Originality/value
The paper focusses on two questions: In what circumstance does market monitoring exist? And how can market incentives affect banking firms’ actions? The first question is studied in a simplified incentive model that provides justification for two types of market discipline. Given that, the effectiveness of market discipline is empirically tested, using the US banking data in the period leading up to a surge in the number of bank failures in 2007-2010. The paper's results show that failed institutions with large size were relatively less responsive to early warning signals of declining uninsured deposits and rising deposit spread.
Keywords
Citation
W.Y. Wang, G., Mahajan, A. and P. Kishan, R. (2013), "Bank asset allocation: the effectiveness of market monitoring", Journal of Advances in Management Research, Vol. 10 No. 3, pp. 376-398. https://doi.org/10.1108/JAMR-07-2013-0046
Publisher
:Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Copyright © 2013, Emerald Group Publishing Limited