The Political Economy of Chinese Finance: Volume 17

The paper provides an overview of material helpful in placing the subsequent papers in context, as well as a summary of the research contributions made by the individual papers themselves.

We begin with a timeline of China’s Economic Reform, including both major events that permitted the opening and expansion of the nation’s economy, and important milestones of the historical movement. We then consider the impact of philosophy and culture (particularly, Confucianism and socialism) on China’s society and government, which leads naturally to certain observations regarding the political-economic model in which state-owned enterprises play a central role. In the final section, we briefly summarize the contents of the remaining papers.

This paper extends our understanding of the concept and global practice of political economy.

The paper sets out the limits of conceptual analysis regarding political economy. It then applies Heidegger’s theory of metaphysics to the cultures of China and the West.

It is possible to construct an account of Confucianism metaphysics which contrasts with modern western metaphysics. The paper suggests some implications of the contrast.

The paper is exploratory and broad-brush. It suggests the potential of further systematic enquiries.

National and business leaders seek to understand the global business environment. This requires insights into the nature of culture and the foundations of cultures. The paper provides a way to make sense of national aspirations and global political/business responses to changed circumstances.

The paper continues a research programme which seeks to explicate Chinese decision-making and relate it to the western decision-making. It is the first paper to use Heidegger’s concept of metaphysics in relation to Confucianism.

We take a state-stewardship view on corporate governance and executive compensation in economies with strong political involvement, where state-appointed managers act as responsible “stewards” rather than “agents” of the state.

We test this view on China and find that Chinese managers are remunerated not for maximizing equity value but for increasing the value of state-owned assets.

Managerial compensation depends on political connections and prestige, and on the firms’ contribution to political goals. These effects were attenuated since the market-oriented governance reform.

Economic reform without reforming the human resources policies at the executive level enables the autocratic state to exert political power on corporate decision making, so as to ensure that firms’ business activities fulfill the state’s political objectives.

As a powerful social elite, the state-steward managers in China have the same interests as the state (the government), namely extracting rents that should adhere to the nation (which stands for the society at large or the collective private citizens).

As China has been a communist country with a single ruling party for decades, the ideas of socialism still have a strong impact on how companies are run. The legitimacy of the elite’s privileged rights over private sectors is central to our question.

Chinese executive compensation stimulates not only the maximization of shareholder value but also the preservation of the state’s interests.

Much of the criticism directed toward banking in China revolves around self-dealing in relationships between bankers and their clients. Corruption, nepotism, high levels of non-performing loans, and the inefficiency of government-directed lending have all been laid at the door of embedded guanxi networks. While valid to an extent, this criticism ignores two important, related points: guanxi networks bring disciplining mechanisms as well as the potential for corruption, and those mechanisms may improve banking governance.

Employing theory from relationship banking, information economics, and the business ethics of guanxi, I examine how monitoring by netizens will lead to greater disclosure.

Relationship banking in a Chinese context – with the influence of guanxi in banking – further increases reputational costs when self-dealing is uncovered. Costs of bad banking behavior are increasing just as benefits from staying rich increase. Increased disclosure affects chances of staying rich as disclosure increases the chance that a corrupt relationship will lead to loss of wealth and reputation.

This paper presents a theoretical construct informed by selected examples. An empirical analysis of netizen monitoring leading to improved banking governance would provide additional support for the theoretical construct.

Bankers, financiers, and government officials must be aware of monitoring by netizens, which forces more ethical financial contracting.

Rather than weakening financial system governance, guanxi may begin to strengthen the disciplinary measures inherent in relationship banking as information disclosure increases and private sector monitoring grows.

This paper provides an extension to private monitoring theory in financial contracting which may be applied to netizen monitoring in other regions and countries.

This paper investigates CEO turnover and the usefulness of relative performance evaluation (RPE) as a management incentive in an emerging economy lacking market-based competition.

In a sample of China’s listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from the period 2001 to 2005, we manually collect the data where a CEO has gone after being removed by reading the annual reports of the firms and searching the major news and business publications, and run OLS regressions to examine how various incentives provided by different CEO turnovers such as promotion, demotion, and rotation affect the firm performance.

We find that 41% of departing CEOs in SOEs is being promoted. The promotion is positively associated with preceding firm performance relative to peers in the same region and this association is more significant than that between the promotion and firm’s specific performance. Furthermore, the promotion outperforms other incentive schemes such as CEO demotions by 5–8% in terms of subsequent Tobin’s q in three years. These consequences persist in undeveloped regions where there are fewer firms listed on the stock market, a lower stock market capitalization, or a higher regional Herfindahl–Hirschman Index ( HHI ).

The findings imply that promotion based on RPE provides an important incentive by creating competitions.

The goal of this paper is to investigate the relationship between government control and firm value in China.

Government might extract social or political benefits from a state-controlled firm, thus decreases firm value. However, government’s monitoring on firm management reduces managers’ agency problem, which increases firm value. We first build a game-theoretic model to prove the existence of optimal government control given these two roles of government, and we then employ the OLS regression method to test the theory predictions using the length of intermediate ownership chains connecting the listed state-owned enterprises to their ultimate controllers as the measure of government control.

We find that firm values first increase then decrease as government control weakens. Moreover, we find that government usually retains a stronger control over state-owned enterprises than the optimal level. In addition, we show that government control can be further weakened in firms with good corporate governance mechanisms, which serve as a substitution of government monitoring.

Our results demonstrate that government control in China is still a necessary but costly mechanism to mitigate agency costs, especially when corporate governance system is underdeveloped.

We identify the substitution effect between government control and corporate governance using a unique measure of government control.

In this paper, we investigate whether internal control and whether corporate life cycle would affect firm performance in the emerging markets of China.

We use Chen, Dong, Han, and Zhou’s (2013) internal control index on the effectiveness of internal control and Dickinson’s (2011) definition on firm life cycle. We use multivariate regression analysis.

We find that the internal control improves corporate performance. When dividing firm life cycle into five stages: introduction, growth, mature, shake-out and decline, we find that the impacts of internal control on firm performance vary with different stages. The positive impact of internal control on firm performance is more significant in maturity and shake-out stages than other stages.

Our findings would have implications for the regulators and policy makers with regards to the importance of internal control in corporate governance and the effectiveness of implementing standards and guidelines on internal control in public firms.

In addition, our findings on the various roles of internal control at different stages of firm life cycle would help managers and board of directors find more focus in risk management and board monitoring, respectively.

Although the prior literature have examined the link between internal control, information quality and cost of equity capital (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, & LaFond, 2009; Ogneva, Subramanyam, & Raghunandan, 2007), our study would be the first attempt to investigate the link between internal control and firm performance during different stages of firm life cycles.

This paper attempts to explore the interrelationships between the split-share structure reform and privatization processes in light of the interplay between the listing announcements of the non-traditional shares of the Chinese firms within the steel industry and market reaction to these listed shares, as well as to analyze the value gained by the firms due to the privatization processes.

The paper examines market reaction to the listing announcements of non-traditional shares as traditional shares by employing event-study methodology. To determine the success of privatization process and value creation to the firm, the paper utilizes multivariate analysis.

The exogenous factors emphasized in a topographical order, explicitly profitability, efficiency, and leverage, are related to the privatization processes and split-share structure reform that impact the market. The study supports that market reacts positively to the listing announcements of non-traditional shares. Being listed improves value to the firm.

The limitation of this study is the lack of data on country, industry, and firm factors; and this study merely relates to one specific industry and one country.

The paper fills a gap in the literature by articulating the impact of privatization and split-share structure reform on both market reaction and firm value. It focuses on the impact of a dynamic process rather than the impact of a static constituent on market reaction and firm value, as the previous studies have been concentrating on. The research shows that there is an accelerated privatization process of state-owned firms in Chinese steel industry and their integration in capital markets.

This study explores the interrelationship between regulatory risks and strategic controls within the financial supervision architecture of an emergent global financial centre of China that embraces innovation as part of its strategic objectives.

This paper employs a longitudinal case study approach to examine the institutional dynamics of the key financial regulators in connection with the regulated financial institutions in Hong Kong before and after the financial tsunami of 2008.

First, this study reveals an organic development of a specialised financial regulatory architecture that resists transforming itself structurally despite the significant impact of externalities. Second, in this post-financial crisis analysis, regulated financial institutions swiftly respond by strengthening their risk controls through compliance with the guidelines imposed by the regulator. Institutional dynamics in influencing the implementation of risk controls through a top-down interactive mechanism are observed. Such dynamic and pertinent rapid responses induce the pursuit of optimal risk management within a regulatory framework.

This paper provides a longitudinal case study to reveal regulatory risks and strategic controls of the global financial centre of China. It unveils mitigating risk control measures in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The study demonstrates how regulatory institutions strive to take precautionary, coercive measures such that the regulated institutions mimic and implement prudent mechanisms.

Over the past decade internationalisation by banks from emerging market economies has accelerated. The purpose of this study is to examine the role of government and home country institutions in the international expansion process of Chinese commercial banks (CCBs).

By employing qualitative research method, data was collected via interviews from 30 senior managers based on a sample of 10 CCBs involved in international expansion over the 2001–2013 period.

The study finds that the Chinese government and home institutions play an important role in motivating CCBs’ internationalisation. Evidence from this research illustrates the effect institutional factors have in emerging economy firms’ internationalisation.

The managerial implication of these findings is that CCBs could take great advantage of government policy by developing proper internationalisation strategies and capabilities that would enhance CCBs’ competitiveness in global market. On the institutional front, removal of the institutional constraints imposed on Chinese banking industry is required. Using market-oriented management and regulatory rules rather than imposing administrative restrictions could therefore accelerate CCBs’ adaption and integration in the international market and enhance their competitive power.

Due to climate change and an increasing concentration of the world’s population in vulnerable areas, how to manage catastrophe risk efficiently and cover disaster losses fairly is still a universal dilemma.

This paper applies a law and economic approach.

China’s mechanism for managing catastrophic disaster risk is in many ways unique. It emphasizes government responsibilities and works well in many respects, especially in disaster emergency relief. Nonetheless, China’s mechanism which has the vestige of a centrally planned economy needs reform.

I propose a catastrophe insurance market-enhancing framework which marries the merits of both the market and government to manage catastrophe risks. There are three pillars of the framework: (i) sustaining a strong and capable government; (ii) government enhancement of the market, neither supplanting nor retarding it; (iii) legalizing the relationship between government and market to prevent government from undermining well-functioning market operations. A catastrophe insurance market-enhancing framework may provide insights for developing catastrophe insurance in China and other transitional nations.

First, this paper analyzes China’s mechanism for managing catastrophic disaster risks and China’s approach which emphasizes government responsibilities will shed light on solving how to manage catastrophe risk efficiently and cover disaster losses fairly. Second, this paper starts a broader discussion about government stimulation of developing catastrophe insurance and this framework can stimulate attention to solve the universal dilemma.

Propose a more comprehensive explanation on the determinants and fluctuations of China’s exchange rate policy in the past decade (2005–2015).

Case study on China’s exchange rate policies in three respective stages since 2005 and then a comparative study on these three stages.

Put forward a two-pronged explanation on the determinants and fluctuations of China’s exchange rate policy in the past decade and arrive at three specific conclusions. First, external pressure is only one factor among many influencing the formation of China’s national interests (Guojia Liyi in Chinese) and the decision-making process on exchange rate policy. Second, national interest is the fundamental driving force and substratum for making China’s exchange rate policy. Third, in the short term, the specific exchange rate policies in different periods were not always in accordance to the national interests (or Guojia Liyi), due to the influences of some factors on the decision-making environment.

The comprehensive view is conducive to better explaining the formation and fluctuations of China’s exchange rate policy and consequently contributes to understanding and even predicting future policies.

This study seeks to explore the presence and the relative strength of market efficiency in the onshore and offshore Renminbi (RMB) forward markets.

In the onshore and offshore foreign exchange markets, the RMB forward contracts are designed in similar ways. However, the underlying economic forces and regulatory frameworks are very different in these two markets. We first analyze the functioning of each market, by examining the covered interest rate parity (CIRP) conditions. Second, we explore the CIRP deviations in the two markets and quantify the role of market frictions and government interventions.

We find that the CIRP condition does not hold in either the onshore or the offshore RMB forward markets. We also find that the offshore market is more efficient than the onshore market in conveying private information about investors’ expectation.

Our results reveal that the onshore RMB forward market provides an imperfect platform for investors to manage their currency exposures. We suggest that by opening the offshore market to domestic participants and the onshore market to more foreigners, the forward rates may become more informative with a greater investor mix. These liberalization efforts are important steps in the right directions to improve market efficiency in the Chinese FOREX market.

This paper examines the statistical relationship between outbound Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and firm performance. We focus on how the link is influenced by sector-specific differences and geographical factors.

We compile a time-series cross-sectional dataset that includes financial variables and FDI activities of South Korean firms between 2005 and 2008 from the DART, a financial statement database. Then, we fit our data against the linear regression models that we designed to identify FDI-performance relationship in different subsamples. Our measurement of firm performance is specifically constructed to reflect excess returns in the stock market.

We found compelling differences in the degree of FDI-performance relationships across different industries. In manufacturing sectors, the flow of direct investment is more heavily associated with firm performances than accumulated stock of direct investment, and vice versa in the service sector. The impact of China factors toward performance aspects of Korea’s outbound FDI which also differs across sectors as well.

Although there have been extensive research efforts on this subject in general, our paper addresses an increasingly significant class of FDIs that have received relatively less attention, that is, direct investment originating from developing economies. Also, our analysis adds a sectoral dimension that contributes to more comprehensive understanding of a multinational-performance relationship.