Communication effects in public good games with and without provision points

Abstract

In this study, 1 investigated the impact of pre-play, non-binding, face-to-face communication on contributions in continuous and provision point games. I find that such communication increases cooperation leading to greater contributions. This effect is found both in the short-term (i.e. periods with communication) as well as in the long-term (i.e. periods with no communication that follow periods with communication). Both the short-term and long-term effects are stronger in the provision point games. In addition, I find that the magnitude of communication has a negative relationship with contributions. Groups that meet more often to communicate and those that communicate more tend to contribute less. This is a preliminary result that must be investigated more fully in future research.

Citation

Krishnamurthy, S. (2001), "Communication effects in public good games with and without provision points", Research in Experimental Economicss (Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 8), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 25-46. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0193-2306(01)08003-6