EFFICIENCY, EQUITY AND DEMOCRACY: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON OKUN’S LEAKY BUCKET

Abstract

Income redistribution and its consequences have been the subject of intense debate over the last three decades. This is nowhere better evidenced than in the motivations which are variously ascribed to such redistributions. The social welfare approach, for example, starts from the premise that redistribution of income from the rich to the poor enhances social welfare, a fact from which redistribution derives its motivation. In contrast Tullock (1983, p. 2) argues that the major impetus for income redistribution is simply that the beneficiaries of transfer programs want larger incomes and greater wealth and have the political power to realize their goals. Buchanan (1984, p. 187) finds a constitutional basis for redistribution arguing that, if the voting franchise is universal and the constitution allows collective decisions concerning income transfers, then the basic property right to income in a society inheres in the voting franchise.

Citation

Beckman, S.R., Formby, J.P. and Smith, W.J. (2004), "EFFICIENCY, EQUITY AND DEMOCRACY: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON OKUN’S LEAKY BUCKET", Cowell, F. (Ed.) Inequality, Welfare and Income Distribution: Experimental Approaches (Research on Economic Inequality, Vol. 11), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 17-42. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1049-2585(04)11002-8