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Monetary policies of developed countries: co‐ordination, coercion or independence

George M. Katsimbris (University of Bridgeport, Bridgeport, Connecticut, USA, and University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece)
Stephen M. Miller (University of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut, USA)

Journal of Economic Studies

ISSN: 0144-3585

Article publication date: 1 April 1995

1136

Abstract

The international linkages between money stocks (and inflation rates) has received much attention. Focuses on the advantages and disadvantages of fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. Fixed rate systems require credible commitments to the rules of the game by the central banks involved. Credible commitment can be achieved through cooperative (symmetric) or coercive (asymmetric) regimes. Did the USA (Germany) dominate other developed (European) countries during the Bretton Woods (European Monetary) system? Examines the linkages, if any, between the USA (German) money stock and money stocks in other developed (European) countries, using the cointegration and error‐correction methodology. Finds evidence that USA (German) money stock did affect other (European) countries′ money stocks during fixed exchange rates. Finds, also, reverse causality which raises serious questions about either the dominance of the USA (Germany) within the Bretton Woods (European Monetary) system, or the usefulness of causality tests is answering such questions.

Keywords

Citation

Katsimbris, G.M. and Miller, S.M. (1995), "Monetary policies of developed countries: co‐ordination, coercion or independence", Journal of Economic Studies, Vol. 22 No. 2, pp. 44-58. https://doi.org/10.1108/01443589510086989

Publisher

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MCB UP Ltd

Copyright © 1995, MCB UP Limited

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