Advertising regulation and market drivers

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to examine the regulation of advertising by considering market‐driven firms (those seeking to keep within the boundaries set by social and industry norms) and market drivers (those seeking to stretch boundaries to gain a competitive advantage). Thought is also given to the costs of regulation and tolerance to the social purse, and the benefits gained by compliance and violation.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors develop a conceptual argument for boundary stretching where market drivers are present in a marketplace dominated by market‐driven firms. The authors then apply a game theory model to examine the conditions, the firm responses, and Government responses. In doing so the authors investigate incentives for non‐compliant behavior in a self‐regulated market and show that a firm can achieve a market advantage by stretching advertising boundaries.

Findings

Results suggest that when government takes a “wait‐and‐see” approach of partial tolerance, then the market driver can become the focal point for the market‐driven, and a shift will take place in the regulatory boundary. If the government is the boundary shifter then social engineers are taking advantage of artificial boundaries they know will not be enforced, with implications for campaigns such as drink‐driving, smoking, and domestic violence. Also, the market driver will gain a competitive advantage by entering a market‐driven marketplace through boundary shifts, even after incurring an initial penalty.

Research limitations/implications

The research demonstrates a need for research into marketing regulation to consider firm types, violation types, and tolerance levels. The study contributes to our understanding of marketer activity with two implications; first the firm is shifting the boundaries and redefining the market focal point as themselves, rather than violating the boundaries and setting themselves outside the rules. Second, depending on the level of tolerance that government has with the regulation of advertising, there is a cost to both the social purse and to market‐driven firms associated with boundary shifters.

Practical implications

A market driver, looking for growth opportunities, should try to enter markets dominated by market‐driven firms, and which have self‐regulation, while market driven firms should either look for regulatory protection or act collectively to wield power over third parties – for example forcing media outlets not to carry market driver advertising.

Originality/value

By introducing the concept of boundary stretching and allowing for market drivers and market driven firms, the authors show the effects of regulation (or tolerance) in a realistic setting and allow for the real‐world dynamics of a marketplace where new ideas create new focal points for social acceptance. This study also provides a clear illustration of the usefulness of game theory in marketing studies.

Citation

Parsons, A.G. and Schumacher, C. (2012), "Advertising regulation and market drivers", European Journal of Marketing, Vol. 46 No. 11/12, pp. 1539-1558. https://doi.org/10.1108/03090561211259970