Pushing budgets down the line: ascribing financial responsibility in the UK social services

Abstract

Budgets are too aggregated, they hold too high a level in the organizational hierarchy, and they are not owned by individuals; therefore they cannot track the consequences of individual actions ‐ these are criticisms of public sector budgets as financial mechanisms of control and accountability. Pushing budgets down the line ‐ devolving budgetary responsibilities to front‐line operational staff ‐ in short, delegation, is current governmental thinking on making budgets more effective instruments in control and accountability. This paper explores the issue of the extent to which budgets have been devolved in the context of empirical data from eight UK social services departments and finds that the devolution of budgets stops short of the front line of service delivery. This research also demonstrates that although individual responsibility for budgets has been ascribed to individuals these individualized responsibilities are being dissipated through organizational processes. First, levels of authorization for spend are not aligned with budget responsibilities. Second, there are multiple sources of access to the budgets “owned” by individuals. Third, organizational rules prescribe spending patterns and constrain the authority of budget holders. Should these results be seen as a residual control problem or are there more fundamental concerns at stake here? The paper theorizes these social and organizational issues in the social services through the notions of individualism and collectivism ‐ focusing particularly on the concept of responsibility.

Citation

Llewellyn, S. (1998), "Pushing budgets down the line: ascribing financial responsibility in the UK social services", Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 11 No. 3, pp. 292-308. https://doi.org/10.1108/09513579810224518