Effective delays in portfolio disclosure

Abstract

Purpose

The timeliness of portfolio holdings information disclosure has been of interest among regulators, academics and practitioners since the Investment Company Act of 1940. The Securities Exchange Commission has been trying to strike a balance between investors' interest in timely disclosure and the potential costs associated with revealing the strategies of investment managers. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether current rules regarding the delay in disclosure adequately protect investors, and prevent the formation of copycat portfolios that can profit from the research of the original portfolio manager.

Design/methodology/approach

The paper examine the effectiveness of different delays (30, 60 or 90 days) in disclosure of holdings for a sample of large‐cap, actively‐managed mutual funds. Copycat portfolios are constructed based on the holdings of the original portfolios, and their returns compared against the returns (net of expenses) of the original portfolios over the corresponding time frames.

Findings

The results indicate that the current delay of 60 days is sufficient to prevent such free‐riding; however, shortening the delay to 30 days would adversely affect mutual fund investors.

Originality/value

The paper aims to provide an answer to those debates on the effective delays in portfolio disclosure among academics and practitioners based on quantitative evidence. It also contributes to leave a guideline for regulators since the patterns of over‐ or under‐performance of the original portfolio returns vis‐à‐vis the copycat portfolio returns over varying delays provide important insights about possible effects of changes in disclosure regulations.

Citation

Hee Choi, S. and Chhabria, M. (2012), "Effective delays in portfolio disclosure", Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Vol. 20 No. 2, pp. 196-211. https://doi.org/10.1108/13581981211218379