Soft and hard strategies of regulating economic crime

Abstract

Purpose

The aim of this paper is to describe and analyse the variations used in different forms of regulatory practices in four Norwegian agencies. The crucial question is what explains the differences in regulatory approaches (from soft to hard).

Design/methodology/approach

The agencies analysed are the Banking, Insurance and Securities Commission of Norway, the Norwegian Competition Authority, the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority and the Revenue Service. They represent different approaches to regulation, from the use of soft and persuasive to more hard and coercive approaches. This paper is based on research by interviews of representatives of the four agencies, and analysis of open sources (reports).

Findings

Important findings are that efficiency cannot explain the preference for strategies. Among the factors influencing the use of strategies were type of harm regulated, offender type (big or small corporations, single persons), the victim (personal, non‐personal or state), the political support of the regulation, the professional background of the staff and the general aim of the regulation.

Originality/value

The paper is opening up a new field of research in Norway. Few, if any have studied the working of these agencies in Norway. They are important since the day‐to‐day regulation of white‐collar crime (WCC) is mainly done by these agencies, not the police or the courts. To get a better understanding of the regulation of WCC more research should be done on the workings of the regulatory authorities.

Citation

Larsson, P. (2007), "Soft and hard strategies of regulating economic crime", Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 14 No. 2, pp. 208-220. https://doi.org/10.1108/13590790710742681