Decision on Quality Investment Level Under Moral Hazard Environment

Abstract

Moral hazard and adverse selection often exist in asymmetric information environment. In this paper, quality investment decision problem is studied under moral hazard. A basic model for quality investment level decision is developed with the supplier as a principal and the buyer as an agent. And then we regard the supplier and the buyer’s rational limitations to set up a model when the buyer’s quality evaluation and processing activities are hidden. The model is optimized and the results under different backgrounds are discussed and compared. Results show that the buyer’s quality evaluation level and processing level are mostly influenced by the supplier’s quality assurance payment. Both the supplier and the buyer choose different quality investment levels under moral hazard because of the supplier’s payment to the buyer in case of internal failure and external failure.

Citation

Cui‐hua, Z. and Hai‐bin, Y. (2007), "Decision on Quality Investment Level Under Moral Hazard Environment", Asian Journal on Quality, Vol. 8 No. 2, pp. 20-31. https://doi.org/10.1108/15982688200700012