An Investigation of Poison Pill Securities, Long‐Term Debt, and the Wealth of Shareholders

Abstract

Poison pill securities can be used to deter takeover activity by making the acquisition cost prohibitive or to increase bargaining power of target firms. Poison pills, which are also known as shareholder rights plans, are typically used in conjunction with other takeover defense mechanisms, such as anti‐takeover charter amendments or dual classes of stock. This study examines the role that debt plays as an anti‐takeover strategy in the presence of poison pills. The results show that, on average, capital markets have little reaction to poison pill announcements. A regression equation, however, shows that announcement period abnormal returns are positively related to leverage ratios. This paper provides empirical evidence that the capital structure of firms plays an important role in the perceived strength of poison pills.

Citation

Forjan, J. and Van Ness, B. (2003), "An Investigation of Poison Pill Securities, Long‐Term Debt, and the Wealth of Shareholders", American Journal of Business, Vol. 18 No. 2, pp. 17-22. https://doi.org/10.1108/19355181200300008