Developing incentive mechanisms for long-term and short-term technological innovation in major engineering projects using principal-agent theory

Abstract

Purpose

Promoting technological innovation is important to address the complexity of major engineering challenges. Technological innovations include short-term innovations at the project level and long-term innovations that can enhance competitive advantages. The purpose of this study is to develop an incentive mechanism for the public sector that considers short-term and long-term efforts from the private sector, aiming to promote technological innovation in major engineering projects.

Design/methodology/approach

This study constructs an incentive model considering the differences in short-term and long-term innovation efforts from the private sector. This model emphasizes the spillover effect of long-term efforts on current projects and the cost synergy effect between short-term and long-term efforts. It also explores the factors influencing the optimal incentive strategies for the public sector and innovation strategies for the private sector.

Findings

The results indicate that increasing the output coefficient of short-term and long-term efforts and reducing the cost coefficient not only enhance the innovation efforts of the private sector but also prompt the public sector to increase the incentive coefficient. The spillover effect of long-term innovation efforts and the synergy effect of the two efforts are positively related to the incentive coefficient for the public sector.

Originality/value

This research addresses the existing gap in understanding how the public sector should devise incentive mechanisms for technological innovation when contractors acting as the private sector are responsible for construction within a public-private partnership (PPP) model. In constructing the incentive mechanism model, this study incorporates the private sector's short-term efforts at the project level and their long-term efforts for sustained corporate development, thus adding considerable practical significance.

Citation

Zhu, J., Chen, J., Jin, W. and Li, Q. (2023), "Developing incentive mechanisms for long-term and short-term technological innovation in major engineering projects using principal-agent theory", Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, Vol. ahead-of-print No. ahead-of-print. https://doi.org/10.1108/ECAM-05-2023-0520