Exploring effective incentive policies for sustainable development of green buildings in China: based on evolutionary game theory and numerical simulation analysis

Abstract

Purpose

This study reveals the green building development path and analyzes the optimal government subsidy equilibrium through evolutionary game theory and numerical simulation. This was done to explore the feasible measures and optimal incentives to achieve higher levels of green building in China.

Design/methodology/approach

First, the practice of green building in China was analyzed, and the specific influencing factors and incentive measures for green building development were extracted. Second, China-specific evolutionary game models were constructed between developers and homebuyers under the market regulation and government incentive mechanism scenarios, and the evolutionary paths were analyzed. Finally, real-case numerical simulations were conducted, subsidy impacts were mainly analyzed and optimal subsidy equilibriums were solved.

Findings

(1) Simultaneously subsidizing developers and homebuyers proved to be the most effective measure to promote the sustainability of green buildings. (2) The sensitivity of developers and homebuyers to subsidies varied across scenarios, and the optimal subsidy level diminished marginally as building greenness and public awareness increased. (3) The optimal subsidy level for developers was intricately tied to the building greenness benchmark. A higher benchmark intensified the developer’s responsiveness to losses, at which point increasing subsidies were justified. Conversely, a reduction in subsidy might have been appropriate when the benchmark was set at a lower level.

Practical implications

The expeditious advancement of green buildings holds paramount importance for the high-quality development of the construction industry. Nevertheless, the pace of green building expansion in China has experienced a recent deceleration. Drawing insights from the practices of green building in China, the exploration of viable strategies and the determination of optimal government subsidies stand as imperative initiatives. These endeavors aim to propel the acceleration of green building proliferation and materialize high-quality development at the earliest juncture possible.

Originality/value

The model is grounded in China’s green building practices, which makes the conclusions drawn more specific. Furthermore, research results provide practical references for governments to formulate green building incentive policies.

Citation

Fan, C. and Li, X. (2024), "Exploring effective incentive policies for sustainable development of green buildings in China: based on evolutionary game theory and numerical simulation analysis", Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, Vol. ahead-of-print No. ahead-of-print. https://doi.org/10.1108/ECAM-06-2023-0622