Why does bank screening matter? Private information and publicly traded securities

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to use an equilibrium model to identify the public and private informational requirements for equilibrium pricing and shows that unless these informational requirements are met, skin-in-the-game policies will not be fully effective against moral hazard for banks with relatively large market share. Selling securitizations with recourse can be.

Design/methodology/approach

The single-period model shows equilibrium prices depend on both public and private information, the latter produced as banks screen loans. If bank has a sufficiently large market share, it can profit by omitting the screening unless investors can detect the change. The author derives the profit function for not screening, shows that a skin-in-the-game policy cannot fully offset its incentives, and proposes a sale with recourse policy that can.

Findings

To value securitizations correctly, investors require both publicly and privately available information. If investors cannot monitor banks closely, correct pricing can be frustrated by profit maximization incentives, since banks with large market shares can profit from not screening. Skin-in-the-game policies cannot fully offset these incentives.

Research limitations/implications

The equilibrium model identifies the public and private informational requirements for equilibrium pricing and shows that unless these informational requirements are met, skin-in-the-game policies will not be fully effective for banks with relatively large market share. Selling securitizations with recourse can be more fully effective.

Practical implications

If it is difficult for investors to obtain private information, skin-in-the-game policies are not provide fully effective remedies against moral hazard. Sales with recourse policies offer promise because they are easy for investors to understand and difficult to evade.

Social implications

Trading on the basis of private information can create perverse incentives, and appropriate corrective policies can help offset them.

Originality/value

The general equilibrium methodology, the findings of incentives to avoid screening, the flaws with skin-in-the-game policies, and the proposal for sale with recourse are all new.

Citation

Neave, E.H. (2016), "Why does bank screening matter? Private information and publicly traded securities", International Journal of Managerial Finance, Vol. 12 No. 5, pp. 478-497. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJMF-11-2015-0199