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Bank crisis resolution in India

Soumik Bhusan (Indian Institute of Management Ranchi, Ranchi, India)
Ajit Dayanandan (College of Business and Public Policy, University of Alaska Anchorage, Anchorage, Alaska, USA)
Naresh Gopal (Indian Institute of Management Ranchi, Ranchi, India, India)

Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance

ISSN: 1358-1988

Article publication date: 28 August 2023

Issue publication date: 27 October 2023

131

Abstract

Purpose

The academic literature has examined why bank runs happen based on the work of 2022 Nobel Prize-winning economists Diamond and Dybvig. They have found the source of banking/financial crisis in terms of mismatch between liabilities (deposits being short term and savers wanting to short-term access to their money) and assets (long term and illiquid). The Lakshmi Vilas Bank (LVB) crisis intensified when it came under Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). This situation provides the opportunity to study whether the elements embodied in the theoretical models like Diamond and Dybvig hold true for LVB crisis. This study aims to examine the reasons for the demise of LVB in India using DuPont financial model, peer group analysis and time series structural break in crucial financial parameters.

Design/methodology/approach

The study examines the reason for insolvency of LVB using financial ratios, financial models (DuPont), financial distress model (Z-score) and asset-liability management. The study also adopts univariate structural break models using quarterly financial data covering the key financial measures used in the RBI’s PCA framework.

Findings

LVB crisis is like Diamond–Dybvig model, in the sense, savers requiring short-term access to their money (liquidity for their deposits) on the information of high non-performing assets, which further deteriorates the illiquid nature of loan portfolio (assets) of banks. The study finds its profit margin (net interest margin and non-interest margin) and managerial efficiency had started deteriorating since 2018. The study finds that LVB’s main weakness lies in its limited credit appraisal ability, its monitoring and weak internal controls. Lending to sensitive sectors (like real estate, capital markets and commodities) and exposure to large business groups also contributed to its weakness. The study also finds huge, elevated asset-liability mismatch, especially in the short-term maturity buckets. Using univariate econometric time series model, the study also confirms financial weakness being evident much earlier than the time when resolution was undertaken by the RBI through PCA.

Research limitations/implications

The study has implications for analysing and monitoring financial distress of banks. The study also has implications for devising banking regulation and supervision.

Originality/value

The study brings in a perspective of the banking regulations using the application of PCA framework on a listed private sector bank. The authors combine an accounting ratio model and combine risk measures that could identify the incipient risks in a bank. The authors believe this will help in refinement of banking regulations and better monitoring mechanisms.

Keywords

Acknowledgements

The authors sincerely appreciate the insightful comments provided by the reviewers, which have substantially contributed in enhancing the quality and clarity of our work.

Since acceptance of this article, the following authors have updated their affiliations Naresh Gopal is at the Indian Institute of Management Tiruchirapalli, Tiruchirapalli, India.

Citation

Bhusan, S., Dayanandan, A. and Gopal, N. (2023), "Bank crisis resolution in India", Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Vol. 31 No. 5, pp. 729-753. https://doi.org/10.1108/JFRC-02-2023-0019

Publisher

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Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2023, Emerald Publishing Limited

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