Information and municipal expenditures: is monitoring effective in reducing overspending?

Abstract

Municipal financial decisions involve the interaction of political actors (including voters, elected officials, and bureaucrats) pursuing their own interests. Although voters should determine public choices through elected officials, bureaucrats have the incentives and may have the monopoly power to dominate the process. This study investigates the relationships among municipal spending, fiscal manipulation, and financial monitoring. Fiscal illusion (as measured by revenue complexity) is employed as an empirical surrogate for bureaucratic manipulation and it is hypothesized that financial audits are an effective monitoring technique for moderating possible bureaucratic manipulation. The results of the study suggest that expenditure levels are related to political power and that fiscal illusion is significant for explaining expenditure levels, especially for cities having qualified opinions. Weak support is provided for the hypothesis that the financial audit is a monitoring technique that may constrain bureaucratic overspending. These findings have important implications for both public administration and governmental accounting and suggest the need for further research on monitorig effectiveness.

Citation

Giroux, G. and Wiggins, C. (1994), "Information and municipal expenditures: is monitoring effective in reducing overspending?", Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management, Vol. 6 No. 4, pp. 600-628. https://doi.org/10.1108/JPBAFM-06-04-1994-B005