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Voting stake of the largest shareholder, ownership concentration and leverage

Timm Gödecke (Technical University of Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany)
Dirk Schiereck (Technical University of Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany)

Journal of Risk Finance

ISSN: 1526-5943

Article publication date: 9 November 2023

Issue publication date: 10 January 2024

129

Abstract

Purpose

This paper aims to investigate the impact of the largest shareholder's voting stake on the firm's capital structure decision.

Design/methodology/approach

To empirically analyze the influence of the voting stake on leverage, a large sample of 814 exchange-listed firms is applied. The baseline regression analysis is complemented by several robustness tests and a difference-in-difference regression analysis to mitigate endogeneity concerns.

Findings

The authors find a negative relationship between the voting stake of the largest shareholder and leverage, consistent with the notion that large, undiversified shareholders have the incentive to reduce risk. Additionally, results reveal that family control has a positive moderating effect, indicating that the negative relationship is less pronounced for family controlled firms.

Research limitations/implications

The authors contribute to the research by suggesting ownership concentration as another determinant of capital structure. Further, the authors add to the literature by showing how the association between ownership concentration and leverage is moderated by family control and that the identity of the largest shareholder is of great importance.

Practical implications

The paper provides important insights to the current debate on the proposal of the European Commission to reintroduce shares with multiple votes as part of the Listing Act. The authors expect the regulation to exacerbate the concentration of voting rights, which results in lower leverage and thus limits corporate growth.

Originality/value

The authors differentiate from previous studies by focusing the largest shareholders' voting stake, instead of using the ownership stake, to assess the impact of ownership concentration on leverage.

Keywords

Acknowledgements

For helpful comments, the authors thank Dr. Bernhard Knuth, Felix Bartels and seminar participants at TU Darmstadt. The authors further express their sincere gratitude to the anonymous reviewers for thoughtful comments and constructive feedback.

Citation

Gödecke, T. and Schiereck, D. (2024), "Voting stake of the largest shareholder, ownership concentration and leverage", Journal of Risk Finance, Vol. 25 No. 1, pp. 35-63. https://doi.org/10.1108/JRF-04-2023-0102

Publisher

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Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2023, Emerald Publishing Limited

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