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Dynamic control of pollution of municipal solid waste incineration

Hui Jie Li (School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu, China)
Deqing Tan (School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu, China)

Kybernetes

ISSN: 0368-492X

Article publication date: 30 October 2023

16

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of the study is to investigate strategies for enhancing pollution oversight by local governments while reducing government-enterprise collusion (GEC) levels. Additionally, the factors influencing pollution control efforts at incineration plants are explored. Potential approaches to improving them and for effectively reducing waste incineration pollution are suggested.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors examined the most effective methods for mitigating incineration-related pollution and preventing collusion and developed a differential game model involving interactions between local governments and incineration plants. The findings of this work have significant policy implications for central governments worldwide seeking to regulate waste incineration practices.

Findings

The results indicate that, first, elevating environmental assessment standards can incentivize local governments to improve their oversight efforts. Second, collusion between incineration plants and local governments can be deterred by transferring benefits from the plants to the local government, while increased supervision by the central government and the enforcement of penalties for collusion can also mitigate collusion. Third, both central and local governments can bolster their supervisory and penalty mechanisms for instances of excessive pollution, encouraging incineration plants to invest more in pollution control. Finally, when the central government finds it challenging to detect excessive incineration-related pollution, enhancing rewards and penalties at the local government level can be a viable alternative.

Originality/value

This study stands out by considering the dynamic nature of pollutants. A differential game model is constructed which captures the evolving dynamics between local governments and incineration plants, offering insights regarding the prevention of collusion from a dynamic perspective. The findings may provide a valuable reference for governments as they develop and enforce regulations while motivating incineration plants to actively engage in reducing waste-incineration pollution.

Keywords

Acknowledgements

Funding: This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (grant number: 71571149).

Citation

Li, H.J. and Tan, D. (2023), "Dynamic control of pollution of municipal solid waste incineration", Kybernetes, Vol. ahead-of-print No. ahead-of-print. https://doi.org/10.1108/K-06-2023-1114

Publisher

:

Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2023, Emerald Publishing Limited

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