Electric vehicle subsidy structure considering network externality under carbon neutrality constraints

Abstract

Purpose

Promoting electric vehicles (EVs) is an effective way to achieve carbon neutrality. If EVs are widely adopted, this will undoubtedly be good for the environment. The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of network externalities and subsidy on the strategies of manufacturer under a carbon neutrality constraint.

Design/methodology/approach

In this paper, the authors propose a game-theoretic framework in an EVs supply chain consisting of a government, a manufacturer and a group of consumers. The authors examine two subsidy options and explain the choice of optimal strategies for government and manufacturer.

Findings

First, the authors find that the both network externalities of charging stations and government subsidy can promote the EV market. Second, under a relaxed carbon neutrality constraint, even if the government’s purchase subsidy investment is larger than the carbon emission reduction technology subsidy investment, the purchase subsidy policy is still optimal. Third, under a strict carbon neutrality constraint, when the cost coefficient of carbon emission reduction and the effectiveness of carbon emission reduction technology are larger, social welfare will instead decrease with the increase of the effectiveness of emission reduction technology and then, the manufacturer’s investment in carbon emission reduction technology is lower. In the extended model, the authors find the effectiveness of carbon emission reduction technology can also promote the EV market and social welfare (or consumer surplus) is the same whatever the subsidy strategy.

Practical implications

The network externalities of charging stations and the subsidy effect of the government have a superimposition effect on the promotion of EVs. When the network effect of charging stations is relatively strong, government can withdraw from the subsidized market. When the network effect of charging stations is relatively weak, government can intervene appropriately.

Originality/value

Comparing previous studies, this study reveals the impact of government intervention, network effects and carbon neutrality constraints on the EV supply chain. From a sustainability perspective, these insights are compelling for both EV manufacturers and policymakers.

Citation

Chen, F., Xu, S. and Zhai, Y. (2024), "Electric vehicle subsidy structure considering network externality under carbon neutrality constraints", Kybernetes, Vol. ahead-of-print No. ahead-of-print. https://doi.org/10.1108/K-07-2023-1185