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Game-theoretical study of military–civilian collaborative innovation in the context of four-party participation

Ning Qi (School of Economics and Management, Shenyang Aerospace University, Shenyang, China)
Shiping Lu (School of Economics and Management, Shenyang Aerospace University, Shenyang, China)
Hao Jing (School of Economics and Management, Shenyang Aerospace University, Shenyang, China)

Kybernetes

ISSN: 0368-492X

Article publication date: 26 February 2024

31

Abstract

Purpose

In the context of constructing an integrated national strategic system, collaborative innovation among enterprises is the current social focus. Therefore, in order to find the interest relationship between multiple game subjects, to explore the influencing factors of collaborative innovation of civil-military integration enterprises. This paper constructs a collaborative innovation mechanism for military–civilian integration involving four game subjects (military enterprises, private enterprises, local governments, and science and technology intermediaries). It aims to solve and reveal the evolutionary game relationship among the four parties.

Design/methodology/approach

To explore the mechanism of military–civilian collaborative innovation involving four players, this study employs game theory and constructs an evolutionary game model for collaborative innovation with the participation of military enterprises, civilian enterprises, local governments, and technology intermediaries. The model reveals the evolutionary game patterns among these four entities, analyzes the impact of various parameters on the evolutionary process of the game system, and numerical simulation is used to show these changes more specifically.

Findings

The research findings demonstrate that active government subsidies promote cooperation throughout the system. Moreover, increasing the input-output ratio of research and development (R&D), the rate of technological spillovers, and the R&D investment of civilian enterprises all facilitate the tendency toward cooperation within the system. However, when the government chooses to actively provide subsidies, increasing R&D investment in military enterprises may hinder the tendency toward cooperation. Furthermore, central transfer payments, government punishment from the central government, and an increase in the information conversion rate of technology intermediaries may suppress the rate of cooperation within the system.

Originality/value

Most of the previous studies on the collaborative innovation of military–civilian integration have been tripartite game models between military enterprises, private enterprises, and local governments. In contrast, this study adds science and technology intermediaries on this basis, reveals the evolution mechanism of collaborative innovation of civil-military integration enterprises from the perspective of four-party participation, and analyzes the factors influencing the cooperation of the whole system. The conclusion of this study not only enriches the collaborative innovation evolution mechanism of military–civilian integration enterprises from the perspective of multiple agents but also provides practical guidance for the innovation-driven development of military–civilian integration enterprises.

Keywords

Acknowledgements

This study was funded by the Liaoning Provincial Science Public Welfare Research Fund (No: 2023JH4/10700011), The Liaoning Provincial Education Science Planning Project (No: JG21DB417), Liaoning Province Social Science Planning Project (No: L20AGL013) and the Liaoning Provincial Department of Education (No: LJKMR20220575).

Citation

Qi, N., Lu, S. and Jing, H. (2024), "Game-theoretical study of military–civilian collaborative innovation in the context of four-party participation", Kybernetes, Vol. ahead-of-print No. ahead-of-print. https://doi.org/10.1108/K-07-2023-1289

Publisher

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Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2024, Emerald Publishing Limited

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