Revisiting the Effect of Voter Isolation

Abstract

Does social-isolation deflate observed preferences for public goods? Using a voting referendum elicitation mechanism, List et al. (2004) document a 30% reduction in affirmative voting when votes are privately, rather than publicly, cast for a public good. We replicate this work and then add to the exercise by examining the role that group size plays in generating social-pressure bias – an extension we motivate with a structural model. Having replicated to the extent possible the List et al.’s consequential private and public treatments, we find that when group size is large (N = 60), social isolation reduces affirmative votes by roughly 30%, a result that does not carry over to the small-group (N = 30) session.

Citation

James, A.G. and Shogren, J.F. (2015), "Revisiting the Effect of Voter Isolation", Replication in Experimental Economics (Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 18), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 137-152. https://doi.org/10.1108/S0193-230620150000018005