Trading Truth for Legitimacy in the Liberal State: Defending John Rawls’s Pragmatism

Abstract

Post-Enlightenment liberalism faces a paradox: The liberal principle of legitimacy demands states justify their constitutional order in terms citizens can accept, but there is no uncontroversial comprehensive conception of justice on which to form the requisite consensus. Rawls resolves the paradox by embracing a pragmatism that abandons the concept of truth in the political forum to secure consensus and legitimacy. Philosophers have challenged the idea of justice without truth as incoherent, and social critics have attacked it as naïve. This chapter defends Rawls’s pragmatism against such critics and argues that the future of liberal constitutionalism may depend on its success.

Citation

Anderson, J.P. (2014), "Trading Truth for Legitimacy in the Liberal State: Defending John Rawls’s Pragmatism", Special Issue: Law and the Liberal State (Studies in Law, Politics, and Society, Vol. 65), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 1-29. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1059-433720140000065001