International and Domestic Uncertainties in the Traditional Deterrence Game

Abstract

We develop an extension of the Traditional Deterrence Game to examine the interaction between international and domestic sources of uncertainty as these sources influence the behavior of Challengers and Defenders. The extension involves incorporating a third and a fourth domestic player, named Assassin ♯1 and Assassin ♯2. Assassin ♯1 reacts to Challenger's decision to capitulate to Defender, and Assassin ♯2 reacts to Defender's decision to capitulate to Challenger. From the perspective of Challenger and Defender, Assassin ♯1 and Assassin ♯2 are lotteries that involve a probability of being punished, and a complementary probability of not being punished, for the decisions to capitulate to the adversary, respectively, in the international game. We employ the two-sided incomplete information version of the game wherein Challenger is uncertain about Defender's type and the behavior of Assassin ♯1, and Defender is uncertain about Challenger's type and the behavior of Assassin ♯2.

The model provides an account of the trade-off between domestic and international conflicts generally, and specifies the conditions under which Challenger and/or Defender is advantaged in the international game with the presence of a domestic constraint in the form of Assassin ♯1 or Assassin ♯2. The model generates two striking results in particular. First, Assassin ♯1 can influence the behavior of some Challengers, whereas Assassin ♯2 can determine the behavior of some Defenders. Second, the Challengers who ultimately capitulate are more prone to initiate conflict, in the first place, than are the Challengers who will not capitulate.

Citation

Carlson, L.J. and Dacey, R. (2011), "International and Domestic Uncertainties in the Traditional Deterrence Game", Chatterji, M., Bo, C. and Misra, R. (Ed.) Frontiers of Peace Economics and Peace Science (Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Vol. 16), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 37-58. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1572-8323(2011)0000016007