NTSB Safety Recommendation

Citation

(2009), "NTSB Safety Recommendation", Aircraft Engineering and Aerospace Technology, Vol. 81 No. 5. https://doi.org/10.1108/aeat.2009.12781eab.017

NTSB Safety Recommendation

Article Type: Safety topics and notes From: Aircraft Engineering and Aerospace Technology: An International Journal, Volume 81, Issue 5

NTSB Safety Recommendations A-09-21 through A-09-28

The National Transportation Safety Board makes the following recommendations to the FAA: evaluate the history of uncommanded ATSV-Open events in the MD-80 fleet and the effectiveness of coupling the ATSV-Open light to the master caution system to determine whether all MD-80 aeroplanes need to be modified to couple the ATSV-Open light to the master caution system. Once the evaluation is completed, require any necessary modifications (A-09-21).

Require principal operations inspectors to review their operators' pilot guidance and training on task allocation and workload management during emergency situations to verify that they state that, to the extent practicable, the pilot running the checklists should not engage in additional nonessential operational tasks, such as radio communications (A-09-22).

Require MD-80 series aeroplane operators to incorporate information about the relationship between the pneumatic crossfeed valve and the engine fire handle into their training programs and written guidance (A-09-23).

Establish best practices for conducting both single and multiple emergency and abnormal situations training (A-09-24).

Once the best practices for both single and multiple emergency and abnormal situations training asked for in Safety Recommendation A-09-24 have been established, require that these best practices be incorporated into all operators' approved training programs (A-09-25).

Require that operators provide pilots with guidance requiring that pilots and flight attendants actively monitor exit availability and configure the aeroplane and cabin for an evacuation when the aeroplane is stopped away from the gate after a significant event to help expedite an emergency evacuation if one becomes necessary (A-09-26).

Revise Advisory Circular 120-48, “Communication and co-ordination between flight crew members and flight attendants,” to update guidance and training provided to flight and cabin crews regarding communications during emergency and unusual situations to reflect current industry knowledge based on research and lessons learned from relevant accidents and incidents over the last 20 years (A-09-27).

Require Boeing to establish an appropriate replacement interval for air turbine starter valve air filters installed on all MD-80 series aircraft (A-09-28).

NTSB Safety Recommendation A-09-29

The National Transportation Safety Board makes the following recommendation to American Airlines: evaluate your CASS program to determine why it failed to:

• •

  identify deficiencies in its maintenance program associated with the MD-80 engine no-start failure; and

• •

  discover the lack of compliance with company procedures.

Then, make necessary modifications to the program to correct these shortcomings (A-09-29).

NTSB Safety Recommendations A-09-41 and A-09-42

The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the FAA: require the Boeing Aeroplane Company to revise its 757/767 procedures and training for addressing an illuminated Standby Power Bus OFF light, to include specific steps to take so that complete loss of battery power is avoided.

These steps should include landing at the nearest suitable airport before the power is depleted and actions to take if landing is not possible (A-09-41).

Once Boeing Aeroplane Company has revised its procedures and training per Safety Recommendation A-09-41 for addressing an illuminated Standby Bus Power OFF light without depleting the main battery, require all operators of 757/767 aeroplanes to adopt these procedures (A-09-42).