Old lessons are hardest to learn

Citation

De Bievre, A. (2001), "Old lessons are hardest to learn", Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 10 No. 1. https://doi.org/10.1108/dpm.2001.07310aab.004

Old lessons are hardest to learn

Old lessons are hardest to learn

When things go wrong, it is always a good idea to stop and think about what might have caused them to go wrong. However, this is often easier said than done, especially when different parties were involved or affected, whether directly or indirectly.

Judging from the Erika casualty investigation report released by the Malta Maritime Authority recently, plenty of people were not exactly doing what they were supposed to be doing before the ship broke up. So can we learn anything from the disaster that we did not know already?

The report should be required reading for its revelations on the sharing (or their failure to share) information between classification societies on the deficiencies discovered in sister ships.

This reveals the need, on the entire series of sister ships, for extra vigilant corrosion monitoring, and for particular attention to be given to the deck longitudinals and their attachment to the deck plate. The information on the sister ships clearly reinforced the conclusion that, "In all probability, corrosion played a significant part in the loss of the Erika."

It is thus strongly recommended that classification societies should review their present rules in order to facilitate the release of the relevant documentation on sister ships, when requested by flag states.

The report is critical of the lack of transparency on the part of the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS). It calls for further improvements in its transfer of class procedures, internal quality control procedures, and early warning system. These are, of course, well-aired concerns.

In connection with this feature, the report gives evidence of discrepancies in class approved plans that led surveyors of different IACS members (Bureau Veritas and Rina) to interpret the diminution of plate thickness differently. This, it concludes, "may have resulted in the acceptance of a structure that should have been renewed."

The long-awaited report is published against the background of calls for the phase-out of single-hulled ships and fresh efforts to eradicate sub-standard ships. The outcome of the crucial Erika session at the International Maritime Organization, which focuses on the narrow issue of single- versus double-hull oil tankers, will not be finally decided until the IMO's Marine Environment Protection Committee meets again this April.

Nonetheless, it is well to note that the Maltese flag administration has joined others in dismissing this issue outright as "irrelevant" in the case of the Erika. The report emphasises that the Erika did not founder because of her configuration as a single-hulled ship.

Problems

The problems, it suggests, began in number two starboard segregated ballast tank. "Had she been fitted with a double hull, the outcome may not have been any different to what it was."

Other conclusions are equally firm. For example, the Maltese authorities are adamant that the French refusal for the Erika to enter a safe port "did not alter the course of events and was not relevant to the loss of the ship."

Nonetheless, they have requested the IMO to encourage coastal states to identify suitable ports of refuge, and to circulate details widely.

Summing up the history of the Erika, the report speaks of "a scenario difficult to envisage [to be] more conducive to corrosion" and singles out localised structural problems, which eventually led to the tanker's total collapse.

It is highly critical of the quality of repairs carried out at the Bijela yard in Montenegro, as part of the last special survey conducted by Italian classification society Rina, but does not draw firm conclusions. It says that they "could have contributed to the initial failure".

Nonetheless, it is believed "likely that significant corrosion still existed after the repairs and had not been addressed by the attending surveyor".

Corrosion

Panship Management Services, the ship managers, also should have identified and/or addressed areas of significant local corrosion, and monitored the repairs correctly. The report further speaks of an "overall pattern of corrosion" playing a "significant part" in the ship's loss, and of "a wasted structure which required frequent and extensive repairs".

The master was criticised for having assumed, wrongly, that the ingress of water in this tank had taken place through cracks he had noticed in the main deck plating.

However, the report also acknowledged that he was "acting under duress, and had to take decisions quickly". Both the master and crew "were confronted with a situation outside their experience and scope".

While criticising the master for not immediately heaving to and reducing speed to the minimum once he knew the ship was in distress, and for not promptly informing the coastal authorities, it concludes that his actions "made no significant contribution to the loss of the ship". In the same vein, "it could not be established that any alternative courses of action would have affected the final outcome of the Erika". These conclusions are in sharp contrast to the substantial blame attached to the master by Rina.

The principal conclusion about the most probable flooding sequence was qualified with the opening phrase, "On a balance of probability and of best fit with the observations", and summarised as follows; "The initial and main source of ingress of sea water was most likely in way of number two starboard segregated ballast tank side shell, due to failure of the ship's side shell plating above the mean waterline in the forward part of the tank between frames 70 and 74."

The report states that, "It was not possible to be precise about the size or exact position of the [initial] hole or split in the side shell, other than the likelihood that it was some distance above the mean waterline."

Cracking

The report supports "the likelihood that cracking developed from this point and resulted in the complete separation of a large section of the side shell structure" and suggests: "It could be that this, like the cracking in the deck, was symptomatic of the detachment of frames."

The initiation and progression of the structural degradation is described as "a likely combination" of several factors that caused a local failure leading to progressive collapse. These are listed as corrosion, local cracks and failure, quality of repairs carried out at the special survey in 1998, quality of surveys carried out by Rina, ship design vulnerabilities, and sea conditions.

The report says that the investigating team's analysis indicated that the ship should not have been overwhelmed by the waveloads encountered during her last voyage or by the hull loading, even taking into account the reduced thickness measured during the last special survey.

What stands out perhaps most from the report is the perennial problem of lack of adequate information. The Maltese authorities even claim that access to "certain" information was "blocked", and that this may have had an effect on the outcome of the investigation.

Adamant

The report is adamant that "neither the flag state nor the fact that the ship was registered in Malta can be considered to be contributors to the loss." It also says that "no evidence was found of the Malta flag administration requesting any classification society to lower standards."

Nonetheless, it suggests there is room for improving the flag state's capabilities of verification and monitoring of recognised organisations, and for attending a larger sample of its ships and companies undergoing surveys and audits.

In addition, it suggests there is scope for expanding the flag state inspection programme, including enhanced inspections, and the worldwide network of flag state inspectors.

Aline De BievreLloyd's Casualty Week, Vol. 322 No. 3,13 October 2000