News item

Citation

Levinson, J. (2005), "News item", Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 14 No. 2. https://doi.org/10.1108/dpm.2005.07314bab.001

News item

Background

Close to 9:45p.m. (2145) on the evening of 7 October 2004, hours after the end of a Jewish holiday, an explosion brought down some ten storeys of the Taba Hilton Hotel, just several hundred meters inside the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula, south of the Israeli border. The hotel, built in 1982 before Israel relinquished control of Taba, is traditionally popular with Israeli tourists. Israeli radio quoted Egyptian television as claiming the explosion was the result of a gas leak from gas balloons. Thirty minutes later there were two other explosions at tourist facilities in the Sinai Peninsula. There could no longer be any doubt. These were terrorist acts. It was later determined that the explosions were detonated as vehicle bombs.

One of the first issues was how many people were injured and killed. Due to inconsistent spokesmanship, the number kept fluctuating. This was heard more on the radio than seen in the newspapers, though the phenomenon was also present in the written press.

8 October 2004

The following morning the Jerusalem Post ran a lead article, “Dozens Feared Dead … ” The newspaper quoted Egyptian television as stating that there were 23 fatalities. (This was before heavy equipment was brought in for extrication.)

On the same day, Yediot set the number of dead at a minimum of 30. Yated cited a similar number. Whereas the Post had only one article of coverage alongside four others on the front page, Yediot devoted five pages to the incident. This was done by heavy use of photographs, including large size, to fill space without verbiage at a time when there was a paucity of hard facts available. One article filled space by giving a short history of the hotel, opened before Taba was transferred from Israeli to Egyptian control in 1989.

In a front page headline, Maariv set the death count at a minimum of 35. An article on p. 2 set the number at 30, probably before the number changed. Maariv took the same tack as Yediot, filling space with large pictures. There was, however, more analysis – off-the-cuff and standard politics given lack of facts.

There was one article about response. Israel reinforced staff at Yoseftal Hospital in Eilat, and the Israel Defense Force set up a field hospital on the Israeli side of the border. ZAKA hired two private planes to bring equipment and volunteers to Eilat.

HaModia reported that by 2345, 43 Israeli wounded were brought to Yoseftal Hospital for treatment. (This was before the border was closed for several hours by Egyptian authorities.)

From the very beginning it was unclear to Israelis what their role was in Taba. At 0607 Israel radio reported in a live broadcast that ZAKA, army and police responders were waiting four hours at the border for clearance to enter Egypt. No bodies had yet been removed from the Hilton, because ZAKA was not permitted to work. The same report, however, acknowledged that 87 lightly wounded had been evacuated to Yoseftal Hospital in Eilat, and seven more seriously hurt had been flown by helicopter to Soroka Hospital in Beersheva.

10 October 2004

There were no newspapers printed in Israel on 9 October 2004 due to the Jewish Sabbath.

In the press on 10 October there still was considerable confusion about what exactly had happened. Haaretz ran a lead headline citing five Israeli dead and eight missing. The accompanying article stated that disaster responders smuggled the body of a three-year-old out of Egyptian territory to the Center for Forensic Medicine in Tel Aviv-Yafo. (On 14 October Index Dati quote the head of ZAKA as taking responsibility for that act. According to the quote, the police thought the flesh belonged to a dog, but ZAKA to the rescue – ZAKA identified the remains as human, and smuggled them into Israel)[1]. An article on p. 2 of the newspaper cited sources claiming Egyptians stole personal property of Israelis who had been in hotel rooms. As to the timetable of the response, Haaretz reported that only on Friday afternoon did a heavy-duty crane arrive at the scene; it was used to lift stone weighing 60 tons. The Egyptian extrication team arrived from Cairo on Saturday morning.

The English edition of Haaretz had an article belying a common disaster myth. The article described how tourists (i.e. victims) took control of the situation and saved a wounded Israeli. The victims were not helpless as is often contended.

On the same morning the Jerusalem Post ran a headline that the Israeli death toll could top 20. In a front-page article the Post quoted a ZAKA volunteer from Jerusalem who complained that the Egyptian stacked bodies in an unrefrigerated area. This criticism was voiced at the same time the Israeli government was emphasizing positive cooperation with Egypt. As a volunteer organization ZAKA does not feel itself bound by government spokesmanship policy. A very candid article on p. 3 put part of the blame for non-cooperation on Israeli arrogance. Amongst other things, Israeli responders wanted to cross the border without passports or even lists of people in response teams.

Yated had an interesting note. It described sheets hanging from upper-storey windows. Those sheets, tied together into chains, had been used to lower people to the ground.

Yediot had a short description of the work of two Israeli doctors who were staying in the hotel at the time. Part of the problem they encountered was no electricity. It was a shame that the report was not much more detailed.

A senior Israeli police officer was quoted as complaining that the Egyptians transferred bodies from Taba to Nuweiba without notifying the Israelis. (One wonders why a sovereign state has to notify a foreign country before bodies are moved.) It was also noted that the Egyptians “forgot” bagged body pieces in Taba. The same policeman was quoted in Maariv as saying that if the tragedy had occurred in Israeli territory, victim identification would have taken much less time.

On p. 19 Yediot noted that ZAKA had received special permission to work on the Jewish Sabbath to help save lives. The source was not noted. ZAKA put out a press release attributing the decision to the Chief Rabbi.

On p. 13 of Maariv there was an account of an attempt to evacuate a bleeding Israeli to Eilat. The vehicle transporting him was held up by Egyptian security guards.

11 October 2004

On 11 October a lead article in the Jerusalem Post cited uncertainty that still lingered concerning the exact number of fatalities. The number fluctuated from 32 to 35. It was reported that Egypt was not releasing bodies before their “nationality” (i.e. identification) was proven by DNA. (It would be quite unreasonable to surmise that the Egyptians could release a body before determination of nationality.)

A reporter wrote on p. 2 that an Israeli rescue worker snuck him past Egyptian guards, then guided him through the bombed hotel. (This writer is of the opinion that although the reporter might have earned a scoop on reporting of looting, the rescue worker certainly abused his position and should be disciplined by his sponsoring organization.).

By Tuesday, 11 October, much of the newspaper coverage turned to the victims. Yediot ran a front page picture of a family of five; the wife and two sons had been killed. The inside pages of the newspaper had additional stories about those killed. According to Yediot, at the end of the extrication operation the Israeli death total stood at 12 of the 32 who perished.

One article in Yediot pinpointed a problem in victim repatriation. On 10 October three of six bodies of Israelis were transferred by mistake from Nuweibah to Sharam-Al-Sheikh. Instead of raising the issue of a diplomatic issue, the newspaper would have shown more professional understanding, had it cited cases of mistaken body shipment in other disasters. Needless to say, the mistake was rectified. Maariv took a much more understanding position, describing the clear willingness of the Egyptians to correct their error.

Page 6 of Yediot carried a picture from archives of ZAKA leader Yehudah Meshi Zahav, telling of his personal problems in arriving at the scene. He mentioned leaving his family after he had promised his children that they would go out together. He did not mention waiting ten hours at the border until clearance could be arranged for his volunteer group.

A short note on p. 7 was of particular importance. The Egyptians could not let the Israel Army (IDF) take control of an area in the Sinai. The solution was that the Israel police was given control of a zone. The IDF then worked under the Israel police. (Within Israel the IDF is not allowed to exercise authority over a civilian area, except in times of war; again, authority is given to the police, whom the army assists.)

An ugly side of the incident was described on p. 8. Israelis complained of extensive thefts after the bombing – from cars, from hotel rooms, and from bodies. What was not mentioned is that theft of identification papers complicated victim identification. Although bodies are certainly not identified based on content of the pockets, those papers certain can be of assistance.

In an interview on Israel Channel 2, the head of ZAKA complained that Egyptians were robbing property under the auspices of Egyptian security forces. This was followed by another interview, this time with an Israeli police officer, who stated that recovered property had been brought to the Eilat police station.

Professor Yehuda Hiss, chief pathologist at the Center for Forensic Medicine in Tel Aviv-Yafo, was quoted in an article in Haaretz. He explained that most injuries were from bomb repercussions and burns. At least nine of the Israeli dead were identified by DNA. The English edition of Haaretz explained that DNA post mortem samples were taken by Israeli experts in Egypt, then compared at the Center with ante mortem samples supplied by families. In that way it was determined which bodies were of Israelis.

Weekly press

The 14 October issue of the weekly, HaShavua Biyrushalayim, gave a breakdown of times involved in the response. At 2149 Israel responders received notification of a major disaster. The other two bombings took place minutes after 2200. At 0100 the Egyptians allowed a small number of ambulances to cross the border; at 0600 the Egyptians allowed in Israeli extrication teams, after they realized that the five-man Egyptian team was insufficient.

The newspaper reported that in parallel, only at 0545 did the injured receive first aid at the explosion site in Ras Al-Satan. (There was no discussion of the professional problem of handling three simultaneous incidents in the same broad jurisdiction, the Sinai Peninsula – a large area with sparse population and settled areas far apart from each other.)

Jay Levinson

This author finds such behaviour abhorrent and a violation of Egyptian sovereignty. One wonders how Israeli police and army allow continued connection with ZAKA, if this is the way their volunteers act. The incident raises numerous questions about fielding volunteers, particularly by a country when working abroad.