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FORMALISM OR ANTI‐FORMALISM: REGULATION AND THE BANK OF ENGLAND

IAN ROBINSON (LECTURER IN LAW)
ROGER HUSSEY (NWIS PROFESSOR OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, AT THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST OF ENGLAND.)

Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance

ISSN: 1358-1988

Article publication date: 1 February 1995

88

Abstract

The supervisory authority of the Bank of England derives from tradition and statute. The interplay of these two factors can be analysed by applying a formalist/anti‐formalist model. In this paper this has been developed to explain the regulatory cycle and the reasons why anti‐formalism has been adopted. Evidence of recent events in the banking industry has been used to support the argument and explain the actions of the Bank of England.

Citation

ROBINSON, I. and HUSSEY, R. (1995), "FORMALISM OR ANTI‐FORMALISM: REGULATION AND THE BANK OF ENGLAND", Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Vol. 3 No. 2, pp. 129-134. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb024835

Publisher

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MCB UP Ltd

Copyright © 1995, MCB UP Limited

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