The simultaneous policy

Citation

Bunzl, J. (2001), "The simultaneous policy", European Business Review, Vol. 13 No. 3. https://doi.org/10.1108/ebr.2001.05413cab.006

The simultaneous policy

John BunzlJohn Bunzl is Director, Martin Bunzl International Ltd, London.

Keywords World economy, Globalization, Regulations, Environment

The principal barrier to implementation of any significant measure to improve today's environmental, economic or social problems, be they in advanced, developing or non-industrialised countries, is destructive competition. Global de-regulated capital flows and corporations know no national boundaries and, by their ability or threat to move elsewhere, force nations to compete with one another for capital, jobs (and therefore votes) and ever scarcer natural resources.

With increased government reliance on capital markets to finance public deficits and on corporations to maintain employment, internationally mobile capital effectively precludes the implementation of any national policy that might incur market or corporate displeasure. The markets have consequently engineered strong leverage over the economic, social and environmental policies adopted by any country, ensuring that only market-friendly, neo-liberal policies are pursued – regardless of the party in power. The result is the stranglehold of pseudo-democracy in which, whatever party we elect, the policies delivered remain substantially the same. Since virtually all nations are part of an increasingly integrated global economy, they are all subject to the same stranglehold. In advanced countries, it is exerted directly by the market itself, ably assisted by the WTO; in developing countries, by the market and through "structural adjustment" imposed by the IMF or the World Bank; in non-industrialised countries by the virtual absence of any foreign direct investment, leaving them to the consequences of warfare, poverty, disease, increasing numbers of refugees and so on.

No nation can exit from this predicament by seeking to re-regulate financial markets, because such action would cause capital flight, devaluation and inflation, if not outright economic collapse. Similarly, policies that seek to address environmental or social problems requiring higher public spending or higher costs for industry are precluded on the grounds of uncompetitiveness, adverse market reaction and the threat of job losses. In de-regulating capital markets, nations have therefore unleashed a force they can no longer unilaterally control – a global competitive merry-go-round, now spinning so fast that no nation can get off (unless it is forcibly ejected by the market itself).

My book therefore argues, first, that politics – regardless of the party in power – has effectively been paralysed into a market-friendly position from which it cannot escape. Second, it argues that fundamental changes to the capitalist system are essential before there can be any hope of closing the "sustainability gap" or of expecting any tangible results from international agreements on reduced emissions. Third, since capitalism can only be changed and controlled by politics – which has itself already been paralysed – we are heading for environmental, economic or social collapse without the means to alter that course. Solutions that fail to address the central barrier to reform that global-free markets and international competition represent are therefore effectively dead in the water.

In spite of this state of affairs, my book sets out a feasible means not only of regaining control of global financial markets and corporations, but of going much further towards creating the conditions for a global society and economy more compatible with nature and the needs of human nature. The disturbing growth of far-right political parties is a sure sign that failure to do so could well prove catastrophic. This book therefore argues that a fundamental transformation from international competition to global cooperation is required, for only through global co-operation between nation states can destructive competition be eliminated and meaningful changes implemented. Crucially, it also sets out a practical method of achieving this. It therefore represents something of a "missing link" without which the many solutions now being proposed by leading economists and ecologists are likely to remain confined largely to theory.

To break the vicious circle of global competition, both between nations and between corporations, all nations need to act simultaneously by implementing the simultaneous policy (SP); a range of measures to re-regulate global markets and corporations in order to restore genuine democracy, environmental protection and peace around the world. SP thus calls on peoples all over the world to recognise the futility of conventional party politics and to unite both by taking policy out of the hands of politicians and, by force of their numbers and their votes, by bringing political parties into competition with one another to adopt SP. By separating the adoption of SP from its implementation, SP transcends party-political differences and allows voters, NGOs, politicians and governments to adopt it without risking their respective personal or national interests. It therefore represents political action of a kind not yet seen: a new politics of cooperation and community which transcends both the divisions of conventional party politics and the dilemmas of maintaining international competitiveness. SP thus offers a real prospect – perhaps the only prospect – of beneficial change and survival.

This new politics has profound implications for north-south relations, the global environment, world economics, global governance, Green parties, non-governmental organisations, international relations, national domestic politics and, not least, for the triumph of the human spirit.

The idea of SP was first aired in a letter to Mr Satish Kumar at "Resurgence", in November 1998 and has evolved gradually over the course of many months. During that time, various pre-publication versions have been circulated to a number of eminent ecologists, counter-economists and others. Although there has been much encouraging praise, it is also certainly necessary to consider their criticisms. Before doing so, however, I feel obliged to make a point of self-criticism.

I am keenly aware that, at least at the time of writing, my lifestyle is very much at odds with what I have written regarding the need to liberate oneself from the masters of greed and envy and to recognise that "humanity cannot live by bread alone". My family and I live in a very large house, enjoy holidays abroad, have three children attending private school and so on. Yet in those circumstances the idea for SP came to me in a split second and, therefore, completely by surprise. Since I sincerely believe and stand by what I have written, my current lifestyle leaves me in something of an embarrassing situation and wide open to charges of hypocrisy. I can only say that my dilemma is, I suppose, one that so many of us share to a greater or lesser extent. What must be our common struggle along the road of transformation will therefore be one shared by me in the recognition that I have further to travel than most.

As far as criticism offered by others is concerned, the main one is that, in assuming that the individual policies that would make up SP can and will be arrived at, I am presuming a universal vantage point of rationality: a presumption that one can define reforms that can both be successfully applied world-wide and also be beneficial to everybody. Indeed, it is suggested by some critics that such a "vantage point" or global "solution" probably cannot exist at all. Instead they argue that human nature and experience suggest that reform is more likely to arise through a myriad smaller-scale initiatives of various kinds occurring all over the world. Initially such initiatives will be seen, as many of them are today, as unorthodox but over time they will gradually be adopted, they say, as mainstream practice. Leading on from this is their criticism that the SP approach is too "top-down" and authoritarian. In addition, it has also been asserted that, even if support for the concept of SP were to become widespread, the differences of opinion and of priorities among supporters over what specific measures would be appropriate would, they say, make it impossible to come to any kind of final agreement. A further criticism concerns the implementation of existing environmental and other policies. It is feared that nations might use SP as an excuse to delay the implementation of those policies until adoption by all countries had been achieved.

I certainly understand these criticisms and, to some extent, accept them and have amended more recent versions of this paper to answer them. There are, however, some points I would like to make:

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  Taking the last of these criticisms first, I cannot really see that SP will be used as an excuse for delay. Every policy needs to be tested using the criteria of whether its unilateral implementation would have a negative or positive impact on national competitiveness. If it is negative, then that policy is never going to get implemented without global agreement in any case and should therefore be included in SP. Governments pondering policies that are positive, on the other hand, will surely want to implement them as soon as possible regardless, because, if they waited for SP, they would lose their competitive advantage. In fact, a clearer distinction between the two types of policy would make them mutually reinforcing, providing a better focus for both governments and campaigners alike, while helping to mobilise public support both for SP and for unilaterally implementable policies.

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  On the point of a presumption of a universal vantage point of rationality, while it may be difficult today to imagine that policies desirable for the whole world could be successfully defined, we can already see how many problems of the economy, the environment and other aspects of life are becoming truly global in scope and, furthermore, are being made worse by global competition. As it becomes more intense, however, it is in the very nature of competition that the co-operative actions necessary to solve the problems it causes tend to become increasingly obvious. It is a bit like a competitive game a group of children might decide to make up together, when there is no adult around to oversee and, if necessary, force cooperation upon them. Inevitably the children find that not all necessary rules can be defined right from the start, so the game has to be tried out and further rules made up as they go along. As the game develops, and if competition risks getting out of hand, appropriate rules tend to emerge to regulate that competition – rules which can, hopefully, be agreed upon by all the children and implemented by all (simultaneously!) to avoid the game degenerating into a small war.

Indeed in the evolving game of global competitive capitalism, already today we can see proposals for policies based on global simultaneous implementation emerging; the most obvious being the Tobin Tax. Another would be US Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton's legislation introduced into the House of Representatives (HR-2545), calling for the abandonment of US nuclear weapons, when all nuclear states do likewise. As far as any future regulation of transnational corporations is concerned, surely it is difficult to see how any significant regulation could possibly be implemented on any basis other than globally and simultaneously.

In conclusion, therefore, I would say that, as global competition intensifies further, such a "universal vantage point of rationality" can exist and is already beginning to emerge. As competition becomes even more acute, further simultaneous policies will inevitably continue to emerge, the proposals in this book representing but a part of that inevitable process.

It should, perhaps, also be pointed out that many of the measures of SP are likely to be characterised by their reversal of current destructive trends rather than by any risky imposition of untried policies that break new ground. For SP is really nothing new in the sense that, throughout human history, governments and laws have evolved in response to changes in society brought about by technical changes and other developments – what we sometimes call "progress". Inevitably, each new development had an impact on society on an ever-larger scale. With each, new societal problems arose requiring legislation and government to regulate and solve them, albeit imperfectly. Such regulation has also traditionally been implemented simultaneously and "globally"; i.e. "globally" in the sense of applying to the entire territory in question – usually a nation. The problem of international competition could be said to be merely an extension of that process of new development. But now the problems caused are international and global, not merely national, and, furthermore, they are actually eroding the ability of nations to maintain previously attained levels of regulation/taxation and, instead, are forcing them to progressively dismantle them. As a response, SP would therefore not necessarily mean that its measures would be much different in character from those implemented nationally in the past. What would mainly be new is that those "old" policies would be implemented by all nations simultaneously. While this might be rather "unified and top-down", it would restore proper democratic governance over the world economy in contrast with what we have today, which is the reverse; the world economy dictating to the world's peoples. So yes, SP is unified and somewhat "top-down" but it is necessarily so. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that, while its effects may be top-down, its support derives solely from individuals, which is very much "bottom-up" and democratic. Furthermore, the limited scope for SP means that it does not represent an alternative to local, small-scale initiatives but, rather, is entirely complementary to them.

As to actually defining and agreeing the SP measures themselves, it will doubtless be very difficult to do so but not, I think, impossible. So to write off the whole project in advance, as some critics would, on the assertion that "agreement will be impossible", seems to me a rather high-handed, negative and unwarranted position to take. Surely there must be much upon which we can agree and what cannot be agreed upon, or is in doubt, can be left out.

Then, of course, there is the most common criticism of them all: "Yes, but is it realistic?" In posing the question of realism, however, people tend to forget that in this context it has two aspects. The first, most obvious one is whether it is realistic to expect that adoption by all nations could actually be achieved. To this, there are, perhaps, two responses. The first was given by Noam Chomsky, who said of SP; "Can it work? Certainly worth a serious try." The second is: If we do not try, we will never find out. Anyway, if there is no better proposal on the table and disaster is looming, what do we have to lose? The second, less obvious aspect, raised by the question of realism, is fear. Even those who would broadly agree with the problem analysis in this book suggest that financial market re-regulation will occur first, they say, in the EU, with the USA following soon after (or vice versa). Thereafter, all other nations are expected to fall into line (Hines, 2000). But given the potential dangers of capital flight and the consequent fear of being the first to "go-it-alone", and given our undeniable human nature, is it realistic to expect, say, the EU to take that risk alone? After all, the leaders of the EU and their citizens might well ask: "Why should we be the first ones to stick our heads over the top of the trench?" Indeed, why should they? So we come down to a simple fact of human nature: the fact of fear. In putting forward solutions, I believe it is fundamentally unrealistic to ignore that fact. To the extent that SP takes this aspect of human nature fully into account it is, I suggest, very realistic.

As a final comment, while a multiplicitous, fragmentary approach to solving problems may, under normal circumstances, be more in tune with human nature, I believe we should remember that the world does not have unlimited time in which to solve its problems. Global warming, deforestation, violent technologies and far-right political parties are not standing still. Indeed, they are already now unmistakably threatening humanity's future. In considering whether our problems require small, fragmentary solutions or a big, unified one, it may be recalled that even Schumacher, in Small Is Beautiful, himself recognised "the duality of the human requirement when it comes to the question of size …", that "We need the freedom of lots and lots of small, autonomous units and, at the same time, the orderliness of large-scale, possibly global, unity and co-ordination" (Schumacher, 1974).

How much longer, therefore, can we afford the luxury of following only a local, fragmentary approach?