Will Israel survive?

Citation

Du Broff, S. (2003), "Will Israel survive?", European Business Review, Vol. 15 No. 3. https://doi.org/10.1108/ebr.2003.05415cab.002

Will Israel survive?

Sidney Du BroffSidney Du Broff is a Chicago-born writer and filmmaker who now lives in London.

Keywords: Israel, Politics AbstractIt has become commonplace in Europe, and the West more generally, to think of the State of Israel as a powerful nation, secure in the knowledge of American support. The author who has strong connections with Israel and has studied it over many years, is critical of this view. The relationship between the USA and Israel is, he argues, ambiguous and fraught with tension. Yet Israelis depend on America, and are aware at all times of their vulnerability to attack. This sense of vulnerability should be borne in mind by Europeans as they engage with Israel and the complexities of Middle East politics.

For those within the Arab/Muslim world fighting against Israel, this is a war. For Israelis it is a Holocaust, as they cower at home, too frightened to walk down the street in their own country, painfully aware of the thousands who have already been murdered and maimed, and wonder who amongst them will be next. They wait, in vain, like the earlier victims, for deliverance; the difference now is that this is their own government, whom they elected, toward whom they look for protection, and from whom they get none.

The government of Israel, inhibited by imposed – and self-imposed – constraints, hopes that the terrorists will get tired of killing them ultimately, and decide that there is more in it for them – and for those they claim to represent – to come to some kind of arrangement, which will provide them with more than they have currently. But why, many radical Arabs ask, should they settle for some, when they can have it all?

Ariel Sharon, cast by many as the "villain of the piece" connected with Sabra and Shatila, has been trying to recast himself as a "moderate." He enlisted the aid of Yasser Arafat's good friend and fellow peace prize laureate, Shimon Peres, hoping that by proximity, some of Peres' moderation might rub off on him. This required that he ignore the effects of "Islamist" suicide bombers, and, at the same time, he hoped it would create a more sympathetic climate in Europe toward Israel, as the blood of its people stained the streets of Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and elsewhere. But this had to be a forlorn hope, since Europe, fully engulfed in the Arab pocket, and committed to the Arab cause, commercially, socially and historically, made it abundantly clear that while they "deplored" attacks on civilians, they "fully understood the reasons for it."

Whilst Israeli vulnerability is largely self-imposed, the command structure that requires it does not have its origin on Mount Sinai, but comes down, rather, from the lofty heights of Washington DC. This Eleventh Commandment – "Thou Shall Not Adequately Defend Thyself" – is an old one, and has prevented Israel from winning the war, merely some of the battles, however impressive. Contrary to what some people think, all previous American Administrations have been profoundly hostile toward Israel, doing whatever they could to ensure that Israel would disappear. At the same time, they tried to demonstrate their unequivocal and unwavering support.

This is an old position, going back to 1936, when Franklin Roosevelt, the then President of the USA, seen as a friend to the Jewish people – signed an agreement with King Ibn Saud, who named Saudi Arabia after himself. The aim of this agreement was, at least according to the Saudi interpretation thereof, to ensure that there would never be a free and independent State of Israel. In general, American presidents are guided by the US State Department, whose officials historically emphasise caution rather than bold steps. Conflict, they instinctively believe, should be avoided at almost all costs.

To quote Aarons and Loftus in their book, Unholy Trinity, published by the St Martin's Press, "In April 1943, a conference of British and American officials formally decided that nothing should be done about the Holocaust, and ruled out all plans for mass rescue." At war's end, the relatively few who survived still found their way blocked into (pre-Independence) Israel, by Britain, and by an equally intransigent USA, who made that aspect of its policy expediently less conspicuous.

In the process of bringing in "illegals," where American ports were involved, US governmental agencies tracked these ships and reported their movements to the British, who were able successfully to intercept them. (see Running The Palestine Blockade, by Captain Rudolph W. Patzert, published by Airlife Books). America, at the time when Israel proclaimed her independence, imposed an arms embargo on Israel and revoked the citizenship of those who went there to fight. At the UN, however, America displayed its prominent second face, by rushing ahead of the Soviet Union to be the first to recognise the newly independent State of Israel. Having defeated the Arab powers (largely created and equipped by Britain), there were no obstacles for Israel on the way to Cairo or Damascus, where a permanent peace agreement could have been concluded, were Israel not compelled to throw away her victory. The wars that followed were but temporary triumphs for Israel, whose policies have been confused largely because of the ambiguities inherent in her alliance with the USA. US foreign policy, although overtly "pro-Israel," is also concerned with appeasing allies in the Arab world, even when the regimes in question are dictatorial and pose a direct threat to Israel's survival.

Israel was not short of intelligence before the 1973 war, but her government chose to ignore the signals. Even King Hussein of Jordan took the trouble to fly to Israel to explain to Prime Minister Golda Meir what was about to happen. Hussein, always a pragmatist, knew that another Israeli-Arab war was against his interests, and those of his people. He was also not at all well pleased with his Arab neighbours, who had drawn him into the Six Day War in 1967, which was disastrous for Jordan and resulted (among other things) in the loss of the West Bank. Yet even King Hussein's warnings went largely unheeded by an Israeli administration that had grown complacent. It was as if the illustrious Minister of Defence, Moshe Dayan, assumed that his existence was the ultimate deterrent.

When crisis finally came, the Israeli authorities telephoned Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State, who also happened to be Jewish. In desperation, the Israelis appealed to be supplied with arms, to defend themselves against the new threat from their neighbours. Kissinger would not take the call. They tried again. He would not take that call either. It must have been apparent, to even the less politically astute Israelis by this time, that sections of the US Administration were prepared to see them disappear. The Administration – and most especially the State Department – was concerned, for political and economic reasons (i.e. oil), to build bridges towards the Arab world and its rulers. In that sense, Israel was a thorn in the American's side. When they woke up to this situation, the Israeli authorities changed tack. They threatened to use nuclear weapons unless they were supplied immediately with conventional arms. Kissinger got the message: Israel was re-supplied forthwith.

Early on in the reign of President Bush Senior, he and Saddam were on first name terms and Saddam was under the distinct impression that Bush had no strong objections to his, Saddam's, adventures in Kuwait. This may have been reinforced by the fact that the USA had already supplied Iraq with 5 billion dollars' worth of aid, meant to support a close ally against an implacable enemy: Iran.

The current Bush Presidency, with its willingness to confront the State Department, is the best one Israel has ever had. But even then, in its eagerness to trawl for allies in the Arab/Muslim world (there are very few), Bush has prevented Israel from employing any kind of meaningful defence, which might have put a permanent end to radical Arab and "Islamist" terrorism there. The USA may well be at war when you read this, in conjunction with its "coalition" partner of one; Bush would no doubt like to finish what his father failed to finish.

The fact is, Israel will never ever live in peace with her neighbours, simply because her neighbours' rulers do not want her there, no matter how many concessions she is prepared to make. Painfully aware of this, in a permanent state of shock resulting from the events of the last more than two years, Israelis will start to look elsewhere for safer places in which to live, where they can feel more confident that their children will have the opportunity to grow up. Already 20 per cent are considering emigration. Thus weakened, Israel becomes even more vulnerable. Under the circumstances, it is hard to perceive how a nation, permanently under siege, can survive. The Passover prayer, "Next Year in Jerusalem," already needs to be altered to "Thank God I'm not in Jerusalem."