When will the British finally let go of Iraq?

Citation

Alsaigh, H. (2003), "When will the British finally let go of Iraq?", European Business Review, Vol. 15 No. 6. https://doi.org/10.1108/ebr.2003.05415fab.002

When will the British finally let go of Iraq?

Hani Alsaighis an Archaeologist and Founder of the Islamic Museum Project. He is based in London, UK

AbstractThe history of British involvement in Iraq has been largely one of incompetence and bad faith, according to tha author, who was a political opponent of Saddam Hussein. Indeed, it is argued, it was British misinterpretations of the Iraqi people’s needs and wishes that created the conditions for Baathist dictatorship. The author believes that Britain’s political class have learned little from past failures in Iraq, and still hanker after influence in the Middle East. The conventional wisdom is also challenged by suggesting that it is the British Government of Tony Blair that is influencing the US Administration of George W. Bush. Many of the author’s conclusions might seem controversial or surprising to the European reader. They are based on the author’s perspective as a member of the Iraqi opposition and remind us of the complex nature of Iraqi and Middle Eastern politics.

Keywords: History, Iraq, United Kingdom, International politics

During the first Gulf War, a British diplomat from the Iraqi club invited me to attend a meeting at Chatham House, on 14 March 1991, to select a new leader for Iraq. I was assuming that I would be chosen as leader of the opposition. The people at this conference were religious Shia from Iraq, along with Ahmed Chalabi, whose “Iraqi National Congress” has received wide publicity in the West, and others whom I had not seen before associated with the Iraqi opposition. I was surprised that the real Iraqi opposition leaders had not been invited. In addition, there was the US ambassador to Britain and the head of the CIA in the UK. The meeting was co-ordinated by Edward Mortimer, former Foreign Affairs editor of the Financial Times, and then considered to be an expert on Iraq. I felt that I had elevated him to this position by introducing him to the Iraqi opposition in exile in this country, after we met and became close friends in 1976.

At that time, the Iraqi opposition was not very politically active, fearing Baathist spies in London and the 5,000 Iraqi students working for the Baghdad regime. I was not afraid of the Baath Party and its embassy here, and remained an activist in the Arab student union. I got my information via Edward Mortimer from US sources. To my surprise though, a religious Shia man was chosen as leader; it seemed as though the decision had already been made previously and the conference was a means of affirming that choice. I commented that it was ironic that while the British and the West were prepared to fight religious fundamentalism in Iran, it seemed that they were happy to accept such a prospect as a future administration of Iraq. After that, I was totally ignored by the British authorities, sidelined as an expert on Iraq and not invited to any further discussions concerning its future. I felt that this isolation was connected to the hostility the British felt towards the Shia, who would always refuse to compromise the freedom and wealth of Iraq.

On 29 April of this year however, I was invited, in my capacity as an archaeologist, to a Conference at the British Museum to discuss the issue of the theft of priceless archaeological pieces from the Baghdad Museum as the American forces descended to “liberate” the Iraqi people from a ruthless dictator.

Present were executives of museums from around the world in addition to one of the researchers of the Baghdad Museum, who had apparently escaped the carnage of looting, owing to a British passport, and confirmed that the looters appeared to know what they were looking for. As far as I was concerned the museum had been standing empty since the last Iraq war when the valuable pieces had been hidden for safety. The conference gained a great deal of publicity for the British Museum, but not much more in terms of resolving the mystery of where and how the stolen objects might reappear. The issue remains shrouded in political intrigue, at a level far above the influence of the British Museum. Perhaps the 800-strong recruited CIA team in Iraq might be able to shed some light on the matter.

The intervention of the British Museum in the cultural heritage of Iraq is symbolic of the nature and style of the historic influence of Britain in this area of the Middle East. The shambolic aftermath of the war has seen a lively debate in this country over the question of the whereabouts of the weapons of mass destruction, yet we have failed to ask the essential question which is being pondered by so many Iraqis – where is Saddam Hussein now? With a British passport, it would be a straightforward matter for him to slip back into this country, where, 30 years ago, he was considered to be a friend rather than the enemy. Moreover, where are the 70,000 Tecreti soldiers who are related to him by marriage or blood?

When Britain was concerned about the Shah of Iran in the 1970s, I warned the authorities, as my father advised me, that it was the young Saddam we should have been keeping an eye on as a future problem for the Middle East. Furthermore, it is Saddam Hussein on whom we should be concentrating our energies now.

The British army have always retained a strong presence in the Middle East, occupying the Persian Gulf and Arab Peninsula for the last two centuries, and it is unlikely that they would let go of that now, still less, that they might hand over such influence to the USA. Since the First World War, the British have used a policy of divide and rule in the Middle East, keeping the tribes and various religious factions apart and the Muslim world disunited.

During the Great War, British forces occupied Kuwait and Iraq. They took Basra and set up a multi-religious committee of Iraqi Jews, Christians and Muslims. Then the British-Indian army moved towards Kute and Baghdad, under the command of General Townsend, who was then captured by the Ottoman army, then the rulers of Iraq. The British claimed that they were liberating Iraq from the Ottomans and thus gained the support of Arab Iraqis. However, the religious Muslims in Iraq (the Shia and Sunni) decided to support the Ottomans as fellow-Muslims against the invaders, and set up their own rival army. This led to the arrival of British reinforcements, commanded by General Muod, who communicated the same message of liberation and won over the support of Iraqi soldiers by adopting the Islamic banner. The whole army approached Baghdad with two slightly conflicting war cries – fighting the Christian and liberating Iraq from the Ottoman. But in 1916 after the occupation of Baghdad, General Muod was found dead, in mysterious circumstances, although it was reported in London that he had died of malaria.

From that time up to 1922, Iraq witnessed many changes and many broken promises. Throughout that period, the country was governed by its first Governor, Sir Percy Cox, and his ambitious civil servant, Miss Gertrude Bell, who caused religious strife by playing the tribes off against each other. She became known in Iraq as “the Queen without a crown”, and the British Government came to rely more and more on her reports. She tried to set up a coalition government in Iraq, meeting the leaders of all the tribes and convincing them that they could rule the country. Always, she promised democracy and self-determination. Christians from Iran and India were all imported to form the Iraqi army. In truly Machiavellian style, she even organised a dinner at her residence to which she invited the Shia and Sunni leaders from the different areas of Iraq, promising that they would discuss their future as the next king of Iraq. When all were gathered together in her palace, on the north bank of the Tigris, they were sent to separate quarters, then rounded up, put in the lower deck of a boat and sent to exile in Sri Lanka and India, along with their followers. They remained in exile for 25 years, where some died in prison.

Meanwhile, Miss Bell managed to destabilise the whole situation by using bribery to create tribal war in Najaf and Karbala, dividing the Shia against each other, and separating tribal from religious leaders. Bribery became an established political tool of government. Anyone who worked for the new occupiers was forced to change their lifestyle, dress and language, to speak English and to agree to wear a new headdress, which was approved by the British and replaced the traditional turban. During the 1920s, the British were also communicating with the Hashmate (Hashemite) family in Arabia, promising them a kingdom in return for their support of the British against the Ottomans. Faisul, son of the King of Hijaz, was brought to Iraq through Basra where he was met by Iraqis who took him directly to Najaf. There, he promised the Shia religious leaders to rule Iraq according to the wishes of the Shia. Yet, Britain certainly did not want to accept an Iraqi democracy dominated by a Shia majority, and ensured that a Sunni became Prime Minister on their terms, while Faisul was put under pressure to remain a puppet king subject to British instruction. Only two of the 20 ministers in the government were Shia; the rest being Sunni although they represented only 25 per cent of the population.

The British appointed King Faisul as king on condition that he sign over to his colonial masters ownership of the oilfields of Kirkuk and Basra and control of the military. Even the King’s children were educated by British nannies sent over from Devon. However, King Faisul reacted to this forced Anglicisation by becoming more sympathetic to the Shia, appointing one of the Chalabis to be the first Shia minister of the government. We believe that it was for this reason that King Faisul was summoned to Britain and returned as a corpse after supposedly falling ill. His son, King Ghazi was also killed in mysterious circumstances, and was succeeded by his son King Faisul II.

The history of Iraq, has, in addition, been a history of Anglo-American rivalry. When the British saw that Iraq was becoming more pro-American, they instigated a coup in 1958 in which the monarchy was annihilated by the Iraqi army, and the Bedouin tribe became the favoured one owing to their willingness to accept British bribery. At that time, the young Saddam Hussein was a corporal in the army. He was one of three adopted young men chosen to lead the Iraqi government. His upbringing was brutal and loveless, and his ruthless nature was a habit learned from childhood survival. When he packed the army, government and administration with his fellow Bedouin, I was forced to leave Iraq.

I believe that it is this under-current Anglo-American war for influence that has led to the reporting of so-called American mismanagement of the peace in Iraq following the recent military campaign to overthrow Saddam’s regime. The British would like to see the Shia kept firmly under control, whereas the Americans would prefer to elevate the Shia. The problem is that Britain is still nostalgic for her former role as a colonial expert and would like to portray the US army and administration as insensitive and incompetent in the Middle East. Sadly though, Britain’s over-inflated profile needs US military might and technology and political and financial influence to provide the support and backing. However, the USA cannot admit that it is Tony Blair who is controlling George Bush, and not the other way round. Since 11 September, it is Mr Blair who has been urging his Republican friend to go to war. It is, after all, the British civil service and British intelligence that controls and monitors the Gulf region.

We can only second guess what the long-standing and much-relished British influence in Iraq will lead to in future foreign policy decisions concerning Iran, Syria and Turkey. The prospect of democracy and self-determination in the Middle East holds out as much hope now as it did in 1919.