The future of European democracy? Three propositions

Citation

Ryser, J. (2004), "The future of European democracy? Three propositions", European Business Review, Vol. 16 No. 1. https://doi.org/10.1108/ebr.2004.05416aab.004

The future of European democracy? Three propositions

Judith RyserCityScope Europe, London, UK

Abstract One of the problems underlying European integration is the apparent incompatibility between widening and deepening. At one level, enlargement of the European Union (EU) is embraced enthusiastically, absorbing an ever wider range of political cultures and economic structures. Yet simultaneously there is a widespread desire to increase the unification of the EU, so that a common European political identity may be adopted and expressed through a European Constitution. Achieving these two goals often seems somewhat like squaring a circle. With this in mind, some European policy-makers are looking outside the EU to Switzerland, a successful confederation of four language groups that has also preserved an exceptionally high level of decentralisation and participatory democracy. There are some parallels between British and Swiss scepticism about the EU. These are reflected in a recent Anglo-Swiss symposium on the future of Europe that brought forth some exciting possibilities, on which EU policy-makers would be wise to reflect.

Keywords: Democracy, Europe, Switzerland, United Kingdom

Preoccupation with democracy waxes and wanes like the ocean tide. People crave it when they are lacking it, during the cold war, in countries run by tyrants or religious zealots. Comes liberation, euphoria and participation, but soon this withers into apathy, low electoral participation and subsequent frustration and powerlessness. Contextual change contributes to these waves, the mightiness of unaccountable multinational corporations combined with widely distrusted politicians who put presentation before substance, a place in history before public debate, as Noreena Hertz has described in her book, The Silent Takeover (Hertz, 2001). No amount of consumer boycott and protest marches seem able to curb the concentration of unbridled power leading to unjust modern warfare, described as an “uncontrollable autophagous game” (Eco, 2002) or selfish disregard of global solidarity-dependent sustainability (e.g. US withdrawal from the Kyoto agreement and Russia’s dithering with ratification).

Among the latest buzzwords such as “roadmap to peace”, “rogue states” and “axis of evil”, “democracy” is enjoying a comeback. Before rejoicing though, it is worthwhile examining its contemporary meaning, together with those of subsidiarity, federalism, sovereignty, public accountability, referendum and citizenship: all paraphernalia of “governance”. In the UK, the notion of “democracy” tends to be associated with “democratic deficit”, mentioned in the same breath as “threat to sovereignty” by a European “federal superstate” by means of a “written constitution”. Most unpalatably, the latter was prepared by a European convention with a Frenchman at the helm in stormy weather. Surprisingly, the UK government spokesmen saw this as a mere storm in a teacup, a “housekeeping exercise” aimed to consolidate the results of a bumpy historic process compounded by fragmented decision making. Yet for other vocal and alarmist UK factions such as the “No” campaign (set up to oppose British entry to the Euro), the UK is facing the most traumatic onslaught ever on its very existence. Not only will it be deprived of its sovereign powers, but according to the UK Conservative Party spokesmen it will be swamped by an unaccountable central bureaucracy, run by protagonists of sameness, uniformity and rigidity who discard cultural identity and eventually sacrifice national civilisation.

What an opportunity lost! Why did the European Union (EU) enlargement not mobilise the imagination of the best brains of Europe, the most experienced critical thinkers, scientists, artists, and poets? Why did it not engage the citizens, emotions and all? Together they could have developed new forms of co-operation to ensure good living standards for all. They could have invented methods to overcome internal barriers to democracy and created external relations that extended social justice to its neighbours and trading partners. Based on these views and feelings, the EU could have agreed on collective obligations towards the most deprived in the world while consolidating its own powers as a respected partner in global negotiations. Instead, those are heard who want to turn the clock back or go “so far and no further”. Timid politicians failed to open a debate on the future of Europe based on frank and accurate information on Europe today. The biased media dis- and misinformed, using their powers without civic responsibility.

Electoral participation statistics and European opinion polls (recorded in Eurostat and Eurobarometer) demonstrate the lack of UK citizens’ interest in matters European. They are both ignorant of facts and prone to prejudice, aided and abetted by politicians and journalists alike. In the UK, the current calls for a referendum on a European constitution (by the Democracy Movement) and the government’s hesitation on its promised referendum on the Euro vindicate the pertinence of exploring coherent procedures capable of mobilising the active participation of informed European citizens in the development of a Europe with which they can identify.

The moment had come to reflect on “democracy and decentralisation”. The UK+CH British-Swiss Steering Committee on Democracy and Decentralisation commissioned Kobi (2003) with research published by the Centre for Reform in 2003 as “A British-Swiss contribution to the debate on the future of Europe”. In the context of this research on democratic institutions and accountability, three propositions towards the future of Europe were scrutinised during a debate chaired by Diana Wallis MEP and hosted by the Swiss Ambassador to London Bruno Spinner in April 2003, as a contribution to the debate on a European constitution. The propositions are discussed in more detail below, but first it is worth exploring why the UK and Switzerland were co-operating on this matter.

Although Martin (2001) claims that “islanders and highlanders have a lot in common”, an alliance between the “United Kingdom” – a powerful member state of the European Union, with a history of colonial power – and a small “neutral” country made up of a long standing pluricultural citizenry may seem implausible. What they share though is their scepticism towards the EU, one on the fringe of Europe permanently looking towards the USA, the other in the heart of Europe keeping ferociously outside the EU. Their political cultures, however, are at opposite ends. One is a centralised state relying on first past the post voting and confrontational politics, an unelected House of Lords with representatives of the judiciary and the clergy; the other is a confederation of sovereign entities made up of different peoples, speaking different languages and belonging to different religions, run by a political rainbow which has to negotiate in permanence within and between levels of government and is kept in check by direct democracy. Arguably, the former makes for strong government and potentially easy change, the latter for middle of the road politics and slow progress. Or, they may endure democratic deficit on the one hand and excess of democracy on the other hand.

The fact that “Switzerland’s new Federal Constitution” takes up a mere 64 pages of an A5 pamphlet (Swiss Confederation, 2002) should put the mind of British lawyers at rest who are used to linear meters of uncodified law of precedence instead of a written constitution. Besides determining its own powers and obligations and its links with the cantons and their sovereignty, the Swiss Federal Constitution also defines citizens’ rights, including habeas corpus. It also stipulates responsibilities of citizens both for themselves and towards the goals of state and society. Binding or advisory referenda and popular initiatives are a constitutionally guaranteed tool of bottom-up participation.

The Initiative and Referendum Institute Europe (IRI) has carried out a survey of the use of referenda in the European process of consensus building (Hautala et al., 2003). It shows that the Scandinavian countries hold referenda because they are embedded in their constitutions, whereas the UK has only used a one-off nation-wide referendum in 1975. There is clearly a need for ex-ante rules about referenda and other direct citizen involvement in EU affairs. As a first step of bringing the EU closer to its citizens the heads of EU member states postulated at Laeken in December 2001 that as well as national parliaments, European citizens should approve the draft European Constitution directly in binding referenda. However, the sovereign EU member states were deciding for themselves which road to choose towards the next stage of EU development, and only a few chose referenda.

Discussion of the UK+CH propositions towards the new European Constitution

A panel of politicians, diplomats, civil servants and academics from the UK and Switzerland discussed the three propositions on democracy and decentralisation with an invited audience of other constitutional stakeholders and the media.

1. Elected president, accountable senior bureaucrats

The first proposition argues (along with the European Convention (EC) draft treaty) that the European Parliament (EP) should elect the president of the European Commission (CEC) (European Convention, 2003). It also wants the EP to elect separately a “EU foreign minister”. Moreover, heads of relevant EU institutions should be individually accountable and subject to dismissal from office by the EP (not collectively as at present). The argument is that making officials more accountable would strengthen the EP, legitimise greater continuity at the top and thus reduce democratic deficit.

Objectors claimed that indirect elections of the EU’s top executives would increase both political party lines and national allegiance, although Simon Hix’s study on “How MEPs vote” (part of the ESRC research on “One Europe or several” (Ryser, 2003), shows that party allegiance has overtaken national lines. Personalising the EU’s leadership would not bring it closer to its citizens. By curtailing direct bargaining between member states, such elections may amount to more centralisation, thus failing to contribute to a more citizen friendly democracy. Finally, establishing a successful level of international democracy is deemed to weaken inevitably national democracies.

What are the alternatives?. A “plebiscite” for an EU president during elections of the EP would assume that European citizens know about the candidates. Would they be nominated by the national political parties, or could anyone stand? Would this reduce the knowledge deficit about Europe among its citizens, or would they abstain, bewildered by a list of hundreds of names from 25 member states? This alternative sounds neither practical nor more democratic.

What is wrong with keeping a rotating EU presidency? Three arguments were opposed to this solution:

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  lack of continuity;

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  difficulty of EU co-operation with unknown local teams; and

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  time lag between presidencies, especially with 25 or more member states.

However, regarding the first objection, reality shows that the six monthly “national programmes” devised by the countries while they are holding the EU presidency pursued mainly EU policies in the making. Besides shifting some emphasis they added little of their own. An elected president of the European Commission with heads made accountable to the EP could equally well ensure continuity during rotating presidencies.

Second, the difficulties which EU bureaucracies claim to have in getting familiar with the presidency teams shows their remoteness from national polity. Yet many EU officials are not going “native” and keep ties with their nationals. Indeed, some parts of the European Commission were dominated by specific nations and personnel had to be redistributed to curb potential bias, although this will be less possible with enlargement. A strategy of closer co-operation between the EU administration and member states could establish continuous links with national parliaments, Ecosoc, the Committee of Regions and other lobbies established in Brussels, thereby also improving subsidiarity.

Finally, it would admittedly take a long time for each country to reach its turn of presidency. Arguments in favour of a rotating presidency are that during each presidency both the local political élite and citizens would get extra exposure to European issues. By obtaining temporary ownership of a piece of Europe’s destiny, each country could raise citizens’ awareness of their European belonging and demonstrate the relevance of EU membership to their everyday life. In their own interest, countries could mobilise their population for European causes. They could empower them to familiarise their fellow Europeans with their way of life by inviting them to cultural events. This would emphasise the diversity among European peoples while instilling sense to the European umbrella of common goals and achievements.

2. Direct democracy: use of referenda, popular initiatives and e-fora

The second proposition supports the inclusion in the new European constitution of legislative initiatives and referenda for constitutional amendments and relevant procedures, already included in the Laeken declaration. Moreover, it proposes an e-forum for European citizens, enabling them to sign initiatives and to object to transfers of competencies from national to EU levels.

This proposition contradicts the ultra-rational definition of indirect democracy whereby elected representatives are solely responsible for political decisions, regardless of the level of participation in the vote. According to this view, even the current low and declining level of turnouts in European or national elections do not justify referenda. Such emphasis on the nation state would mean the transformation of the EU into a loose intergovernmental institution, leaving accountability and authorisation to the nation states. Lack of a common vision other than economic targets would weaken such an EU even further.

Another objection is that not all nation states have mandatory referenda. They would not be feasible at EU level because a common electoral process without common identity and mutual trust is bound to fail. It could be argued though, that while the EU may lack common identity, this is also true for many member states.

A distinction has to be made between trust in politicians and trust in European institutions. More direct democracy would strengthen European values and its institutions. At present active petitions are current practice at the EP. Citizens are able to put forward their points of view, albeit through their MEPs. This could be extended to consultative interactive e-governance, enabling citizens to sign up for causes that would have to be debated above a certain level of support.

The enlarged EU will have a greater number of citizens on a much smaller territory than the USA where the distance between citizens and institutions is considerable. Although living together in a much smaller space, Europeans do not seem to be either able or willing to learn about their “common Europe”. They could benefit from intermediary institutions which would assist them in gaining a better understanding of the EU and its institutions, bridge the credibility gap between decision makers and citizens and empower citizens to engage more effectively in European affairs.

Genuinely interactive e-government, a sort of “virtual European popular assembly on the Internet” could involve citizens more closely in democratic decision-making processes, provided language problems can be overcome. Yet, in the real world of some 500 million European citizens and residents, a universal communication network may be unrealistic and more pragmatic groupings may emerge by inclination. They may focus on specific sectoral or territorial issues and rely on existing networks and flows of co-operation generated by pressure groups or social movements.

3. Transparency of EU spending

The third proposition demands more transparency into how the taxes raised by the member states are spent by EU institutions. Some think that money talks. For them transparency means the possibility to trace money back to taxpayers’ pockets. This may apply to personal interests but less to mutual or collective interests that may display more inertia towards areas outside their direct sphere of controls.

The view of “who pays when the piper calls the tune” claims that those who pay most should have the greatest say and requires beneficiaries to pay for what they get. This position contradicts the fundamental principles of both democracy and social justice and would make instruments like the EU structure funds redundant. It would exclude both redistribution and regeneration and ultimately question the raison d’être of the EU altogether.

According to another view, transparency encompasses EU accountability. Owing to subsidiarity, member states spend the lion’s share of the EU budget on implementing approved projects. Transparency and accountability has thus to follow the money stream through all levels of political decision making – from the EU to member states and lower levels of regional and local government down to community action. This would imply a clear distribution of competencies, with the European Commission in charge of monitoring and sanctions.

In reality, the internal structure of accountability and transparency varies considerably between member states. Large and small countries lack symmetry regarding power, status and money. Within member states, centralism, creative accounting, diffused double counting, etc. tend to thwart clarity. Using the ultra vires principle in centralised states against supranational consensus building, as well as ultra-decentralised pragmatism in federalist structures, undermines equitable distribution and compensation. The clarity of the power base which nation states inherited from the enlightenment no longer exists in the twenty-first century. Mutually exclusive boundaries have given way to overlapping zones of influence and fuzzy areas criss-crossed by flows of mutual interest. Discrete decisions are substituted by simultaneous negotiations mediated both territorially and functionally. Such a continuous process of consensus building and trade offs may lead to temporary allegiances capable of seeing through a phase of project implementation, only to be disbanded or shifted to other levels for new purposes. Despite these cascading complexities within the EU, there are positive examples of regional co-operation across member state boundaries, some having more tax raising powers than regions within member states.

Why should more transparency of EU finances mobilise citizens in Europe out of their apathy vis-à-vis the EU while they are often alienated at the national level, and while national parliaments and the electorate are increasingly powerless vis-à-vis the executive?

Conclusion

What is the raison d’être of a constitution for the EU from the perspective of sceptical islanders and highlanders? Why should the former opt for it, when they have no written constitution themselves, and how realistic is it to scale up the constitutional characteristics of a tiny country in the heart of Europe to the whole subcontinent?

For the British-Swiss Steering Committee on Democracy and Decentralisation to explore three propositions directly linked to the debate on a European constitution was somewhat an academic undertaking. The process itself was clearly thought provoking. Not least it highlighted what opportunities the participants of the European convention missed during their deliberations, as they made no serious attempt to explore alternative models of democratic processes. Instead they juxtaposed conventional practices of member states and tried to find a compromise acceptable to all, while watering down the few institutional features unique to the EU, such as the European Commission. By challenging their conventional suggestions at three different levels the UK+CH propositions provide a measure of how daring the EU will be about its future. So far, asymmetry of ratification is bound to inflict variable legitimacy on the constitution and the chasms emerging from member states’ intense lobbying make for an uneasy predicament.

Is the effort to improve the democratic deficit of the EU capable of producing results, or has Europe reached a stage where the craving for peace after the Second World War and the reprieve from the cold war have waned to the extent that the EU can be left to implode? Is the bloody beast unable to change its spots and does it matter in the light of USA’s hegemony? Or do Europeans cherish their common values enough – individual freedom and collective humanism built on human rights and the rule of law for the good of all – to be willing to pay a price? Will Europe, despite its history of revolutions, be able to evolve gradually, by embracing reforms when necessary, and has this time come now? If Wertheim (1974) is right, the rising waves of emancipation will prevail and Europe, due to the collective will of its citizens, will be able to evolve, build on its assets and continue to prosper. Todd (2002) goes a step further in his global perspective. He sees Europe and Asia becoming a counterweight to the USA, which will become a large nation among others once they have decided to focus on their internal social and economic problems. To that effect the European constitution should provide the framework for the right balance between the economic and social objectives of its peoples, enabling them to live their common future “united in their diversity” in an open society. Not least this should motivate them to nurture their cultural assets, including their languages, and prevent them from succumbing to the globalising forces of dominating uniformity.