Essays in Socio‐Economics

Citation

Patapan, H. (2000), "Essays in Socio‐Economics", International Journal of Social Economics, Vol. 27 No. 1, pp. 86-96. https://doi.org/10.1108/ijse.2000.27.1.86.3

These essays by Etzioni build upon his previously published work The Moral Dimension: Toward a New Economics (New York, The Free Press, 1988), and deal with various aspects of a new field of “socio‐economics” which seeks to combine the variables studied by neo‐classical economics with those of other social sciences.

The essays are divided by Etzioni into three groups. The first group of two essays reflects his most recent work and thinking on socio‐economics: “Voluntary Simplicity” (ch. 1) examines the psychological and societal assumptions underlying the modern trend towards less consumption; “A Communitarian Note on Stakeholder Theory” (ch. 2) raises the possibility of shifting from “shareholder” to a “stakeholder” model of corporate governance, with all that it may entail.

The second group, “Opening the Preferences” (ch. 3) and “The Case for a Multiple‐Utility Conception” (ch. 4) are more technical in nature, attempting to examine the implications for preferences and utility within the discipline of socio‐economics.

The third group deals with the socio‐economics of decision making. “Normative‐Affective Factors” (ch. 5) examines the importance of values on choice and decision making. “Mixed‐Scanning Revisited” (ch. 6) investigates how we make decisions when we have partial or fragmented information as opposed to imperfect or no knowledge. “Making Policy for Complex Systems” (ch. 7) looks at a medical model for rationality and policymaking, using practical rather than analytical information in decision making. “The Mapping of Man” (ch. 8) considers the role of history and culture in shaping tastes and thereby decision making.

The book ends with a chapter by Richard M. Coughlin on the differences between socio‐economics and communitarianism. In “Whose Morality? WhichCommunity? What Interests? Socio‐Economic and Communitarian Perspectives” (ch. 9) Coughlin marks out the boundaries between the two fields in such terms as individualism, morality, community and participation.

Works such as these, which gather together articles and essays that have been written and published in different places over a period of time, are difficult to evaluate: there is no sustained argument that is developed in the course of the monograph; each piece has in mind a different problem, a different audience; opinions and arguments change and advance over time. On the other hand, a collection such as this provides a welcome and valuable opportunity to gain perspective and overview, to draw together overall themes and consider as a whole the advances that have taken place.

Etzioni’s articles provide a consistent and formidable questioning of the core assumptions of neo‐classical economics; though some of the claims are more persuasive than others, the overall effect is of a sustained and serious critique of economics. It is in this light that we need to confront the question whether Etzioni’s criticism, if accepted, is in fact fatal for a social science based on scientific principles. Another way to put the question is why does Etzioni persist with the need for “parsimonious” explanations, of statistical evaluation and scientific models? Perhaps, as he indicates in his discussion of a medical model for economics, he still demands “empirical specificity”; hence his persistent attempt to introduce multi‐variable analysis (ch. 7, p. 148). But the question remains whether his attempt to expand economic analytical premises does not ultimately compel a rejection of mathematical modelling altogether.

The second, and related question concerns the emphasis on the “social” in socio‐economics. The essays consistently seek to augment the conceptual formulations of neo‐classical economics with the insights derived from other disciplines, including sociology, psychology, anthropology, and history. What is perhaps surprising is the relatively limited role accorded to politics in Etzioni’s analysis. This may perhaps be explained by the sociological origins of the socio‐economic critique, as noted by Coughlin (ch. 9, p. 164). There may also be the need to avoid a return to political economy, especially if socio‐economics is a media via between the now diminished left analysis and the more radical free‐marked models. But in fact many of these articles implicitly raise and confront political or political theoretical questions, for example, the examination of voluntary simplicity (ch. 1) and role of the corporation in the regime (ch. 2) can easily be seen as a sustained critique of capitalism; the debates regarding rationalism, incrementalism and mixed scanning (ch. 6) presuppose a normative debate about conservatism, pluralism and progressivism; the critique of rationality and the nature of human beings (chs 4 and 8) revive older debates regarding the limits imposed by justice and morality on Epicureanism (refashioned in part as scientific utilitarianism by Benthamites). Indeed, the discussion of “community” in the book as a whole would have benefited considerably from the extensive political debates regarding communitarianism.

These considerations direct our attention to a more profound aspect of socio‐economics as a whole. Clearly socio‐economics is not scientifically “neutral”. But the normative presuppositions of Etzioni’s scholarship are not immediately evident. It is no longer possible to categorise his analysis in terms of left and right, though to neo‐classical economists he may be seen as a “soft” Marxist. A more profitable starting point may be Coughlin’s claim that socio‐economics may be de‐ontological. The Kantianism of socio‐economics is confirmed by Etzioni in his essay on preferences (ch. 3, p. 55). If indeed socio‐economics may be described as a Kantian correction of the utilitarianism of neo‐classical economics, then we are compelled to return to the first question noted above – can such a critique be described as merely a “correction”? Do not the normative presuppositions of each perspective rule out limited modifications? In short, can Etzioni consistently hold back from a more profound critique of scientific social science generally and economics in particular?

Unfortunately, and this is a quibble, poor editing – missing diagrams and references, words joined together, typographical errors – are annoying and detract from the overall strength of the work as a whole. Nevertheless, given the importance of these larger questions and issues, these essays should be read for their scholarship and the challenges they pose for the theory and practice of modern economics.