Understanding Management Research

Citation

Baldacchino, K.J. (2002), "Understanding Management Research", Journal of Management Development, Vol. 21 No. 4. https://doi.org/10.1108/jmd.2002.02621dae.001

Understanding Management Research

P. Johnson and J. DuberleySageLondon2000

Overview and relevance

The purpose of Understanding Management Research is to explain the importance of epistemological assumptions to management research questions, approaches and results. The authors provide a review of particularly influential epistemologies, along with a look at possible future directions. Given that the book concerns a "study of the criteria by which we can know what does and does not constitute warranted knowledge" (p. 2), it is not surprising that the book evokes considerable self-reflection and invites a second reading. Simultaneously though, the authors are able to introduce complex philosophical debates in a simplified and understandable manner, enabling the reader to gently build a strong appreciation of epistemology's relevance to management research.

As the authors stress, epistemology can help researchers to understand the implications of their own assumptions on the research they engage in. These implications permeate numerous aspects of research in the social sciences, driving the design of research activity in areas such as:

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  which topics are viewed as researchable;

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  who the subjects should include and how these subjects should participate in the research;

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  the choice of methods to produce the sought-after understanding;

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  the goals of the research;

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  the manner in which results are accepted.

Another point identified by the authors is that, increasingly, management researchers are faced with literature that assumes an understanding of epistemological concepts. Examples of this assumption abound, as in the direct advice (von Krogh et al., 1998, p. 28):

… researchers have to position themselves … within the epistemologies to be able to see the limitations of their own ways of thinking and to gain inspiration for new, interesting research questions derived from other epistemological areas.

Additionally, a benefit not explicitly identified by the authors but of growing relevance in the new "knowledge society", is that many researchers in both the natural and social sciences are undertaking research related to the creation, enabling and management of knowledge. Epistemology is central to my own area of interest, for example, in building an understanding of the types of information individuals and organisations seek, how the information is gathered and what value is sought and gained from the information.

Coverage

The authors have chosen to focus on depth of coverage, rather than breadth, detailing the following epistemologies: positivism, conventionalism, post-modernism, critical theory, critical realism and pragmatism. Selection is clearly necessary in introducing the subject. However, for the new management researcher where a wide variety of backgrounds should be assumed, a summary matrix of major epistemologies through time, along with the prevalent nomenclatures and writers/works, would help to position the book in the reader's mind. While all of the selected approaches are demonstrated to be relevant to management research (excepting post-modernism which must only have been included to demonstrate variability), the scope is disappointing in its exclusion of the Greeks and any non-Western approaches. Greek ideas remain central to much Western thought, for example Baumard's starting point of the Greek categorisations of knowledge – episteme, techne, phronesis and metis – in his exploration of tacit knowledge (Baumard, 1999, p. 53). As for non-Western views, management and other researchers are now working in a globalised economy of multi-national firms and diverse employee populations. Also, influential thinkers are able to communicate on a world-wide basis, with innovative and useful ideas from scholars such as Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, pp. 31-2) highlighting epistemological approaches far removed from Cartesian dualism:

… ultimate reality for the Japanese lies in the delicate, transitional process of permanent flux, and in visible and concrete matter, rather than in eternal, unchanging, invisible and abstract entity.

Setting the scope limitations aside, the coverage of the chosen epistemologies is well managed. By beginning with positivism and then using this epistemology as a foundation for explaining the others, the authors have taken good advantage of the fair assumption that many readers will be entrenched in positivistic paradigms. As the epistemologies deviate increasingly from these positivistic traditions, reaching to the world of post-modernist scepticism, understanding becomes more difficult. Evidence of the authors' effectiveness surfaces strongly as the reader is able to recognise that the difficulty comes not from shortcomings of the presentation, but rather from one's own barriers with respect to unfamiliar world-views.

The authors do particularly well in their accounts, for each epistemological approach, of key commitments, aims of research, and role of the researched and the researcher. Table I attempts an initial summary of some of the key concepts, in part drawing from the framework offered in the book's conclusions (p. 180). The chosen epistemologies are dominated by subjectivist epistemologies, likely reflecting the limited usefulness to date of positivist results regarding more complex aspects of human behaviour, and objectivist ontologies, likely reflecting scepticism's inherent contradiction with any search for knowledge.

Table I Key concepts of surveyed epistemologies

Having recently read Kuhn's (1970) Structure of Scientific Revolutions, I found the discussion of Conventionalism especially interesting. For those who have only experienced "normal science" in the Kuhnian sense (Kuhn, 1970, p. 5), Kuhn's account can easily be viewed as a fascinating history of science with little appreciation of the fundamental challenges it poses to positivism. It does not seem clear how much of the conventionalist epistemology was developed by Kuhn himself, versus by epistemologists deriving and developing Kuhn's observations, but it would be interesting to re-read his book with new insight.

While it is appreciated that characterisations and boundaries of the epistemologies can be fuzzy, suggestions for structuring frameworks in terms of the relationships between epistemologies would have been more usefully placed in the book's introduction, even if to be repeated in the conclusions. Also, the introduction should have covered key terms such as ontology (not defined until Chapter 4), supported by a descriptive and comprehensive glossary of terms. A further style point is that, while the chosen epistemologies were covered in depth and in a very understandable manner, the variations and critiques of each epistemology seemed heavily summarised at chapter ends. These critiques frequently involved complex ideas and arguments and, where the critiques were not further developed in the description of a subsequent epistemology, readers may find it necessary to re-read and sometimes accept partial understanding of these debates.

Generally speaking, once the key commitments of the epistemology are clearly grasped, the implications for research are reasonably straightforward to deduce with one notable exception – research methodology. Methodologies proved problematic throughout, beginning with positivism. In particular, ambiguity surrounded the treatment of qualitative and interpretative methods with respect to positivism. Not until the concluding chapter, when neo-positivism was highlighted, did I return to the coverage of this variation on positivistic epistemology and begin to differentiate the methods applied to positivism versus anti- or neo-positivism. For other epistemologies, research methods were frequently unclear or eclectic: methods for conventionalism vary by conventionalist; post-modernists have no basis for viewing any method as preferable (and search to find a reason for research itself); and pragmatists "thrive" on a variety of methods (p. 167).

Circularity

In the opening pages of the book, the authors introduce a central issue for epistemology, that of the "problem of circularity" (p. 3). In order to have any theory of knowledge, one must presuppose the conditions in which knowledge can take place. So, if knowledge is built, for example, on the observation of sense-data, one must assume that such evidence can lead to reliable knowledge. The result of this circularity is that (p. 4):

… everyone adheres to some theory about what constitutes warranted knowledge – a set of epistemological commitments which provide us with criteria for distinguishing between reliable and unreliable knowledge.

The impacts of this inescapable problem are pervasive when undertaking the study and analysis of epistemologies themselves. First, as discussed with respect to post-modernism, understanding the critiques of one's own assumptions and understanding sets of assumptions which differ markedly from one's own assumptions can present significant challenges. The literature abounds with these struggles, as when a graduate student struggles with empirically observed "facts" that are quite the opposite of the expected outcomes (Edmondson, 1996, pp. 203-30). Second, when as previously suggested one begins to consider ideas such as Nonaka's, will it be possible to adequately communicate such ideas to individuals steeped in very different socio-historical traditions? As many epistemologies encourage seeking alternative perspectives, these difficulties suggest that time might be well spent on further developing frameworks or methods to facilitate such communication "across" paradigms. For example, in the discussion on conducting positivist research, the authors list example "threats to internal validity" (p. 49) or common pitfalls. Similarly, common pitfalls in interpretation might be identified when, say, a positivist attempts to grasp the writings of a critical realist or to observe the behaviour of a pragmatist.

Another disturbing feature of the epistemologies presented, also rooted in the problem of circularity, is that each epistemology contains fundamental gaps or inconsistencies in its abstractions. Table II highlights a few of the key shortcomings, leaving some to continually seek firmer foundations and others, like the authors, to conclude: "Perhaps the most we can hope for in considering epistemology is to become more consciously reflexive" (p. 4).

Table II Key shortcomings of surveyed epistemologies

Common themes

The authors have taken a straightforward approach to the examination of epistemologies, detailing the key commitments and implications of each epistemology in turn. Additionally, they have motivated understanding of successive epistemologies by critiquing aspects of those previously discussed. However effective this approach is, the subject's inherent complexity assures that significant points will be missed or misunderstood. Alternative structures to the investigation could aid this understanding. For example, in their conclusions, the authors offer a simple epistemology-ontology model on to which the different epistemologies are positioned (p. 180). Additional or expanded models of this type, varying the axes to explore other comparators, can quickly highlight gaps in understanding. Another approach is to discuss central themes across all of the epistemologies, allowing tailored focus on issues helpful to building a broad base of understanding for specific epistemologies.

One theme calling for added attention is the role of language in the various epistemologies. Language arises early in the discussion of positivism, in the context of a "neutral observational language" (p. 24). At this point, the concept poses little problem possibly because emphasis on language can be circumvented by treating the concept as "theory neutral observer". But certainly by the time of the post-modernism discussion, where the "linguistic turn" arises and "no meaning exists beyond language", language concepts must be grasped. Understanding the history of language's relation to epistemology, supported by a more complete and integrated exploration of key thinkers and concepts in this area, could presumably be of considerable value to the diverse population of management researchers.

Developments in the discipline of epistemology itself also point the way to building a richer understanding, in particular the emphasis on the social construction of reality seen since the conventionalists. Interestingly, humanities students have long appreciated the additional understanding gained from a broad look at historical, social, cultural and political facts, for example studying history to better understand the literature. The authors frequently hint at social drivers to the development of different epistemologies, but the coverage is fragmented and incomplete as a natural result of the book's structure and emphasis. The post-modernism discussion provides a good example of the potential value of this focus, where the description of the event that may have signalled the beginning of post-modernism conveys a wealth of contextual insight (p. 92):

… when the Pruitt-Igoes public housing development in St Louis, Missouri, previously billed as Le Corbusier's "machine for modern living", was knocked down, having been recognised as uninhabitable.

Another avenue toward a deeper understanding of the epistemologies is through placing them in their theological, moral and ethical contexts. From the founding of positivism at least partly inspired by the desire to escape theological dogma to the fundamental problems of subjectivist epistemologies in determining when "truth" has been found, moral and ethical context is likely to have great relevance. The authors stress this inter-relatedness when they conclude for those combining an objectivist ontology with a subjectivist epistemology, "our knowing selection of one knowledge system as opposed to another becomes a question of ethical priority" (p. 188). However, as with other common themes, coverage of this relationship is difficult when using the structure applied by the authors.

Future directions

The authors' primary conclusions from their survey of epistemologies centre on the importance of researchers maintaining consistency with respect to their epistemological assumptions and the usefulness of reflexivity in trying to achieve this consistency. Although they identify two types of reflexivity, methodological and epistemic, the epistemic type applied to assumptions based on a subjective ontology appears to offer the most potential for enhancing awareness. Reflection more broadly applied appears to be receiving renewed focus, as Daudelin (1996, p. 299) reports that "evidence exists that [reflection] is becoming a part of the lifeblood of organisations today", and it only seems natural that reflection should once again find favour in the study of knowledge systems. Although modern-day reflexivity may have differing motivations than those of the early rationalists, surely there is a contribution from self-examination and self-understanding as we seek to understand others.

Additionally, other areas call for more attention in the future. The authors have focused on individual epistemologies, not the manner in which these epistemologies overlap and interact within and between subjects. Why should one seek a consistency in assumptions? Such consistency is likely to strengthen the internal validity of our research, but it cannot be intuitively assumed that external validity would benefit similarly. And what should be the expected outcome of increased reflexivity on the part of the researcher? Certainly, one can expect increased self-understanding, but such a path must also encourage maturing – or at least evolving – epistemological assumptions. A lack of consistency through the life of a research project need not be negative, provided the researcher maintains a keen awareness and adapts the work accordingly. Other interesting questions in this area abound:

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  How does the researcher effectively interpret subjects with markedly different epistemological assumptions?

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  What are the common pitfalls and lessons learned?

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  Should research subjects be sought in differing epistemological "categories" in order to enhance the possibility of generalisable outcomes?

Further, with respect to the generalisability of results in the management sciences, one needs to consider the assumptions and inter-relatedness not only of the researchers and their research subjects, but rather of a whole host of subjects, objects and relationships. Figure 1 provides a sketch of this broad arena and the many relationships which may bear on interpretation.

Figure 1 Entities and relationships in management research

My position

Similarly to the authors, I feel compelled to provide an initial cut at my own position before leaving the discussion. That I am able to do so at this point emphasises the success of the authors in achieving their motives. However, when the authors identify their broad alignment with critical realism, they quickly return to the problem of circularity certain that their own views will have had some impact on the presentation (p. 192). Therefore, while I have determined an initial position, it will be necessary to investigate the writings of others – particularly those who have participated in defining these epistemologies – in order to gain confidence in the categorisations.

My assumptions are positivist, based on the firm belief that a world exists independent of my own cognitive processes. I am also in little doubt that there is the possibility of a theory-neutral observational language, driven by the power of replicability in multiple contexts and by multiple researchers, albeit researchers predominantly of the same epistemological understanding. Additionally, positivism has proved and continues to prove itself exceedingly useful, even if not deemed progressive, whether it operates according to its espoused theories or the Kuhnian theories-in-use (Argyris, 1992, p. 57). But, current positivistic work in the management sciences seems still in its infancy with regard to dealing with the complexities of cognitive humans, leaving its results at present of only limited usefulness to the practising manager. Therefore, it seems prudent to find a supplementary approach to management research, one based on a subjective ontology. Borrowing from James though, "when we give up the doctrine of objective certitude, we do not give up the quest or hope of truth itself" (cited in Johnson and Duberley, 2000, p. 159). The authors also note this sentiment with reference to the pragmatic-critical realist position: "… while the truth may well be 'out there' we may never know it in an absolute sense" (p. 162).

For the management researcher with positivistic foundations, pragmatism seems a natural supplement. Positivism seeks prediction and control to produce "instrumentally useful knowledge" (p. 27). Similarly, pragmatists such as Dewey argue "that to have knowledge is the ability to anticipate the consequences of manipulating things in the world" (cited in Johnson and Duberley, 2000, p. 59). It is easy to maintain that this quest for usefulness is central to positivism's continuing pervasiveness, and equally easy to maintain that the inherently practical focus of management and managers demands useful results. Another major factor in pragmatism's attractiveness is highlighted by the authors' inference of a research approach from Sayer's writings (p. 163):

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  define practical intervention and expected outcomes which the claim articulates through a causal association;

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  implement the practical intervention;

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  assess the intervention in achieving the expected outcomes;

Surely, this is what managers do on a daily basis under the banners of problem-solving and continuous improvement, as demanded by their quality standards.

Still, adopting a pragmatic approach leaves much unanswered. The researcher is left with fundamental decisions such as:

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  What are the criteria for effectiveness or usefulness of results?

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  Who should establish the criteria?

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  What is the breadth of the community to be researched, and against whom will effectiveness be gauged?

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  Must we seek consensus on the evaluation of effectiveness, and can such consensus be reached without invalidating the research assumptions?

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  Which methods should be applied, as the pragmatist may find value in a wide variety of approaches?

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  Is generalisability an objective and, if so, how does this impact the decisions above?

It would appear that building an understanding of the importance of epistemology may well lead to far more questions than answers.

In closing though, the parallels between positivism and critical realism-pragmatism encourage yet another line of thinking. The authors speak of the "middle way" (p. 159) sought by Dewey and others as they balanced their realist ontology with their subjectivist epistemology. Interestingly, other related disciplines may be moving toward analogous middle ground, an idea supported by Gardner (1985, p. 45) in his investigation of the history of cognitive science. In his investigation, Gardner (1985) looks at developments across six fields: epistemology, psychology, artificial intelligence, linguistics, anthropology and neuroscience. In general, he observes that the common themes of the early holistic efforts, followed by the behaviourist effects, are now often incorporating aspects of both as more and more evidence amasses. His concluding focus is on efforts he terms "cognitive-scientific" (1985, p. 293), encouraging the view that much "progress" can still be made.

K.J. BaldacchinoBournemouth University

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