Reframing strategic thinking: emergence beyond the box

Citation

Kelly, S. and Kouzmin, A. (2009), "Reframing strategic thinking: emergence beyond the box", Journal of Management Development, Vol. 28 No. 3. https://doi.org/10.1108/jmd.2009.02628caa.001

Reframing strategic thinking: emergence beyond the box

Article Type: Introduction From: Journal of Management Development, Volume 28, Issue 3

Strategy has eluded a universal definition even though the concept is central to the field of management (Hatton and Bruce, 1994) – an outcome ensuing from the contradictory perspectives of the diverse schools of thought evident in the literature and a research culture arguably far from mature (Caldart and Ricart, 2004, p. 96). Whether it is predominantly a concept founded on planning, thinking, configuring, positioning, competency acquisition, or emergence remains unclear and disputed. It is also evident that strategy is a term that is often misunderstood, frequently being seconded to make a statement seem more important or provide a decision with more weight or credibility.

Nevertheless, the deconstruction of strategy has evolved to a point where parsimonious solutions describing what strategy is and how it should be practiced dominate management literature. This is not surprising given that science, in particular, craves simplicity and shuns complexity. However, the greater the deconstruction, the greater the abstraction and in the context of the praxis of strategy this has led to a disconnect between the world of “doing” and the world of “theorising”. Strategy has been simplified by some theorists to a point where practitioners should only need to select a predetermined mix to achieve a competitive advantage, a compelling proposition for the busy manager and a premise evident in other areas of organisational theory where it has been argued that “researchers tend to reduce complex organisational reality to a small number of variables and over-simplify theories” (Finlay and Cooksey, 2001, p. 15).

It is argued in the papers presented in this series that the approach is all wrong and that rather than seeking simplistic solutions to complex problems, one should embrace the complexity that exists within organisations and the environments in which they operate. It is a view of strategy inherent in the following quote (Boyd[1], cited in Hammond, 2001, p. 161) characterising strategy as:

… a mental tapestry of changing intentions for harmonising and focusing our efforts as a basis for realizing some aim or purpose in an unfolding and often unforeseen world of many bewildering events and many contending interests.

However, in dynamic environments, minimal structures “constituted by a clear strategic intention, an adequate number of simple rules and ample individual freedom” (e Cunha and da Cunha, 2006, p. 843) are exceedingly more effective (Mason, 2007).

However, if a system’s specific long-term behaviour is unpredictable, setting specific goals is a questionable activity. Complexity theory leads to the conclusion that long-term states cannot be predicted, making it impossible for humans to stay in control. Therefore, if systems dynamics and complexity theory do have relevance to human action, then the current dominant ways of thinking about strategy are undermined, a proposition which has been gaining in currency since the mid-1990s (Cooksey and Gates, 1995; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998; Caldart and Ricart, 2004; e Cunha and da Cunha, 2006).

The research process which built upon these observations and which underpins the outcomes presented in this series of papers was both rich and complex. Application of an action research methodology involved the development of an action research process model that will be a useful guide to other researchers. Through an inductive, deductive and reflective frame detailed in papers seven eight and nine in this series, different groups, individuals and firms were involved in the development, review and refinement of a model of strategy creation which sought to both account for the dilemmas evident within the theoretical review and which provided practitioners with a useful tool. The tension inherent in this process is that acceptance by the author of organisations as complex adaptive systems – systems that preclude prediction and control – rather than cybernetic systems – in which plan and control is a central tenet – can also be construed to mean that the actions of managers are irrelevant.

Of course, this is not an outcome which is tenable or reasonable because what managers do does matter. The tension is managed by the researcher through the development of a model which allows practitioners to embrace complexity; as evident in Boyd’s (Boyd[1], cited in Hammond, 2001) characterisation of strategy; and through an examination of their understanding of their firm and its environment. Notably, it is also a model that is focused not on finding the right answer, but on asking the right questions, and, in so doing, does not profess to be a cure-all. By going through the steps detailed in paper eight, for example, it is argued by the researcher that firms are more likely to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of their business, facilitating agility, proactiveness and learning while avoiding the stifling affects of micro-management.

The presented model of strategic development has, therefore, taken the concept of emergence from the complexity sciences and applied it to an organisational context. It is an adaptation demonstrated to be valid on the basis that there is no process of emergence embedded within classical theory and growing evidence that complexity is the appropriate paradigm within which to study organisational behaviour. However, rather than ignore valuable contributions in the literature, the model facilitates emergent strategic behaviour through the development of a hybrid school of strategic thinking utilising some ideas from the design and resource-based schools together with the lessons embedded within the learning and emergence schools. The ideas of the planning and positioning schools have been totally rejected and are seen as unhelpful in the context of this hybrid philosophy.

In the very least, these papers free strategic thinking from the ideologised and autogamous dominance of the “dismal science” of economics in much of the strategic management discourse – there is a more coherent and sophisticated intellectual positioning about the emergent complexity of strategy beyond Porter (1980, 1985).

John Boyd was a US Air Force Colonel who developed what has become known as a dynamic capabilities framework and OODA loops that have revolutionised military thinking and that of many business leaders.

Stephen Kelly, Alexander Kouzmin

About the editors

Stephen Kelly is an Associate Professor and Head of the School of Commerce and Management at Southern Cross University. He is also Director of the Centre for Enterprise Development and Research. He has published in a range of areas, broadly incorporating small firm strategy, planning and performance; business-to-business networks and industrial clusters; service quality and delivery; venture capital; SME internationalisation; and destination marketing. His current research is focused on the formation and development of ICT industrial clusters in Australia and China. Prior to joining academia he worked in the Australian building materials and construction industry in various staff and line positions predominantly within marketing and sales.

Alexander Kouzmin is an Adjunct Professor in the School of Commerce and Management at Southern Cross University and Adjunct Professor in Management in the School of Management at the University of South Australia. He has published eight books, contributed some 60 chapters to national and international monographs/books, presented research papers and keynote addresses at more than 200 international conferences, and has published, to date, some 180 refereed papers and review articles.