Residential tenancies

Citation

(1998), "Residential tenancies", Property Management, Vol. 16 No. 3. https://doi.org/10.1108/pm.1998.11316cab.028

Residential tenancies

Residential tenancies

Northampton BC v. Lovatt [1998] EG 142

The appellants in this case were the tenants of a council house in Northampton located on the council's "Spencer Estate". From 1994 onwards their three eldest sons (who in 1994 were 13, 15, and 17 years of age) apparently "ran wild" on the estate, "with behaviour which was criminal or antisocial or both", and which were listed elsewhere in the Law Report as including harassment, trespass, criminal damage, burglaries, vandalism and incidents of racial abuse. The council obtained an order for possession on the grounds that persons residing in the dwelling-house "had been guilty of conduct which was a nuisance or annoyance to their neighbours" as set out in Ground 2 of Part I of Schedule 2 of the Housing Act 1985. The appellants contended that although most had been committed on the "Spencer Estate", since none of the acts in question had been committed within 100 metres of the demised premises, their children had not caused nuisance or annoyance to their "neighbours". (The acts in question had arisen and the relevant notices had been served before the coming into force of the amendments made by the Housing Act 1996.) The "Spencer Estate" in area was some 500m square.

The court was divided in its view. By a majority of two to one it held that the terms of the tenancy agreement and of the wording used in the statute were wide enough to cover the acts complained of; Pill, LJ, dissenting, held otherwise, on the basis that although the conduct of some of the residents of the dwelling-house in question had been "appalling", Parliament had not intended to provide some form of "general neighbourhood protection against bad behaviour by a tenant or resident". How far this case may assist the courts in deciding on the meaning of the word "locality" as used in the 1996 Act remains, of course, to be seen.

Laimond Properties Ltd v. Al-Shakarchi [1998] The Times, 23 February 1998

In this case the Court of Appeal had to consider whether it was always necessary for the court to order that a new tenancy of alternative accommodation (provided for a Rent Act protected tenant under the provisions of s.98(1) of the Rent Act 1977) to itself be a protected tenancy governed by the Act of 1977. No, said the Court: this was only necessary where, in keeping with the provisions of s.34 of the Housing Act 1988, the court considers that the grant of a new assured tenancy of such accommodation would not afford the tenant the required security [of tenure]. In this case the court below had expressed itself satisfied that an assured tenancy would afford the required security, and so had not been under any obligation to order that the new tenancy be a protected tenancy.

Church Commissioners for England v. Baines, Ebied v. Hopkins; Wellcome Trust v. Hammond [1998] 02 EG 121

It is probably fair to say that the decision of the Court of Appeal in Pittalis v. Grant [1989] 2 EGLR 90; [1989] 28 EG 126, took the property world rather by surprise: in that case it was held that where a business tenant of mixed commercial and residential premises had granted a sub-tenancy of the residential premises to a third party, the latter was not protected against the head landlord by the Rent Act 1977 if the mesne landlord subsequently surrendered his lease.

In these three cases, each of the judges at first instance had felt obliged to follow the decision of the Court of Appeal in Pittalis v. Grant. Wrongly, now says the Court of Appeal. The decision in Pittalis v. Grant had apparently been decided in ignorance of the qualifying words of s.24(3) of the Rent Act 1977.s. 24(3) state that "A tenancy shall not be a regulated tenancy if it is a tenancy to which Part II of the Landlord and Tenant Act applies '...however, it then goes on to say' but this provision is without prejudice to the application of any other provision of this Act to a sub-tenancy of any part of the premises comprised in such a tenancy". Quite how the Court of Appeal managed to overlook these qualifying words in the earlier case is not explained, but the consequence is clear: Pittalis v. Grant had been decided per incuriam; it was therefore not binding in any subsequent cases; "It follows", said Leggatt, L.J. "that each of the county court judges was led into error by Pittalis v. Grant. Each of the appeals must be allowed and the orders made in each set aside."