Business Strategy over the Industry Lifecycle: Volume 21

The central organizing principle for this volume – the industry life cycle model – is so widely accepted and its basic premises so taken for granted that it has become conventional wisdom in business. Executives in a range of industries use the model to guide their thinking about when and how to invest in various industries. Diversification decisions, for example, are often made on the basis of life cycle logic, especially as large, established companies seek high-growth opportunities for investment.

This article considers the relationship between consumers’ valuation of performance improvements and technology development over the technology life cycle. Presenting a demand-based perspective, it explores how the character of life cycle maturity, the nature of competitive threats, and firms’ innovation incentives all change when consumer demand for performance matures in advance of a technology’s performance trajectories. It characterizes demand maturity by introducing the idea of a demand S curve as a complement to the traditional technology S curve. In doing so, it offers a new lens for assessing firms’ prospects of achieving superior performance through the commercialization of new technologies.

While it is widely recognized that firms in an era of technological ferment exist under conditions of significant uncertainty and ambiguity, little is known about the exact processes through which firms explore their ideas and resolve uncertainty. Arguing that our understanding of the era of ferment is much less developed than other aspects of the technology life cycle, we examine the micro-dynamics of technology-based entrepreneurial firms during this period. We focus on the role of purposeful experimentation as a key form of learning for start-ups firms in the era of ferment. Our approach contrasts with the prevailing view in the literature in which the era of ferment is characterized by extensive experimentation across firms, with each firm representing a single data point in an industry-level experiment. It also extends the learning literature by focusing on start-ups and taking the perspective that learning can encompass purposeful experimentation as well as local search and chaotic adaptation in the era of ferment. Building on the literature on experimental design, we propose a definition and taxonomy of purposeful experimentation. The taxonomy defines the experimental landscape as having three domains – technological, product and business model; and two dimensions – degree of simultaneity and degree of parameter manipulation. We examine this framework using data from a technology-based start-up and find evidence for purposeful experimentation as a key element of the firm’s learning strategy. We also highlight the organizational constraints and challenges that are associated with experimentation. Our findings emphasize the importance of entrepreneurial action, choice and internal experimentation processes.

The quest to explain how incumbents respond to changes in their industry is affirming the role that managerial cognition plays in those decisions. Recent empirical evidence suggests that anticipating the nature and timing of industry changes could increase the likelihood that the organization develops an effective response. Mounting evidence suggests also that such ability to anticipate and respond may depend on decision-makers’ prevailing and emerging cognitive frames. This raises a number of questions about the nature of those cognitive frames and how they impact the decision making processes and ultimately organizational response. In this paper we report the findings from three case studies of how established incumbents respond to changes to their industries brought about by the emergence of the Internet.

New industries are created from the pioneering activities of a few firms. These firms generally face great uncertainty and risk, but also stand to benefit from early mover advantages due to the preemption of resources. Based on an empirical analysis of a diverse set of consumer and industrial innovations introduced in the U.S. over the past 100 years, we find that entrants during the pre-firm take-off stage (termed Creators) have higher survival rates than later entrants that enter between the firm and sales take-off (termed Anticipators), and both of these entrant types have higher survival rates than firms that enter after the sales take-off (termed Followers). Notably, survival rates for Creators and Anticipators do not depend on entry time within the cohort group, i.e. what matters is whether an entrant enters before or after the take-off, not whether it entered first in its cohort. Our results indicate that there is no real option value in waiting when one considers survival as a performance measure, which bodes well for firms interested in creating new industries.

Do firms build new capabilities by hiring new people? We explore this question in the context of the pharmaceutical industry’s movement towards science-driven drug discovery. We focus particularly on the potential problem of endogeneity in interpreting correlation between hiring and changes in organizational outcomes as evidence of the impact of new hires on the firm, and on the more fundamental conceptual question of the conditions under which hiring might be a source of competitive advantage, given the well known objection that resources that are freely available through the market cannot be a source of differential capabilities. Using data on the movement and publication of “star” scientists, we find that the adoption of science based drug discovery within the firm is closely correlated with the hiring of star scientists. This correlation appears to be reasonably robust to a number of controls for endogeneity. We also show that the hiring of highly talented scientists appears to have a significant impact on the behavior of scientists already working within the firm. We interpret this as consistent with the idea that hiring may change organizational capabilities through the interaction of new talent with the policies, routines and people already in place within the firm.

This paper studies organizational change following a shift in an industry environment, in the context of how a focused factory adapts to a change in its manufacturing objectives. We use the organizational nature of production operations to suggest that the effectiveness of adaptation will depend on how well the manufacturing requirements of the new objectives match manufacturing capabilities at the production line level. We test our hypotheses using primary data from the Hartselle, Alabama compressor manufacturing focused factory of the Copeland Corporation. The results suggest that factors that influence adaptability derive from individual and organizational competence, and that the direction and extent of their influence depends on the systemic nature of the operational activity concerned. The results highlight roles of carefully designed complexity in operations and of process-oriented decision making on the shop floor in successful adaptation. This work contributes to our understanding of how business organizations overcome constraints to change.

We investigate the effects of technological capabilities on firms’ survival chances during market-fusing technological change. Our context is the matured U.S. machine tool industry. During the period of our study, 1975 through 1995, a drastic shift in demand conditions prompted the buyers of machine tools to demand more versatile products to improve their productivity. The advent of microprocessors enabled manufacturers to meet these demands by combining the functions of previously distinctive products. As a result, market segments fused and machine tool manufacturers in once disparate product categories came into direct competition with one another. We propose that incumbents with broader component and architectural capabilities will be better able to adapt to and hence survive market-fusing technological change. Our results, based on a panel data set of U.S. machine tool incumbents, support the value of broad component capabilities but reveal no adaptive advantage of architectural capabilities.

Systemic industries comprise groups of firms making component products that are valued as complements by consumers (PC, automobiles, aircraft, networking). In this study, we investigate the distribution of research effort across the technological system by individual firms as a basis for building competitive advantage. Our empirical setting is a sample of component makers in the personal computer system. We show that even in a sample dominated by focused component manufacturers, diversified research effort in the broader technological system improves R&D productivity in the component technology. Broad scope R&D in the rest of the system also increases the marginal benefits of research efforts in the component technology, though at a diminishing rate. We explore the determinants of this complementarity between the scope of system level research and the focus on component level research, and derive implications for competitive advantage.

Although studies of “core competence” appear frequently, the concept lacks a clear definition that allows one to operationalize it and use it to develop falsifiable predictions. We propose a definition based on the phenomenon that core competence is typically applied to – adaptations to different external context. Sourcing insight form the paradigm of organizational ecology, we develop arguments rooted in theories of structural inertia and environmental imprinting. Empirical analyses of failure rates of entrants in the Italian automobile industry confirm our propositions that core competence is a source of competitive advantage when industry entry is based on relevant capabilities and a source of inertia and obsolescence when core competences need to be substantially altered. We conclude that whether core competence materializes as a dynamic capability or exposes the firm to liability to selection and obsolescence is a random process. Its outcome hinges on environmental variation and the resulting firm-environment (mis)alignment and is thus largely beyond managerial control.

Case studies of four important automobile firms are used to understand how the performance of both diversifying and new entrants into the automobile industry was conditioned by their pre-entry experience. Various conjectures based on the four firms are then tested using a unique data source on the pre-entry backgrounds of all entrants into the automobile industry from the commercial inception of the industry in 1895 through 1966. In addition to analyzing the types of pre-entry experiences that affected the longevity of entrants, the analysis also focuses on the conduits by which pre-entry experience influenced the performance of entrants and the extent to which pre-entry experience had enduring effects.

We examine the evolution of vertical specialization in three industries: chemicals, computers, and semiconductors. Vertical specialization is the restructuring of industry-wide value chains, such that different stages are controlled by different firms, rather than being vertically integrated within the boundaries of individual firms. In some cases, vertical specialization may span international boundaries and is associated with complex international production networks. After decades of vertical specialization, firms in the chemical industry are re-integrating stages of the value chain. By contrast, the semiconductor and computer industries have experienced significant vertical specialization during the past ten years. We examine how and why these contrasting trends in vertical specialization have co-evolved with industry maturation and decline, and underscore the importance and role of both industry factors and business strategies necessary for industries to become more specialized. We also consider the effects of vertical specialization on the sources of innovation and the geographic redistribution of production and other activities. We conclude that the evolution of vertical specialization in these three industries has both reflected and influenced the strategies of leading firms, while also displays industry-specific characteristics that are rooted in different technological and market characteristics.

Managers of corporations that are facing fading product-market domains are often inertial in their response to such decline or engage in endgame strategies within these markets. For managers operating in dynamic markets, however, such responses are often ineffective. Rather, such markets often demand a corporate entrepreneurship response whereby managers move their businesses into new market opportunities as the value of current market domains inevitably begins to fade. The emphasis is on exiting from declining markets while simultaneously capturing and exploiting opportunities in more promising markets. In this chapter, we describe the recombinative organizational form (i.e. structure and process) by which this can occur. We focus on the modular organizational structure (i.e. modularity, relatedness, and loose-coupling) and corporate dynamic capabilities (i.e. probing, patching, and recoupling processes) by which managers can cope with the inevitable decline that is the nature of dynamic industries. An example from recent empirical research provides an illustration of such corporate entrepreneurship.