Studies in Law, Politics and Society: Volume 40

I discuss the case of Hassan Almrei, one of the five Arab men detained as suspects who have the potential to engage in terrorism. Hassan Almrei's detention arises out of a section of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act of Canada that authorizes security certificates. A security certificate permits the detention and expulsion of non-citizens who are considered to be a threat to national security. Detainees have no opportunity to be heard before a certificate is issued and a designated judge of the Federal Court reviews most of the government's case against the detainee in a secret hearing at which neither the detainee nor his counsel is present. The detainee receives only a summary of the evidence against him. I discuss this legal situation as a state of exception that is part of a legal structure in which non-citizens have fewer rights than do citizens. Two conceptual tools shape my understanding of security certificates and their use in the “war on terror”: race thinking and the state of exception. The five detainees are more than simply victims of racial profiling. Their Arab origins, and the life history that mostly Arab Muslim men have had, operate to mark them as individuals likely to commit terrorist acts, people whose propensity for violence is indicated by their origins. When race thinking, the belief in the division of humanity into those prone to violence and those who are not according to racial descent, is accompanied by the idea that there must be two different, hierarchical legal regimes for each, and when we begin to grow accustomed to places without law and to people to whom the rule of law does not apply, we enter the terrifying world of the colonies and the concentration camp. This article examines how a space where law is suspended operates in the “war on terror” and it attends to the work that ideas about race do in the environment of the exception.

In a series of mid-20th century cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has modified and diversified the status of the enemy in U.S. law. We see a shift away from the statist egalitarian model toward a transnationalized model of enemies. U.S. Supreme Court decisions in three clusters of cases (German enemy aliens, the internment of the West Coast Japanese Americans, and Communist) from the 1940s and 1950s prefigure the radicalized post-9/11 “enemy combatant” status. The choice for such enemy conceptions is both a result of and a contribution to the changes in contemporary practices of violence.

This article examines the persistence of a “rights” movement in a political environment rife with the language of personal responsibility. Through an analysis of interviews of welfare rights activists in three states, this article explores the frequency and type of both “rights” and “needs” discourse frameworks. Neither rights nor needs language is employed frequently in the interviews. Activists do not view the language of rights and needs as necessarily conflictual. Furthermore, race appears to play some role in discourse choices between rights and needs. African American women utilize both rights and needs rhetoric, while White women prefer needs language. The results offer evidence of the centrality of race in understanding discourse choices among those struggling to gain recognition of basic human needs and rights.

In a two-party system, electoral capture refers to the political dilemma faced by a group that regularly votes overwhelmingly for one party while the other major party has no interest in competing for the group's votes (Frymer, 1999). In 2004, 11 states approved amendments to their state constitutions that banned same-sex marriages. The initiatives passed by wide margins that, except in Utah, exceeded the margin of victory for the winning presidential candidate in each state. The broad support for the anti-gay initiatives suggests the electoral capture of Gay and Lesbian Americans.

How do prosecutors behave when the state puts them in charge of solving social problems? Drawing on interviews with prosecutors in California, this article investigates the degree to which problem-oriented strategies can transform the conventional prosecutorial role. The data show that problem-oriented prosecutors regard themselves as more responsive to the communities they serve and more inclined to develop creative and broad-ranging strategies to manage deviance within these communities. But there are significant limitations to the social worker role embedded in the problem orientation. First, problem-solving approaches are most compatible with chronic, low-level criminal offenses that hold little professional allure for prosecutors, who therefore have little incentive (at least in traditional professional terms) to devote time and energy to solving them. Second, the problem-oriented model produces among prosecutors a challenging role conflict, as the skills required for effective, creative problem-solving contrast sharply with those traits that traditionally define a good prosecutor. If problem-solving strategies are to effectively take hold, therefore, the prosecutorial role must be reconceptualized and the institution of prosecution reconstituted to accommodate a wider range of attitudes and actions.

All clients are to some extent subject to their attorney's construction of their interests. This state of affairs reaches the extreme in the case of the class action because the class action permits masses of individual claims to be combined in one proceeding to promote efficiency and solve collective action problems. Class action scholars have long debated the role of class members without conclusion. The doctrine on whether and when the class member is considered a “party” to the litigation is incoherent. Neither courts nor commentators are clear on limits of the ethical duty of class counsel – does it run to individual class members or to the class as a whole? And if such a duty runs to the class as a whole, is the class an entity, like a corporation, or an aggregation of individuals each of whom is entitled to enforce class counsel's attorney–client obligations?