Research in Finance: Volume 25

It is hard to believe that I have edited 20 volumes of Research in Finance since 1985. The Series has made significant contributions to the literature by publishing many chapters on important topics in the fields of finance and economics. A total of 12 chapters in this volume represent some current research on interesting and important topics. Kane stresses the ideas that the character of a country's financial safety nets should be dynamic and its design must address differences in transparency, deterrency, and accountability that develop across time and across countries. Based upon a simple game-theoretic model, Panyagometh and Roberts show that a contingent purchase and assumption policy is the most effective choice for an acquirer of a failed bank in reducing moral hazard problems. In a subsequent chapter, Panyagometh and Roberts extend their analysis to show that a mandatory subordinated debt policy (MSDP) can be used with a contingent purchase and assumption policy to further reduce the probability of future bank failure. Chen et al. argue that it is fundamental to good corporate governance that the corporate managers must provide owners with accurate, timely, and complete disclosure of the firm's real options. O’Neill et al. use vector autoregressive models to examine the interrelationship between housing activity and general economic activity and find that the relationship has changed in some OECD countries.

This chapter explores correspondences between the costs and benefits of financial and circus safety nets. The author stresses the idea that the character of a country's net cannot be static. It must adapt promptly to changes in the market, legal, bureaucratic, and ethical problems it is intended to alleviate.

Safety nets expand over time for two reasons. First, large firms whose operations lie formally outside the net have strong incentives to make themselves too difficult for authorities to fail and unwind in crisis circumstances. Second, in good times, safety-net managers underinvest in crisis planning. As a result, crisis-generated changes in the ordering of regulatory norms dispose them to rescue firms that are difficult to fail and unwind without holding themselves closely accountable for either the costs or the distributional effects of the subsidies the rescue engenders.

Using a two bank, two-period game-theoretic model, this chapter shows that contingent purchase and assumption policy under which the choice of acquirer for a failed bank is contingent on the surviving banks’ risk-taking behavior is generally most effective in reducing moral hazard problems, particularly for countries with low levels of competition and high regulatory barriers. Moreover, we find that to minimize the probability of future bank failures, the choice of acquiring bank should be based not only on the short-term goal of resolving the insolvencies of financial institutions, but also on the long-term effects of ex ante risk-taking incentives.

This chapter extends Panyagometh and Roberts (2008) by taking into account differences in costs of closure among countries and the effects of subordinated debt on moral hazard problems. Our results show that a mandatory subordinated debt policy (MSDP) can be used with contingent purchase and assumption policy to further reduce probability of future bank failure if the high level of uninsured debt can improve the effectiveness of monitoring. While a MSDP might be appropriate for some developed countries with effective informational and supervisory environments and developed financial markets, such as the U.S., extending a MSDP into developing countries is questionable.

It is fundamental to good governance that corporate decision makers be well informed, have the knowledge-base necessary to use the information effectively, and share the same motivations as the owners. Further, managers must provide owners with accurate, timely, and complete disclosure of the company's positions. Regarding the first part of the problem, value-based incentive systems have been under development in order to aid in resolving conflicts of interest between owners who lack the specific information (or the background knowledge to utilize it) and the managers who act as their agents. Such systems often focus exclusively upon cash flows relative to resource investment; yet, share values are often substantially greater than the amount that could be explained by expected cash flows from existing operations. Indeed, in some firms the majority of share value may derive from growth opportunities or other real options that add flexibility or reduce risk. So, value-based incentive systems could be improved by explicitly rewarding actions that create or enhance the firm's real options. Further, satisfactory disclosure requires that accounting reports include adequate information about the firm's real options, with market-based mechanisms for defining the necessary information and calling it into the appropriate arena.

Housing activity is an important indicator of general economic activity, and house price movements are an important variable in international financial markets. In this chapter we utilise vector autoregressive models to examine how the interrelationship between housing activity and general economic activity has evolved in four OECD countries. Our results provide support for the hypothesis that the relationship between housing activity and general economic activity has changed in many OECD countries. For Australia, however, no such evidence was found. These results suggest that caution needs to be exercised when using previous experience to forecast both housing cycles and general economic activity.

Starting from 2003, Microsoft and many other companies have either gradually reduced or completely replaced stock options with restricted stocks in their compensation plans. This raises an interesting question: which form of compensation is better, stock or options? This chapter makes an economic comparison between the two compensation vehicles and concludes that stock is preferred to options. The backdrop of the study is dynamic asset allocation within a utility maximization framework whereby the company may go bankrupt. The incorporation of bankruptcy risk into the analysis is motivated by the recent downfalls of companies such as Enron and WorldCom.

We demonstrate that vesting requirements and bankruptcy risk can lead to significant value discounts. When the restricted stock and options have a vesting period of 5 years, and account for 50% of the total wealth, the total discount is more than 60%, out of which 20% is due to bankruptcy risk. More importantly, we find that stock is a better compensation tool than options. For a given dollar amount of grant, the higher the stock proportion, the higher the expected utility. In fact, replacing options by stock can lead to a substantial amount of cost savings for the firm, while maintaining the same level of utility for the employee. For example, when options account for 50% of the total wealth and are subsequently replaced by stock, the granting cost is reduced by about 60%. Our findings therefore provide a theoretical support for the move to stock-only style of performance compensations.

It is widely believed that contrary to standard asset allocation theory, employees irrationally hold concentrated investments in company stock in their 401(k) plans thus bearing firm-specific risk that could otherwise have been diversified away (see e.g., Benartzi, 2001). However, in measuring any such lack of diversification costs, a unique tax benefit associated with such investments (available to those who choose the Net Unrealized Appreciation (NUA) strategy) has been hitherto ignored. We analyze an employee's optimal allocation of retirement assets among alternative investments, including company stock, in the presence of the NUA tax benefit. The employee has a standard power utility function and seeks to maximize expected utility from her after-tax wealth upon retirement. Based on simulations, we find that, even when company stock is stochastically dominated by investments in the market index, the employee will allocate a non-trivial part of her retirement funds to company stock for a wide range of parameter values. Consistent with empirical evidence, the allocation to company stock is greater for employees closer to retirement and when the company's stock has experienced substantial gain in value.

In this study, we analyze the power of the individual return-to-volatility security performance heuristic (ri/stdi) to simplify the identification of securities to buy and, consequently, to form the optimal no short sales mean–variance portfolios. The heuristic ri/stdi is powerful enough to identify the long and shorts sets. This is due to the positive definiteness of the variance–covariance matrix – the key is to use the heuristic sequentially. At the investor level, the heuristic helps investors to decide what securities to consider first. At the portfolio level, the heuristic may help us find out whether it is a good idea to invest in equity to begin with. Our research may also help to integrate individual security analysis into portfolio optimization through improved security rankings.

The KOSPI 200 options at its initial stage generated a significant number of violations in no-arbitrage conditions which involve both options and the underlying index. However, when the arbitrage conditions are formed independent of the underlying index, the average size of violation is not large and few arbitrage opportunities exist. There are more frequent violations on near-maturity days, with in-the-money options and larger violation sizes during opening and closing hours. The arbitrage opportunities remain intact even after realistic transaction costs are taken into account and index futures prices are used instead of the stock index in an alternative specification.

Empirical evidence of the hedging pressure risk premium exists only in the futures contracts with delivery-related options. Since hedging pressure is supposed to exist for all futures contracts, the empirical evidence raises an interesting empirical question: whether the hedging pressure risk premium is in fact the risk premium associated with the delivery-related options. This chapter contains an empirical test of the non-redundancy between the two related but alternative sources of non-market risks. For the test, we employs a futures risk premia model in which the expected futures returns contain the market risk premium (proxied by the equity market risk premium) and two non-market risk premia (proxied by the hedging pressure effect and by the delivery risk premium reflected in the returns of futures options, respectively). Our main finding is that both the hedging pressure and the delivery risk premia are non-redundant and statistically significant for futures contracts with delivery-related options. This finding implies a substantial degree of segmentations between these futures markets and the underlying asset markets.

This chapter adopts value at risk (VaR) to analyze the hedge timing issue. Suppose that a producer, at a give time, recognizes the possible need of a futures contract for risk reduction purpose. Should the producer trade in the futures market immediately or should he wait? Conditions are characterized under which delaying the hedge decision is preferred as it produces a smaller VaR. For an efficient futures market, it appears that the producer is better off delaying the hedge decision as long as possible. However, strong backwardation promotes early hedging.

Owing to the fact that the over-the-counter (OTC) market has no organized exchange, the options traded in the OTC market are more likely to be exposed to credit risk, Asian options being one of them. In this chapter we first discuss the pricing of geometric Asian options and the Black–Scholes options model subject to credit risk. We then combine the two models to derive a closed-form formula for pricing a geometric Asian option subject to the credit risk. The numerical analysis reveals that other pricing formulae existing in the literature can cause serious pricing errors when there is a possibility of default in reality.