Advances in Taxation: Volume 20

Self-employed business owners are far less compliant in reporting and paying their taxes than wage earners (employees). Discounted utility theory suggests that people act rationally and would not be willing to prepay an upcoming obligation. Mental accounting and behavioral economics theory take a different view, asserting that taxpayers will prefer a pay-as-you-go pattern (i.e., regularity). In response to these opposing theories, we conducted a behavioral experiment to see if a taxpayer who is given the opportunity to pay estimated federal income taxes monthly (instead of quarterly) will do so, and also whether they are less delinquent than those in the control group, who paid estimated federal income taxes quarterly. Our results indicate that when respondents were explicitly offered the opportunity to make monthly rather than only quarterly payments, the majority of the respondents opted to make monthly prepayments at least once. Additionally, those with an explicit option to pay as often as monthly rather than quarterly had significantly fewer dollars of delinquency. Paying more frequently could alleviate some budgeting pressures for the self-employed and result in fewer delinquencies to be collected at the federal level.

We survey private foundations for governance factors and internal processes that help explain why they barely miss (or not) the benchmark for qualifying distributions that would save them taxes on net investment income. Private foundations are subject to a 2% tax rate on their net investment income. If qualifying distributions are above a benchmark, the foundation qualifies for a 50% reduction in the tax rate to a 1% tax rate. This tax rate structure provides a “cliff effect” where the additional distributions required to qualify for the lower tax rate may actually be less than the potential tax savings (Sansing & Yetman, 2006). For example, one foundation in our sample could have saved $15,613 in tax by paying an additional $318 in distributions. We view this situation as a clear governance failure. Our first contribution to the literature is that board interest and information system strength affect the likelihood of avoiding such a governance failure, even after controlling for the general quality of management with management compensation and professional fees. Our second contribution is that foundations without sufficient financial savvy and sophistication appear to pay higher taxes. Given the large number of small, relatively unsophisticated foundations in America, differential tax rates based on sophistication is an interesting policy debate.

This paper examines the optimal use of tax incentives relating to the Hawaii sales, use and excise tax. While many states offer exemptions to these taxes, Hawaii is the only known state that ties its excise tax credit to the depreciation method used on the state income tax return. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to use the Hawaii business tax context to illustrate the complex trade-offs and year-by-year analyses that small businesses often must employ in the presence of shifting federal tax policy that indirectly influences state tax structures because of tax coupling. Federal and Hawaii taxpayers can elect to expense depreciable property using the 179 expensing provision or to depreciate using the modified accelerated cost recovery system (MACRS). We develop a model that will help non-corporate small businesses in Hawaii determine their optimal tax cost recovery strategy: (1) Utilize Hawaii Section 179 immediate expensing on purchases of tangible personal property, or alternatively (2) Employ MACRS depreciation on these purchases combined with the Hawaii Capital Goods Excise Credit. Our modeling separately considers the possibility that the proprietor jointly makes the federal and Hawaii cost recovery decision, as well as the alternative possibility that these cost recovery decisions are made independently.

The study illustrates that the interaction of federal and state law differences exacerbated by frequent tax changes may cause significant tax compliance complexity and resulting confusion for small non-corporate business taxpayers who are generally not equipped to wrestle with such issues. From a policy perspective, states may wish to minimize complexity using coupling efforts with federal law or otherwise routinely revisit outdated state tax statutes that indirectly cause unintended tax consequences. States must be cognizant, however, that their own budget constraints may worsen if they fully couple with recent generous federal Section 179 expensing limits.

The current and widespread view in option trading is that early exercise of call options is suboptimal unless there are large dividend payments on the underlying stock (e.g., Finucane, 1997; Hull, J. C. (2008). Options, futures and other derivatives (7th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall; Poteshman & Serbin (2003)). Our study substantially refines this view by demonstrating that U.S. tax rules governing capital gain holding periods can create incentives for early exercise under certain conditions. Hence, this study adds to the factors that investors likely consider when making option exercise decisions. We further note that recent research documents early exercises in the absence of large dividends, and refers to these option exercises as “clearly irrational.” Predictions of early exercise from our tax-based model are consistent with the observed patterns of early exercise, suggesting that the criteria for denoting an option exercise as “irrational” should be refined to incorporate capital gain holding periods.

Prior research provides evidence that, when searching for information to resolve client issues, tax professionals’ search processes are subject to confirmation bias. That is, their search tends to focus on information consistent with client preferences at the expense of attending to information that is contrary to client preferences. Although tax professionals are client advocates, such confirmation bias in information search is problematic because it may lead to systematic upward bias in assessments of the evidential support for client-preferred positions and to overly aggressive recommendations. In addition to their clients, tax staff professionals are also accountable to their supervisors. Therefore, this study investigates whether staff professionals’ confirmation bias in information search is influenced by their supervisor's initial belief concerning whether the client-preferred tax position can or cannot be supported. We predict that confirmation bias will be stronger when the supervisor's belief is consistent with client preference than when it is not. We report the results of an experiment in which 83 experienced tax professionals performed a simulated research task. We manipulated the client's preferred tax position and the supervisor's initial belief in a 2×2 between-subjects design. Our results generally support our hypotheses in a case in which the client recognized a loss. However, when the client recognized a gain, the results do not support our hypotheses. We also find that measures of confirmation bias are positively associated with subordinates’ assessments of the evidential support for the client-preferred position and that evidential support assessments are positively associated with the strength of recommendations for the client-preferred position.

In the past decade several high-profile public figures have equated patriotic duty with paying taxes. We examine how patriotism influences taxpayer attitudes toward taxation. Using taxpayer subjects who participated in a Volunteer Income Tax Assistance program, we find that patriotic individuals are significantly more positive about paying taxes to support their country and are more likely to believe in the progressivity of the tax system than nonpatriotic individuals. We find no evidence that patriotic taxpayers find paying more tax overall to be patriotic. However we find strong evidence that patriotic taxpayers perceive tax evasion (tax cheating) to be unpatriotic.

This study uses county-level property tax data to assess alternative theories for government interaction in setting tax rates. Tests of the two theories, tax competition and yardstick competition, incorporate data for both mobile and immobile property. Using spatial econometrics, results show a statistically significant, positive effect of neighbor rates on local rates for mobile property, consistent with both forms of competition. However, similar statistically significant positive effects for immobile property are consistent only with yardstick competition. The results have implications for decision making in the competitive environment government authorities face.

The global economic crisis has highlighted the continuing problem of tax evasion. For tax agencies to respond, an important antecedent necessitates knowing the extent of the problem. This study is the first to comprehensively review recent research on the tax gap. Our primary contributions are twofold. First, we argue that the tax gap, as conventionally defined, is conceptually flawed because it fails to capture behavioral responses by taxpayers adequately. Our second contribution is to review methods for measuring the tax gap and compare empirical estimates. We suggest that many of the most trenchant criticisms of conventional tax gap measurement (and the “hidden economy” measures that underlie them) leave only microdata-based measures of tax noncompliance as likely to deliver more reliable tax gap estimates. Even here, however, further work is required, on both conceptual and empirical aspects, before researchers are likely to deliver tax gap estimates suitable for policy analysis (e.g., implications for enforcement policy).