Advances in Taxation: Volume 28

We experimentally investigate how the level of government (either federal or state) and whether funding is being allocated to enforcement or service efforts in a revenue agency affects trust in the agency, as well as support for the funding initiative. We find that the two independent variables interact, such that trust in the state agency is not affected by whether the proposed funding would be allocated to service or enforcement efforts. But, at the federal level (the Internal Revenue Service), trust in the agency is significantly higher when the proposed funding is to hire additional service employees as opposed to hiring additional enforcement employees. We also find that the level of government moderates the mediating effect of trust in the agency on the relation between the use of funds and support for the funding.

This paper uses two studies to examine taxpayers' knowledge of tax incentives for charitable giving and also explores the consequences of this knowledge on charitable giving decisions. The first study surveys 600 US taxpayers to establish a baseline understanding of how making a charitable contribution affects taxpayers. In the second study, we conduct an experiment with 201 US taxpayers in which we manipulate the knowledge of taxpayers by providing an educational intervention; we also measure, if, how much is donated in a hypothetical scenario under various tax deductibility conditions. The first study indicates fewer than half of participants understand the basic principles of how charitable donations affect tax liability. Our second study reveals that a short educational video is extremely effective at improving taxpayers' understanding and helping them accurately estimate the tax benefit associated with charitable giving. However, through moderated mediation analysis, we also show that participants who received this educational intervention and accurately estimated the tax benefits in turn decreased their charitable giving. We conclude that the majority of US taxpayers do not understand whether they benefit from certain deductions and may be overestimating the benefit they receive from charitable giving, resulting in giving more than they intend.

This chapter examines how public attitudes and judgments about tax fairness reflect distributive justice rules about proportionality/contributions, needs, and equality; fairness issues that influence voluntary tax compliance (Hofmann, Hoelzl, & Kirchler, 2008; Spicer & Lundstedt, 1976). Most public polls and some prior research indicate the general public considers progressive income tax rates as fairer than flat tax rates, a reflection of the Needs rule of distributive justice theory; our 1,138 participants respond similarly. However, two-thirds of our politically representative sample of the American public actually assign “fair shares” of income taxes consistently with fairness-as-proportionality above an exempt amount of income, consistent with the Contributions rule of Equity Theory. We argue experimental assignments of fair shares of income taxes can best be understood as a combination of the Needs rule, applied by exempting incomes below the poverty line from income taxation (via current standard deductions) and taxing incomes above this exempt amount at a single tax rate (i.e., a flat-rate tax) consistent with the Proportionality/Contributions rule. Viewed in combination, these two distributive justice rules explain the tax fairness judgments of 89% of our sample and indicate surprising general agreement about what constitutes a fair share of income taxes that should be paid by US citizens from the 5th percentile to the 95th percentile of the income distribution. The joint application of these fairness rules indicates how seemingly competing, partisan distributive justice concerns can inform our understanding of social attitudes about tax fairness across income classes.

In this chapter we analyze how the designation of foreign earnings as “permanently reinvested” outside the US (PRE) is related to subsequent firm growth and market returns. Prior research suggests that firms that hold excess cash in foreign markets to avoid the US corporate income tax experience lower growth, since such “trapped” cash is inefficiently invested. However, foreign earnings can be inefficiently invested in forms other than cash. We hypothesize and find that as the ratio of PRE to total assets increases, firms' growth rates decline. Our results suggest that trapped earnings, and not just trapped cash, are associated with lower growth. Because PRE have also been associated with earnings management in the literature, we further analyze the association between the use of PRE to meet or beat earnings targets and subsequent growth, observing a significant and persistent negative association. Finally, we note that the market discount for PRE, and especially for the use of PRE to manage earnings, appears to be relatively small. Our results provide support for FASB's stated plans to increase disclosure requirements surrounding the tax accrual.

Krull (2004) finds that US multinational corporations (MNCs) increase amounts designated as permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) to maximize reported after-tax earnings and meet earnings targets. We extend this research by examining the relationship between executive equity compensation and the opportunistic use of PRE by US MNCs, and the market reaction to earnings management using PRE designations. Firms use equity compensation to incentivize executives to strive for maximum shareholder wealth. One unintended consequence is that executives may engage in earnings management activities to increase their equity compensation. In this study, we examine whether the equity incentives of management are associated with an increased use of PRE. We predict and find strong evidence that the changes in PRE are positively associated with the portion of top managers' compensation that is tied to stock performance. In addition, we find this relationship to be strongest for firms that meet or beat forecasts, but only with the use of PRE to inflate income, suggesting that equity compensation incentivizes managers to opportunistically use PRE, especially to meet analyst forecasts.

Further, we provide evidence that investors react negatively to beating analysts' forecasts with the use of PRE, suggesting that investors find this behavior opportunistic and not fully convincing. This chapter makes an important contribution to what we know about the joint effects of tax policy, generally accepted accounting principles, and incentive compensation on the earnings reporting process.

This chapter evaluates the effectiveness of states' research and development (R&D, used to represent creditable research expenses) tax credits. Prior studies report mixed results on the effect of state R&D tax credit incentives. Generally, such studies consider the influence of state R&D tax credits by applying the statutory income tax and R&D credit tax rates. We reexamine the effect of a state's entire tax burden instead of the statutory tax rates in moderating the effectiveness of a state's R&D tax credit incentives. After controlling for several nontax factors, such as the workplace environment, political environment, and workforce education levels in a regression analysis during the 2010–2013 period in 50 states, we find that statewide private-sector R&D spending is a positive function of the R&D tax credit and this effect increases with the overall level of the state tax burden. We attribute this finding to the fact that high tax burdens increase the present value of the R&D tax credits.

Consumption taxes are an integral part of government revenue in countries around the world and are often subject to consumer evasion. The rapid rise of electronic commerce has exacerbated this problem as cross-border selling over the internet has enabled foreign businesses to sell and avoid collection and remittance of tax on their sales.

In this paper, we search for the solution to this problem through the analysis of three tax collection models: vendor, financial institution, and internet service provider (ISP). In addition, we examine administrative tools that enable more effective collection as well as inducements for taxpayers or collection agents to carry out their responsibility.

We conclude that the ISP collection model is not feasible at this time. On the other hand, we find that the vendor model, when supplemented with appropriate administrative tools and inducements, and the financial institution model, both represent viable options for policymakers to consider.