Studies in Law, Politics, and Society: Volume 76

Education is both a human right and an indispensable means of achieving other rights. Provision of education for irregular status migrant children tests the commitment of nation states to this basic right even as states curb irregular immigration. In the US, the right to go to school was guaranteed to irregular migrant children, by the case of Plyler v. Doe in 1982. This article argues that the right enshrined in that decision faces considerable risk of being eroded in the current political context. The article presents a detailed critical analysis of the rationale in the case, with a full consideration of the shaky constitutional framework on which the decision was based. It also examines the direct legal challenges to the right to education since Plyler, and the potential impact of new political and legal changes in contemporary times.

This article identifies children’s rights as a neglected area in citizenship literature, both in socio-legal scholarship and in British nationality case law. It analyzes reasons for this neglect and posits that there exists a dichotomy in approaches to the wellbeing of children in the UK. The characterization of children’s interests and subsequent obligations owed by states to children are different in nationality law from other areas of law, notably, family law. Through our case study of the registration of children as British citizens, we argue that in the UK formal legal membership may appear achievable “in the books” but remains elusive in “law in action.” Children’s interests should be just as central to citizenship studies and nationality case law as to family law cases. A new approach to acquisition of British citizenship by children, with the best interests of the child as a critical evaluative principle at the heart of decision making, will usher in a new era. In the absence of such reconceptualization, children remain passive subjects of nationality law and their voices are unheard in processes of acquisition of citizenship.

The aim of this paper was to explore commonalities between HIV/AIDS-related conditions, obesity and other disabling impairments as health-related barriers that limit opportunity and advancement in society and the workplace. Taking a number of examples from original fieldwork and European Union (EU) and United Kingdom (UK) law, we posited that ‘disability discrimination’ under EU law remains an indefinite, imprecise and incomplete area that requires greater alignment with the social model of disability. The principle attributes of societal discrimination towards people living with HIV and obese people are that these conditions are perceived to be primarily or in some instances, solely caused by controllable factors related often to behaviours and lifestyle choices. Strong beliefs that these conditions are controllable are perceived as a justification and in some instances encouragement for the creation of stigma and discriminative behaviours that are unjust and uninformed. The structure of the paper is as follows. First, this paper postulated how and why stigma exists towards both individuals with disabilities and also obese individuals and people living with HIV; second, reviewed the legal framework on disability discrimination in both UK and EU courts that are directly relevant to the concepts of obesity and HIV-AIDS; third, presented critical thoughts as to the extent to which emerging decisions of the Court of Justice of the EU concerning obesity and HIV-AIDS accord with the social model of disability and fourth, offered an analysis of the implications of the UK and European framework and suggested possible interventions in this area.

This article intervenes in the debate, among US disability rights advocates, about physician-assisted suicide (PAS). Through an ethnographic study, I situate this debate in the context of the dominant form of end-of-life care in the US hospice. Based on this analysis, I argue that PAS should be an issue of secondary concern to disability rights advocates, and that their primary concern, at the end-of-life, should be the improvement of US hospice care. By thus “putting the ‘right to die’ in its place,” they can achieve consensus among themselves and leverage this consensus to achieve the most substantial advancement of disability rights.

This paper examines the implications of the disability rights critique of prenatal testing on the development of genetic policy and abortion rights. It traces the reappearance of the disabled body in public deliberations over reproductive and genetic politics that use disability to frame arguments about which bodies are worthy of protection, how and why we limit reproductive choices, and what reasons women may use to terminate their pregnancies. The disability critique of prenatal testing and selective abortion finds itself in productive tension with reproductive rights politics, which increasingly features disability in both pro-life and pro-choice messages. The uneasy alliance between disability and pro-life interests has profound implications for both disability legal scholarship and the sociolegal inquiry into the role of rights articulation – and rejection – by social movements.